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Abstract 
Rwanda is seeking to address genocide and it consequences through one of the most comprehensive, 
and arguably innovative, set of transitional justice measures yet developed. This study provides a 
critical analysis of this 'Rwandan approach' to transitional justice with a focus on the key claim by 
Rwandan authorities, but often made in other contexts too, that transitional justice furthers post-
conflict reconciliation. 
The central objective is to analyse critically the implications and consequences of the 
Rwandan transitional justice programmes for reconciliation in a post-genocide society. This question 
lends itself to a twofold analysis, firstly in terms dermed by the Rwandan process itself (thUS asking 
about the implications of transitional justice for 'reconciliation' as envisaged in Rwandan 
programmes); but secondly, too, in terms of broader objectives related to reconciliation as described 
in transitional justice theory more generally. 
Following Galtung's definition of 'positive peace', I conceptualise reconciliation as the 
removal of lingering or new forms of structural and cultural violence in a post-conflict society. 
Rwanda's 'official narrative', by constrast, views reconciliation primarily as the reconfiguration of 
racial and ethnic identities within a common framework of national belonging. 
The study does not involve new primary research but is largely dependent on descriptive and 
evaluative studies of what the Rwandans are seeking to achieve. The case study is developed at three 
levels: firstly, in terms of a discussion of the national political and social context in Rwanda within 
which the transitional justice programmes operates; secondly, in terms of the official mandates of 
these institutions (which contain a specific conceptualisation of reconciliation consistent with the 
official Rwandan approach to reconciliation); and thirdly, by analysing the operational history and 
implementation of these mechanisms in terms of their goals (self-defined and broader). Throughout, 
the aim remains to generate insights regarding the often-claimed link between transitional justice 
mechanisms and reconciliation, however defined. 
Borrowing from Mamdani, a key goal of countering cultural violence is identified as 
'reconciliation with history' which entails building agreement through enabling engagement between 
opposing historical perspectives, as well as by acknowledging and including in the 'offical narrative' 
individual 'little narratives' in the form of victim and perpetrator testimonies. Additionally, building 
the rule of law is identified as a key goal of overcoming structural violence that, in post-genocide 
contexts, typically entail both impunity and 'ethnicising guilt', that is the conflation of categories that 
shaped the conflict with categories which determines victim and perpetrator identities. 
The main components of Rwanda's domestic transitional justice programme - the 'official 
narrative', national prosecutions as well as the Gacaca process - are evaluated in terms of the 
objectives developed above. This analysis produced a set of conclusions about the implications and 
consequences of transitional justice measures for reconciliation in Rwanda. The primary objects of 
the study, Rwanda's transitional justice mechanisms, remain in operation at the time of writing, 
making a conclusive judgement of their performance premature. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 1994, Rwanda suffered one of the most brutal outbreaks of violence in the twentieth 
century. Extraordinary numbers of victims perished or were mutilated, raped, looted and 
displaced. Equally extraordinary numbers of perpetrators committed these crimes. It is 
widely accepted that between 850,000 and 1,000,000 primarily Tulsis (out of an estimated 
total Rwandan population of7,700,000) lost their lives at the peak of the violence during a 
period of approximately one hundred days, whilst estimates of those involved in the killings 
vary from several hundred thousand to several million. I 
The mass killings were set in motion on 6 April 1994 when the plane belonging to the head 
of the Hutu-controlled government, President Juvenal Habyarimana, was shot down, 
triggering the onset of a systematic killing campaign targeting Tutsis as well as H utu 
individuals suspected of opposing, or not fully supporting, the genocide.' Killings were 
committed driven by radicalised Hutu elements, fIrst in the capital, Kigali, and then across 
Rwanda involving high numbers of civilian perpetrators, coinciding, in turn, with the 
invasion from Uganda of the Rwandan Patn'otic Front (RPF). 3 
See Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda en'sis: History o/a Genocide 1959-1994 (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995), 264 
for a discussion of the contestation around the number of victims who perished during the genocide. For a discussion of 
estimated numbers of perpetrators, see Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the 
Genocide in Rwondo (Cape Town: David Philip, 2001), 266; also Rene Lemarchand, 'Coming to terms with the past: The 
Politics of Memory in Post·Genocide Rwanda,' Dbservatiore de I'AJrique centrale 3, 27 (23 July 2000): 7 [ElectronicJ. 
Available at: http://membres.lycos.fr/obsac/OBSV3N27·TermswithPast,html? [March 2008J who puts the number of 
those who participated in the killings, 'either as organisers, executors, or unwilling accomplices surrendering to threats' at 
capproximately ten percent of the Hutu population of roughly 6.5 million'. This is strongly contested by the Rwandan 
rovernment, which views the number of perpetrators to be around 1,000,000. 
The terms CHutu' and 'Tutsi' has been debated voluminously. For a detailed discussion of this field, see Mamciani, 
When Victims Become Killers, I-55. He uses the terms mainly, not as self-evident ethnic/cultural or class/market-based 
categories, but as polItical categories. Similarly, I use the terms to designate mainly groupings identified as a result of 
political developments in Rwanda, rather than as ethnic/cultural or c1assmarket-based categories. 
For consistency I will refer throughout the discussion to the RPF. Strictly speaking it was the Rwandan Patriotic 
Army (RPA) which invaded Rwanda from the north. Despite President Habyarimana's softening stance towards domestic 
Tutsis, he failed to achieve a settlement with the RPF which operated as the political arm ofthe RPA. Since 1959, when a 
Hutu-dominated regime had come to power, a steady stream ofTutsi refugees and exiles congregated across the border in 
Uganda and began, gradually to organise militarily under the leadership of the RPF for a variety or reasons, some related to 
the quest to return to Rwanda, but others to political developments in Uganda. Insurgent attacks escalated into a full-scale 
civil war during the late 1980s, providing a pretext for increased repression and violence against Tutsi civilians in Rwanda. 
On 1 October 1990, the RPA attacked from their bases in Uganda. The initial attacks were successfully rebuffed, forcing 
General Paul Kagame to rebuild the RPA. By the middle of 1991, he led a 15,000·man force and controlled a strip ofland 
straddling the Uganda/Rwanda border. On 4 August 1993, the Arusha agreement - signed between President 
Habyarimana's government and the RPF - provided for a future Broad Based Transitional Government, a National 
Transitional Assembly, united armed forces and a range of other measures designed (0 further democracy and power-
sharing; see Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 191 f. However, the war contmued with waves of attacks, and lasted until June 1994 
when Kagame (Ook over Kigali, thereby bringing an end to the raging genocide. 
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In the days and weeks that followed, genocide and war unfolded together. The RPF 
conquered Kigali on 4 July, forcing the ruling Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour Ie 
Developpement (et la Democratie) [MRND (D)] to flee to Zaire. The war officially ended on 16 
July, but the mass killings only gradually fizzled out in the months thereafter, continuing 
largely as a result of displaced Rwandans moving across the border into the Democratic 
Republic of Congo's Kivu provinces in one way or the other until today. In and beyond 
Rwanda, the sequence of events during 1994 became known simply as 'the genocide'. 
After winning military control of the capital and stabilising the country, the political arm of 
the RP A, the largely Tutsi-dominated RPF, embarked on a systematic project of rebuilding 
the country from the ruins of genocide and war. One of their first steps upon taking power 
was to arrest more than 120,000 perpetrators accused of varying degrees of guilt and 
complicity in the mass killings. Subsequent rebuilding efforts, now in their fifteenth year, 
have produced notable successes: reorganising the state, achieving economic growth and 
enhancing development opportunities, not least for rural women. 
This period, however, has also been characterised by a umque approach to transitional 
justice programmes of unprecedented scope and variety, allied to a lack of democratic 
reform and political power-sharing. 
1.1. The Central Question 
This study aims to provide a critical investigation of the Rwandan approach to transitional 
justice, based on a selective review of the literature. The study does not seek to address the 
causes of the genocide (a topic that has received substantial attention in the literature) but 
rather to focus on the post-genodde period, and more specifically on the Rwandan approach 
to transitional justice. Transitional justice has been an important priority of the government-
driven rebuilding programme in Rwanda. Significantly, the Rwandan approach to 
transitional justice differs from the internationally prevailing approaches in important 
respects. 
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Transitional justice4 may be understood in three distinct, but related ways: 1) with reference 
to the different practices and processes in which transitional or post-conflict societies 'deal 
with the past of political atrocities'; 2) with reference to the normative and other debates and 
discourses about the assumptions, mechanisms and objectives of such practices and processes 
for dealing with past political atrocities; and 3) in terms of the new field or sub-fields of 
empirical and comparative research about the various cases, processes and practices dealing with 
past political atrocities. 
The term thus refers, firstly, to the various methods, practices and processes by which 
different post-conflict or transitional societies deal with past political atrocities in order to 
achieve some measure of accountability for these crimes as well as social reconciliation 
and/ or democratic consolidation.5 Transitional justice is differentiated from more routine 
and regular ways of dealing with the past in stable societies by a special concern with past 
political atrocities within the context of the particular challenges posed to justice during 
times of political transition, or in the aftermath of major civil conflicts. Consequently, the 
scope, intensity and legacies of past political atrocities, together with the fragile conditions of 
transitional and post-conflict societies, combine to shape the specific characteristics of 
transitional justice processes and mechanisms. 
The generic concept 'dealing with the past' encompasses a diverse range of interventions 
addressing past atrocities in ways that seek to promote goals such as reconciliation and 
democracy.6 Interventions associated with a transitional justice agenda typically include 
bringing past political perpetrators to book through criminal prosecution and punishment, 
vetting and lustration, structured processes of public truth-telling, production of publicly 
accessible archives about past political crimes or public apologies and other formal 
opportunities for reconciliation between former political and military opponents, as well as 
For a recent, provocative analysis of transitional justice as 'non-field', see Christine Bell, 'Transitional Justice, 
Interdisciplinarity and the State of the "Field" or "Non· Field, '" The International Journal o/Transitional Justice 3,1 (2009): 5-
28. See also Paige Arthur, 'How "Transitions" Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,' 
Human Rights Quarterly 31, 2 (May 2009): 321-367. 
5 See Andrew Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation - After the Violence (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Riener, 200 1), 1-14; see 
also Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004; 
Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Juan E. Mendez, 'Accountability for Past 
Abuses,' Human Rights Quarterly 19 (1997): 255. 
6 This phrase has come to selVe as the accepted shorthand for 'dealing with past atrocities', 'crimes against 
humanity' or 'gross human rights abuses'. 'Dealing with the past' could of course apply to all sorts of other cases from 
making antiquarian collections or writing memoirs to archival research and the heritage industry. But in the context of 
transitional justice, it is the more distinctive meaning of dealing with past political atrocities or gross violations of human 
rights that is at stake. 
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reparations for victims. 7 On the other hand, countries such as Spain encouraged citizens to 
forget the past through what Rigby calls a 'pact with oblivion'.8 This set of distinctive 
practices and associated discourses of 'dealing with the past (of political atrocities)' includes 
the particular transitional justice approach taken by the RPF regime in Rwanda in dealing 
with the aftermath of the genocide in 1994, which will be a main object of investigation for 
this study. These include ambitious, if largely unsuccessful, attempts to prosecute alleged 
genocide perpetrators during the first five years after the RPF came to power, an evolving 
legal framework to enable a more nuanced and realistic prosecutions programme in later 
years, coupled with an extensive, national community court system called Gacaca, operating 
in tandem with the national courts. 
The domestic approach to transitional justice by the RPF regime is not the only transitional 
justice measure implemented in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. Alongside the 
RPF-driven programmes, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) operating 
from Arusha, was tasked to prosecute the leadership of the previous regime responsible for 
the genocide. In addition, various efforts to establish international justice in relation to the 
Rwandan case have been undertaken in line with the principle of 'universal jurisdiction'. 
Based on this notion, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Finland, Canada and the Netherlands 
began judicial procedures against genocide suspects from Rwanda. Such cases are founded 
on the principles of international human rights law informing the 1948 Genocide 
Convention: 'that certain crimes are of such gravity that no person or entity that committed 
them enjoys immunity and their punishment is the responsibility of the whole international 
community': Although significant for the development of international human rights law, 
the impact of these international interventions on Rwandan society is indirect and slight. 
They are also based on different assumptions, principles and objectives than the domestic 
Rwandan approach to transitional justice, which is the object of investigation of this thesis. 
See Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Fonner Regimes, Volumes I-Ill 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995); Luc Huyse, 'Justice After Transition: On the Choices Successor 
Elites Make in Dealing With the Past,' Law & Social Inquiry 20 (1995): 51-78; Lue Huyse, ed., Traditional Justice and 
Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: Leamingfrom African Experiences (Stockholm: Idea International, 2008); Claus OlTe, 
jDisqualification, Retribution, Restitution: Dilemmas of Justice in Post-Communist Societies,' Journal of Political Philosophy 
I (1993): 17-44. 
8 Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation, 2. 
Barbara Oomen, 'Justice Mechanisms and the Question of Legitimacy - The Example of Rwanda's Multi.layered 
Justice Mechanisms,' (Paper presented at conference entitled: Building a Future on Peace and Justice, Nuremberg, Germany, 
June 2007): 19. See also Luc Reydams, 'The ICTR Ten Years On: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm?' Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 3 (2005): 977-88. 
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Accordingly, this thesis will not consider the ICTR or other international interventions in 
Rwandan transitional justice. 10 
Secondly (at the level of a literature about the processes and practices described above), 
transitional justice refers to normative discourses and debates about what ought to constitute 
the aims of measures and mechanisms for dealing with past political atrocities. 11 How and 
for what purpose transitional justice initiatives should, or should not, be undertaken, how 
they can be justified or on what grounds they can be criticised or should be opposed and 
how they contribute to outcomes such as justice or peace, are the subjects of ongoing 
normative debates on transitional justice. 
Normative engagements of this kind range from ad hoc polemics and partisan controversies 
to more objective reports and commentaries, grounded justifications and sustained analyses. 
In so far as actual transitional justice processes and practices involve written outputs (e.g. the 
proceedings of tribunals or truth commissions), this may be closely associated with related 
normative discourses and debates about these interventions. However, while the former 
functions as an integral part of the practice of transitional justice itself, the latter is a 
secondary enterprise reflected in the literature regarding this practice. 
Thirdly, the term 'transitional justice' can also refer to the new and burgeoning field or sub-
fields of empirical and comparative research about the various cases, processes and practices 
dealing with past political atrocities. Transitional justice approaches in the first sense are 
thus the object of investigation of the field of transitional justice in this third sense, which may 
also critically challenge key assumptions and conclusions of normative approaches to 
transitional justice in the second sense. While normatively it is claimed that making 
perpetrators accountable for their past atrocities will serve to prevent the recurrence of 
political violence and atrocities in future (as against counter normative claims for the 
superior virtues of forgiveness and reconciliation), empirical investigation sets out to 
determine the actual (possibly unintended) consequences of both scenarios. Empirical 
investigations of various kinds have led to an interdisciplinary literature including 
10 We will also not engage with the complications attached to the role of countries such as France, Germany and 
Belgium, not only as former colonial powers, but also as a result of perceptions in Rwanda about the role of these countries 
during the genocide. For a discussion in this vein, see Gomen, 'Justice Mechanisms,' 19. 
II Neil Kritz, 'Where We Are and How We Got Here: An Overview of Developments in Search for Justice and 
Reconciliation, I in The Legacy of Abuse: Confronting the Past, Facing the Future, ed. Alice H. Henklin (New York: Aspen 
Institute, New York University School of Law, 2002). 21-45. 
10 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
comparative and theoretical analyses of case studies and global trends." As such, this sub-
field of empirical and comparative research of transitional justice is closely related to another 
sub-field, namely that concerned with democratic transitions. The comparative study of 
transitions from authoritarian rule, which came to be known as 'transitology', includes 
much material and discussions relevant to transitional justice, though that is not a main 
concern. 13 
Distinguishing between different senses of transitional justice - firstly as a practice, secondly 
as normative discourses and debates in the literature on this practice, and thirdly as empirical 
investigations a/this practice - is meant to clarify the relation between Rwandan transitional 
justice as the object of this investigation and the different kinds of literature on Rwandan 
transitional justice. These distinctions also aim to clarify the status of this study in relation to 
the various senses of transitional justice differentiated above. Much of the literature on this 
process has a notably normative orientation, ranging from the human rights activism 
informing reports generated by non-governmental organisations such as Human Rights 
Watch or Amnesty International, through publications geared to policy debates on the issues 
of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect confronting the international 
community, to the more general project of establishing and consolidating international 
human rights law and a human rights culture. 14 
In contrast to this literature, my aim is to provide an account and analysis of the Rwandan 
transitional justice approach in the first sense of its actual practice, objectives and 
consequences. As such, this investigation accepts that the nature and objectives of the 
Rwandan practice of transitional justice may differ significantly from more familiar notions 
of transitional justice in the normative literature. At the same time, this study, as a critical 
analysis, is itself rooted in certain normative conceptions of transitional justice, the rule of 
law and democracy, which will be further explained in the subsequent conceptualisations of 
12 A recent development is the launch of the International Journal a/Transitional Justice in 2007. See, c.g., Stover and 
Weinstein, My Neighbor, My Enemy; Beil, 'The ICTR Ten Years On,' 9; also Carlos Santiago Nino, Radical Evil on Trial 
(New York: Yale University Press, 1996); and Elster, Closing the Books; Richard Wilson, The Politics o/Troth and 
Reconciliation -Legitimizing the Post-Apaltheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Mamdani, When 
Victims become Killers. See also Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter & Audrey Chapman, eds., Assessing the Impacl of 
Transitional Justice: Challengesfor Empin'cal Research (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009). 
13 The seminal works were Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitionsfrom 
Authoritarian Rule: TentativeCondusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baitimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1986) and Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
14 For a more detailed discussion of these types of publications , please see Chapter 2. 
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reconciliation and the rule of law following below. This study therefore engages with both 
the first and second senses of transitional justice, namely an analysis of the actual practices 
and processes of transitional justice as these occur in Rwanda, but through a critical 
perspective on the Rwandan case informed by more general normative considerations. The 
discussion is not primarily a contribution to the empirical research and comparative analysis 
of different cases as described in the third sense of transitional justice above. 
While the focus of this study will be on transitional justice as it appears in Rwanda, the 
discussion is organised around a specific theme in the literature on the subject, namely, with 
transitional justice as a means to promote reconciliation, more akin to the restorative justice 
approach than that of the retributive justice approach." As such this reflects a more general 
normative conception of transitional justice itself. On this view, bringing victims and 
perpetrators of human rights violations together within a structured process of truth-teIling, 
including apologies and reparations to victims, has the potential to obviate or quell the 
motivation for revenge after conflict. In the Rwandan case, too, transitional justice measures 
and institutions have been officially mandated to promote reconciliation, though it cannot 
be assumed that the thrust of this mandate is identical with more general normative 
conceptions of transitional justice. Part of the investigation will be to ascertain precisely the 
particular objectives and justifications of the Rwandan approach to transitional justice in 
relation to more general normative conceptions. 
My central aIm IS therefore to identify some of the assumptions and implications of 
Rwanda's transitional justice programmes in the official quest for post-conflict national 
reconciliation, and then to analyse these processes critically, in terms of my own conceptual 
and normative framework of transitional justice and reconciliation. 
1.2. Reconciliation as building 'Positive Peace' 
At this point it is important to conceptualise 'reconciliation' more precisely. 'Reconciliation' 
IS a key term in transitional justice, but with different and contested meanings. In post-
15 See Rigby, Justice and Reconciliation; Charles Villa-Vicencio, Walk with us, but listen - Political Reconciliation in Africa 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, forthcoming 2010); Wilson, The Politics oJTruth and Reconciliation; Lyn 
Graybill, Truth and Reconct1iation in South Afn'ca - Miracle or Model? (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2002); David 
Bloomfield, Teresa Barnes and Luc Huyse, eds., Reconciliation After Violent Conflict (Stockholm: Idea International, 2003); 
David Bloomfield, 'On Good Terms - Clarifying Reconciliation,' BerghofReport 14 (Berlin: BerghofResearch Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management, October 2006); Hugo van der Merwe, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
Community Reconciliation: An AnalYSis o/Competing Strategies and Conceptualizations (Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason 
University, 1999). 
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conflict contexts, 'reconciliation' may refer to various stages of conflict resolution ranging 
from 'negative peace' to 'positive peace', a key distinction first introduced by Johan 
Galtung. 16 Similarly in a political sense 'reconciliation' may stretch from the quest to fmd a 
minimal modus vivendi for former enemies sharing the same territory to more active 
programmes of communal reintegration and nation-building. I) For our purposes, though, 
Gaitung's notion of 'positive peace' may assist in framing 'reconciliation' as a central 
concern of transitional justice. 
While Galtung's basic distinction between 'negative' and 'positive peace' has been widely 
accepted both in the peace studies movement and more widely in the conflict resolution 
literature, it has proved much more difficult to reach any kind of agreement on the more 
specific meaning of 'positive peace'. Galtung himself defined 'positive peace' in terms of 
another controversial distinction, that between 'structural violence' and 'cultural violence'. 
According to Galtung 'positive peace' entails the removal of both 'structural' and 'cultural' 
violence as the main underlying causes of internal war. I ' 'Structural violence' concerns the 
way power is organised in society in ways so as to inflict 'avoidable insults to basic human 
needs, and more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is 
potentially possible' .19 
'Cultural violence', by contrast, refers to any aspect of culture that can be used to justify 
violence, either directly or structurally'O 'Cultural violence makes direct and structural 
violence look, even feel, right - or at least not wrong', writes Galtung. 'Cultural violence' 
16 Jahan Galtung described negative peace as the absence of direct, personal violence, most often achieved through 
the cessation of hostilities in the wake of military victory or negotiated settlements. Positive peace represents the removal of 
the main underlying causes of war. See Johan Galtung, 'Three Approaches to Peace: Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping and 
Peacemaking,' in Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975): 282-304. For a 
more recent adaptation, see Rama Mani, Beyond Retdbution, Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War (Oxford: Polity Press, 
2002),12,13. It needs to be noted that Galtung's formulations of 'positive peace' and 'structural violence' date back some 
fifty years. A range of innovations on, and criticisms of, Galtung's position exists; see, for example, Kenneth Boulding 
'Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung,' Journal of Peace Research 14, I (March 1977): 75-86. Galtung himself, too, 
later revisited his own writing in Johan Galtung, 'Twenty.five years of peace research: Ten Challenges and Some 
Responses,' Journal of Peace Research 22, 2 (June 1985): 141-158 and in Johan Gal tung, 'After Violence, Reconstruction, 
Reconciliation, and Resolution: Coping with Visible and Invisible Effects of War and Violence,' in Reconciliation, Justice, 
and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, ed. Mohammed Abu-Nimer (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 3-23. At the same 
time it is important to note that specific connotations of 'positive peace' are far from settled. The notion of 'structural 
violence', too, is contested. It has consistently been criticised as incoherent and/or ideologically loaded. So, while invoking 
these notions and adapting them for my own purposes, 1 am not thereby buying into Galtung's full theoretical scheme 
and/or the normative approach characteristic of the 'peace studies' movement. 
17 Harvey and Weinstein, My Neighbor, My Enemy, 2f. 
18 Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence,' Journal of Peace Research 27,3 (1990): 297. 
19 Galtung, 'Cultural Violence,' 292. 
20 Galtung, 'Cultural Violence,' 291-305 
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involves 'those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence .. , that can be used to 
justify or legitimise direct or structural violence.'21 
Galtung differentiates between the different types of violence thus: 'Direct violence is an 
event; structural violence is a process with ups and downs; cultural violence is an invariant, 
a "permanence", remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow 
transformations of basic culture .. .'22 Galtung describes direct violence 'as direct cruelty 
perpetrated by human beings against each other and against other forms of life and nature in 
general' .23 Cultural violence is a 'substratum from which the other two can derive their 
nutrients' .24 By contrast, patterns of structural violence vary over time. Generally, Galtung 
claims, there is a causal relation from cultural via structural to direct violence.2' 
In terms of this analysis, the Rwandan genocide itself would fust and foremost count as 
'direct violence'. But to what would 'structural violence' and 'cultural violence' refer in both 
the pre- and post-genocide Rwandan contexts? In general terms, 'structural violence' in the 
Rwandan context may refer to the ways in which power was organised so as to issue in both 
localised incidents of direct violence as well as eventually in the genocide itself. 'Cultural 
violence' would refer to those aspects of culture or symbolic resources available to motivate 
and justify direct violence, including the genocide. Taken together, they can provide an 
analytical framework in which reconciliation sought by transitional justice may be 
understood by analogy with Galtung's definition of 'positive peace'. 
Reconciliation thus may be conceptualised as creating conditions for the removal of violence 
in its various forms, especially 'structural' and 'cultural violence' .26 Whether or not 
reconciliation achieves this double aim can potentially be judged at two levels: fustly, by 
judging Rwanda's transitional justice processes against their own criteria, and, secondly, by 
postulating a different set of criteria derived from broader normative discourses. In the first 
instance, the Rwandan transitional justice processes are judged against the benchmark of 
reconciliation defined in Rwandan terms. In the second case, they are evaluated against 
21 Galtung, 'Cultural Violence,' 291. 
22 Galtung, 'Cultural Violence,' 294, 295. 
2) Gaitung, 'Cultural Violence, I 295. 
24 Galtung, 'Cultural Violence/ 295. 
25 Galtung, 'Cultural Violence,' 295. 
26 Ironically. this definition of positive peace expands and in some ways counters Galtung's own definition of the 
term, which, like many others, tends to over-individualise reconciliation when he states that it involves 'the process of 
healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the bad relation'; see Galtung, 
'After Violence,' 3. 
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reconciliation defined more broadly with reference to requirements associated with human 
rights, the rule oflaw and democratisation. 
With regard to the first mode of evaluation against Rwanda's own goals for reconciliation, 
the guiding question becomes: to what extent do Rwanda's transitional justice mechanisms 
promote their stated objective of reconciliation as the reconfiguration of previous racial and 
ethnic categories in an official project of nation-building? With regard to the second mode of 
evaluation, the question is to what extent these transitional justice mechanisms promote 
reconciliation - understood as the removal of both structural and cultural violence as 
underlying causes. 
1.3. Research Design 
The central research question of this thesis is to what extent, and in which ways, Rwandan 
transitional justice programmes have contributed or could contribute to reconciliation in the 
post-genocide Rwandan society. This question lends itself to a twofold evaluation, firstly in 
terms defined by the Rwandan process itself (thus asking whether transitional justice could 
promote 'Rwandanicity' or national belonging as envisaged in Rwandan programmes); but 
secondly, too, in terms of objectives related to reconciliation as they appear in broader 
transitional justice debates. Already, I have claimed that reconciliation includes the removal 
of forms of structural violence, specifically through the law (so as to help inaugurate the rule 
of law after periods of mass violence and/or political oppression), as well as forms of 
cultural violence, specifically in relation to how history functions within the new 
dispensation (so as to ensure adequate inclusion of conflicting views as well as grass-roots 
perspectives). 
To generate the best results in this regard, this case study is developed at three levels: firstly, 
in terms of a discussion of the national political and social context in Rwanda within which 
the transitional justice programmes are required to operate; secondly, in terms of the official 
mandates of these institutions (which contain a specific conceptualisation of reconciliation 
consistent with the official Rwandan approach to reconciliation); and thirdly, by analysing 
the operational history and implementation of these mechanisms in terms of their goals (se1f-
defined and broader). Throughout, the aim remains to generate insights regarding the often-
claimed link between transitional justice mechanisms and reconciliation, however defined. 
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The main source of information for this study is a growing body of literature seeking to 
evaluate the Rwandan post-genocide reconstruction process in various ways. One such angle 
of critique emanates from transitional justice literature, and runs, broadly speaking, along 
the lines of the three types of transitional justice discourses identified earlier in this chapter, 
namely, as descriptive analyses of the actual operations, as normative debates about what 
the Rwandans ought to achieve and as comparative, empirical studies seeking to find ways 
to measure the impact of these processes in relation to other transitional justice case studies. 
Given the dearth of the last type of study, my discussion is largely dependent for its 
information on studies of the previous two types. 
In focusing on structural and cultural violence, respectively, my aim is to develop a more 
precise set of criteria, over and above the benchmarks put forward by the Rwandan 
authorities themselves, of what ought to constitute the aims of a transitional justice 
programme that seeks to promote reconciliation in the aftermath of genocide. This is done, 
in each case, against the backdrop of an analysis of both the specific features of the Rwandan 
context - both culturally/historically and structurally/legally. 
National genocide prosecutions as well as the Gacaca processes, the main components of 
Rwanda's domestic transitional justice programme, are evaluated in terms of the objectives 
developed above, those related, on the one hand, to the removal of cultural violence (in 
ways that history is handled), and, on the other hand, the removal of structural violence (in 
ways that the rule oflaw is applied). 
This enables me to produce a set of provisional conclusions as to whether or not, and in 
what ways, transitional justice can, or cannot, contribute to reconciliation in Rwanda. 
The study has two important limitations: firstly, this discussion contains relatively little fresh 
empirical study, but rather utilises what has already been recorded. Published data is 
augmented by informal observations of the author, obtained during regular visits to Rwanda 
over the past four years. 
16 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Secondly, the primary objects of the study, Rwanda's transitional justice mechanisms, 
remain in operation at the time of writing, making a conclusive judgement of their 
performance impossible. Throughout the discussion, therefore, I refer to actual as well as 
potential consequences of the transitional justice processes. 
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Chapter 2: Rwanda as Transitional Justice Case Study 
The Rwandan genocide has been called 'Africa's Holocaust'.! There is a growing consensus 
in the literature that around 10 percent of Rwanda's population died in 1994, that hundreds 
of thousands more were injured or raped and that about three million people were 
displaced. 2 This chapter selectively surveys the corpus of studies on Rwanda after 1994 and 
positions this investigation in relation to that. 
On 7 April 1994, the day after President Habyarimana's plane was shot down, agents of the 
Habyarimana government and armed forces, with the help of the Presidential Guard and the 
interahamwe (unemployed youth organised in a military wing of the ruling party), began 
killing 'the enemy' in Kigali, systematically hunting down and killing those listed as targets. 
The first victims included prominent Tutsi politicians and civil society leaders, as well as a 
number of moderate Hutus accused of being RPF accomplices.) 
Over the next weeks, international bodies debated whether the killings constituted 
'genocide', not least because declaring the killings as 'genocide' would impose a duty on 
State Parties 'to prevent and punish' the killings.4 The UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Cn'me of Genocide was approved by the United Nations General Assembly 
on 9 December 1948. It entered into force on 12 January 195!.' As this debate whether the 
Rwandan killings constituted genocide continued, the killings expanded beyond the capital, 
Kigali. Well organised, relying on Rwanda's efficient local government structures as well as 
on an established culture of enforced public service, and fomented by the fear of a return to 
Tutsi rule generated by war with the RPF, as well as by years of strident racist anti -Tutsi 
propaganda, local leaders enlisted the help of civilians at every level of society to help kill as 
many Tutsis as possible. Collaboration with the killers occurred at different levels of 
For a comparative analysis of the Rwandan genocide and the Nazi Holocaust, see Nigel Eltringham, Accounting 
for Horror- Post-Genocide Debotes in Rwanda (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 51-69. 
2 For a discussion of the various claims, see Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Cdsis, 263-265. 
Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 182. 
Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil; The Failure o/Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: Random House, 2003); 
See also Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Roko/the West in Rwanda's Genocide (New York: Zed Books, 2000). See also 
the UN's own report: I. Carlson and H. Sung-Joo and R. Kupolati, Report o/the Independent Inquiry into the Actionso/the 
United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda (New York: United Nations, 1999). 
, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260A (Ill) (9 December 1948) [Electronic]. Available: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu3/b/p genoci htm Z007 [June Z007]. Genocide accused are to be tried either in the 
State where the crime was committed or 'by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction'. 
18 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
complicity, from that of passive bystanders to passing on information or looting, to that of 
assisting killers in terms oflogistics and provisions, as well as with the physical killing. 
The combination of genocide and war initiated by the invading RPF, which eventually 
succeeded in deposing the incumbent MRND (D), left Rwanda in ruins. Apart from those 
killed, a further 30 percent of the population fled into exile. Property and infrastructure, such 
as homes, water and electricity supply and roads, were destroyed. The judicial system was 
decimated. Bodies were lying everywhere and thousands of women became pregnant 
following rape. Massive migration, national instability and the cessation of all formal 
economic activity were further challenges to the new regime: 
Following initial eyewitness reports ofthe devastation, a steady stream of publications began 
to emerge about the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. For the purposes of this analysis, 
these publications can be divided into three main types: 
2.1. Type 1: Descriptive: 'This is Genocide!' 
The first type of publication is essentially descriptive of the extraordinary nature and extent 
of the political atrocities. These studies, broadly speaking, contain two kinds of information: 
on the one hand, statistical and factual reporting outlining the extent of the violence (often 
including attempts to establish the numbers of those killed, violated or displaced), and, on 
the other hand, detailed and graphic narrations of specific episodes of violence. The latter 
were often personalised accounts, organised around events and personalities. Analytical 
comments tended to be added largely as an afterthought. 
More specifically we can distinguish two types of descriptive publications that began to 
appear as early as May 1994, namely, formal reports seeking to categorise the killings as 
'genocide' as well as more journalistic and/or impressionistic accounts of the atrocities. The 
first type refers to field reports by human rights agencies as well as to United Nations (UN) 
briefs and communiques into which the term 'genocide' was gradually introduced. 7 In this 
6 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Infonn You that Tomorrow We will be Killed with Our Families - Storiesfrom Rwanda 
(London: Picador, 1998), 229, 230. 
7 United Nations (UN), 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/16, (7 April 
1994), [Electronic]. Hereafter UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/16. Available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.orgidoc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/170/30/PDF IN9417030.pdf70penElement [January 2008]; UN, 
'Statement by the President ofthe Security Council', UN Doc. S/PRST/1994121, (30 Apri11994) [Electronic]. Hereafter 
UN Doc. S/PRST 11994/21. Available at: 
hUp;1 Idaccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N941 199/86/PDF IN9419986.pdf70penElement [January 2008]; UN, 
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regard, it needs to be noted that 'genocide' is a technical term with major implications in 
international law and politics.8 The emphasis, particularly soon after the event, was to 
ascertain whether what had happened was 'mere' mass killing, or indeed qualified as 
'genocide,.9 Initial UN reports were followed by more extensive human rights reports, most 
notably Alison Des Forges's Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. 1O A major 
contribution of this body of literature was that it brought the Rwandan atrocities to 
international prominence as genocide. A large number of books were subsequently published 
adopting a more journalistic and/or impressionistic approach, but with broadly the same 
objective as the reports cited above, namely, to underscore the Rwandan experience as 
'genocide'. This type of descriptive publication, whether historical or journalistic, typically 
sought to impress on the reader the brutality of the Rwandan events of April 1994 through 
vivid details, narratives and anecdotes. II 
'Special Report ofthe Secretary.General on UNAMIR' UN Doc. S/1994/470 (20 April 1994) [ElectronicJ. Hereafter UN 
Doc. S/1994/470. Available at: 
http;1 I daccessdds. un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN IN941 IS6170/PDF !N94lS670.pdflOpenElement [January 200SJ; UN, 
'Report of the Secretary·General on the situation in Rwanda' UN Doc. S/1994/640 (31 May 1994) [ElectronicJ. Hereafter 
UN Doc. S/19941640. Available at: 
http;1 I daccessdds un.orgl doc/UNDOC/GEN IN9412341 I2IIMG!N9423412. pdflOpenElement [January 200SJ; 
UN, 'Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Jose Ayala Lasso, on his Mission to 
Rwanda of 11-12 May 1994', UN Doc. E/CN.4/S·3/3 (19 May 1994) [ElectronicJ. Hereafter UN Doc. E/CN.4IS·3/3. 
Available at: http·lldocuments·dds·ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN IG941 127/22/pdf/G9412722 pdflOpenElement 
[January 200SJ; 
UN, 'Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni·Segui, Special Rapporteur ofthe 
Commission on Human Rights', UN Doc. E/CN.4/199517 (2S June 1994) [ElectronicJ. Hereafter UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/199517. Available at; 
http;1 Idaccessdds. un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN IG941 131 147/PDF IG9413147,pdflOpenElement [January 200SJ; UN, 
'Security Council Resolution 935', UN Doc. S/RES/935 (I July 1994) [ElectronicJ. Hereafter UN Doc. S/RES/935. 
Available at: http;1 I daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOCIGEN IN94/273/51 IPDF IN9427351.pdflOpenElement [January 
200SJ. 
g The Genocide Convention, mirrored in the Rome Treaty, defines victims of genocide as those affected by 'acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such ... ' More 
specifically this formal definition of 'genocide' includes 'killing members of the group, causing bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part, imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferring 
children ofthe group to another group.' See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260A (III) (9 December 1945) 
[ElectronicJ. Available: http;1 Iwww.unhchr.ch/htmllmenu3/b/pgenoci.htm 2007, [June 2007J. Available at: 
http;1 Iwww.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlaU/genevaconventions [June 2007J. 
9 For example see: S. Kiley, 'I saw hills covered with bodies resembling lawns of flesh', The Times, 14 May 1994, 
10 Alison Des Forges for Human Rights Watch (HRW), 'Leave None to teU the Story - Genocide in Rwanda', 
(March I, 1999). No Page Numbers. [ElectronicJ. Available at: http'llwww.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1999/rwanda/ 
[January 200SJ; HRW, 'Genocide in Rwanda', 6,4 (May I, 1994) [ElectronicJ. Available at: 
http'llwww,hrw org/sites/defayltlfilcs/reports/RWANDA945,PDF [January 2009J; African Rights (AR), 'Rwanda. 
Death, Despair and Defiance' (London; Revised Edition 1995); AR, 'Rwanda; Broken Bodies, Torn Spirits. Living with 
Genocide, Rape and HIV I AIDS' (April 2004) [ElectronicJ. Available at; 
http'l Iweb.archive.org/web/20060S2311 1235/www ,a[ricanrights. org/publications/BrokenBQdies404,pdf [January 200SJ; 
Amnesty International (AI), 'Rwanda: Reports of Killings and Abductions by the Rwandese Patriotic Army, April-
August 1994', (October 1994) [ElectronicJ. Available at 
hltp: I Iwww&!!!!!WYl!sa.org/documentJlhp?lang=e&id-F A398E IS0777FOD6S02569A6006055AF [January 200SJ. 
]1 See Prunier, The Rwanda en'siS', Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You~ Scott Peterson, Me Against My Brother -At War 
in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda (New York: Routledge, 2001); Jean Hatzfeld, Into the Quick of Life- The Rwandan Genocide: 
The Survivors Speak, trans, Gery Feehily (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2000); Gil Courtemanche, A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali 
trans. Patricia Claxton, (Toronto: Alfred A, Knopf, 2003)~ Fergal Keane, Season 0/ Blood (N ew York: Penguin Viking, 
1995); Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder - The Rwandan Genocide (London: Verso, 2004); Elizabeth Neuffer, The Key to 
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Some of the more journalistic accounts in particular have been criticised for presenting the 
violence in voyeuristic and superficial fashion - even of serving to reinforce stereotypical 
perceptions of African societies as inherently 'tribal' or 'primitive'." Taken together with the 
prominence given to the notion of 'genocide', an unintended outcome of the descriptive 
genre was the impression that the Rwandan violence amounted to another typical example 
of entrenched hatred. The extraordinarily high numbers of perpetrators further suggested 
that the Rwandan genocide was committed in the name of blind ethnic hatred. Implicitly 
these descriptions implied a particular explanation of the genocide, i.e. that the genocide was 
the result of 'primordial bloodlust' - rather than a modern, premeditated, well-organised 
attempt to annihilate Tutsi. 13 
2.2. Type 2: Analytical: 'How could this happen?' 
A second type of study, distinct from the descriptive genre, is analytical, explanatory and 
largely thematic. These studies typically relate the Rwandan genocide to more general 
explanations of the causes of wars typically associated with African conflict. 14 One factor 
that has frequently been invoked in this context, also to help 'explain' the Rwandan 
genocide, is that of ethnicity. 15 
It can hardly be disputed that the genocide was conducted in the name of ethnicity. However 
the precise manner in which ethnic identities contributed to genocide has been a matter of 
My Ne;ghbor's House- Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda (New York: Picador, 2001); and Rosamond Carr, LAnd ala 
Thousand Hills: My Lifo in Rwanda (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1999). 
12 See Eltringham, Accountingfor Horror, 63-65 where he lists headlines describing the Rwandan killings as 'pure 
tribal enmity', 'tribal bloodlust' and 'tribal carnage' and in the London Times as 'tribal slaughter' and tribal carnage'. Words 
such as 'savagery' and 'frenzy' were often used, too, He also notes that The Economist editorialised in 2000 that 'brutality, 
despotism and corruption exist everywhere - but African societies, for reasons buried in their culture, seem especially 
susceptible to them'. For a broader, but related, discussion on the 'seductiveness of moral disgust', see Michael Ignatieff, 
The Warrior's Honor-Ethnic War and the Modem Conscience (New York: Henry Holt, 1998), 72-109. 
13 Eltringham, Accountingfor Horror, 64. 
14 The phenomenon of 'ethnic war' and its links to 'genocide' has produced volumes of studies trying to explain the 
proliferation of intrastate ethnic wars (defined as conflict with at least 1000 casualties per year and at least 100 on each side) 
since the Second World War. Fearon and Laitin, for example, claim that since the Second World War there have been 122 
conflicts that fit their definition of civil wars, of which 73 were fought along ethnic lines. See James D. Fearon and David 
D. Laitin, 'Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,' Amen'can Political Science Review 97, 1 (February 2003): 77-78. There has 
been no shortage of explanations for this increase in intrastate war. These include the emergence of weak postcolonial 
states. Others claim that ancient tribal hatreds revived as the Cold War ideological polarities disintegrated; see, for 
example, Robert Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Joumeythrough History (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993) and David Callahan, 
Unwinnable Wars: American Power and Ethnic Conflict (New York: Hill and Wang. 1998). 
]S See for example Andreas Wimmer, Richard Goldstone, Donald Horowitz, Ulrike Jora5, Conrad Schetter, eds., 
Facing Ethnic Conflicts: Toward a new Realism (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004); and David A. Lake and 
Donald Rothchild, 'Containing Fear: the Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,' International Secun'ty 21, 2 (Fall 
1996): 41f; Chaim Kaufmann, 'Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,' International Security 20,4 (Spring 
1996): 136-175; Roy Licklider, 'The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,' The Amen'can 
Political Science Review 89. 3 (Sept 1995): 681-690. 
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intense debate. There are some who postulate 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' as predominantly cultural 
identities,16 others who postulate them as primarily economic identities (where material 
conditions are seen as paramount)" and yet others who prioritise political identities (where 
the way political power is organised is seen as the key variable explaining ethnic conflict).l8 
Mamdani views 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' as political identities, and argues that a focus on the 
apparent ethnic revolutions and counter-revolutions in Rwanda is superficial and 
misleading. Actually, the different groups merely swapped positions between 'ruler' and 
'being ruled', essentially preserving the oppressive nature of political relations, not only after 
1959's Hutu revolution, but also after 1994. Scott Strauss recently produced another major 
study in this vein, The Order of Genocide: Race Power and War in Rwanda. l • Together with 
Mamdani's study, this forms the most systematic attempt yet to explain the Rwandan 
genocide in terms of a coherent theorisation of ethnicity. Strauss identifies three aspects, 
namely, a context of civil war, state power and pre-existing racial and ethnic classifications, 
which, he claims, drove the genocide. 
These more analytical studies, following on the first generation of 'descriptive' studies 
referred to above, were more sensitive to the allegations levelled at some of the earlier 
studies, namely that they reinforced the notion of African society as 'tribal' and 'primitive'. 
While seeking to advance a causal explanation of the genocide with reference to, amongst 
others, ethnicity, these studies also sought to refute the understanding of the genocide as 
simply an outburst of ancient ethnic hatred. Far from postulated as a 'spontaneous' outburst, 
the genocide was in fact presented as a calculated and coordinated response to a political 
16 This view confirms the traditional approach to Rwandan studies by cultural anthropologists dating back to the 
original fascination of European researchers with perceived differences, both physical and social, between the Tutsi, Hutu 
and Twa, Conflict arose, these commentators claimed, primarily from cultural differences. Prunier writes: 'For nineteenth 
century European visitors preoccupied with race, the somatic differences between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa clearly indicated 
racial difference. John Hanning Speke first published a theory on racial difference in Rwanda in his Journal o/the Discovery 0/ 
the Sourceo/the Nile in 1863 in which he speculated about the Tutsi as a Uconquering, superior race" with a "foreign origin", 
possibly from southern Ethiopia.' See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 7. See also John Hanning Speke, Journal a/the Discovery 0/ 
the Sourceo/the Nile (Mineola, New York, Dover Publications, 1996) and Christopher, C. Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The 
Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (Oxford: Berg, 1999). 
17 Mamdani describes this conception of ethnic identity within Rwandan studies as 'market-based identities'. See for 
example, Michel Chossudovsky, 'Economic Genocide in Rwanda,' in The Globa/isation o/Poverty: Impacts a/the IMP and 
World Bank Reforms, ed. Michel Chossudovsky (Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network, 1997), 111-124; also Catherine 
Andre and Jean-PhiUipe Platteau, 'Land Relations under Unbearable Stress: Rwanda caught in (he Malthusian Trap,' 
(Namur, Belgium: Centre de Recherche en Economie du Developpement (CRED), Faculty of Economics, University of 
Namur, February 1996); See too p, Verwimp, Development and genocide in Rwanda - A political economy analysis oj peasants and 
power under the Habyarimana regime, (Leuven, Faculty of Economics, No. 170, 2003). See also Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and 
Genocide in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1996). 
18 See Mamdani, When Viaims berome Killers, 21-24. See also Helen M. Hintjens, 'When Identity becomes a Knife: 
Reflecting on the Genocide in Rwanda,' Ethnicities 1,1 (2001): 25-55, where she argues that the genocide was meticulously 
organised by a 'beleaguered inner core of state functionaries'. 
19 Scott Straus, The Order a/Genocide - Race, Power and War in Rwanda (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2006). 
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problem (that of the RPF invasion) within the context of a war. Genocide is recast as state 
violence, not popular violence. 2o Central to this quest has been efforts to analyse why such 
high numbers of perpetrators participated in the mass killings and why so many victims 
died. 
If an unintended consequence of the descriptive genre of Rwandan genocide studies has 
been to reinforce 'tribalist' stereotypes, an ironic feature of the second type of study has been 
to parallel certain elements of the post-genocide ideology of the RPF. The government of 
Rwanda steadfastly maintains that it was not intrinsic ethnic relations but 'bad leadership', 
together with 'genocide ideology' and a culture of 'blind obedience' that lay at the root of the 
genocide.'1 
2.3. Type 3: Comparative: 'How does Rwandan Transitional Justice compare?' 
A third major group of studies focuses on the post-genocide efforts to rebuild Rwanda. 
Among these are the various development reports and studies on the economic challenges of 
facing Rwanda, including regular World Bank reports." There is also a steady stream of 
ongoing political commentary and analyses of issues such as democratisation and human 
rights." 
In the systematic treatments of Rwanda as a post-genocide case study, an important theme 
has been to identify ways in which the Rwandan context is comparable to other cases of 
transitional jusice, as well as ways in which it is not. Literature on Rwanda's transition 
points, for example, to common ground with other cases where political transition was 
20 The distinction between 'intentional killing' sustained by hatred and 'functional killing' deriving from calculated 
organisation and premediated outcomes is worked out in more detail by Jon Elster: See Elster, Closing the Books. For an 
application to the Rwandan case, see Rene Lemarchand, 'Disconnecting the Threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust 
reconsidered: Idea: A Journal 0/ SodalIssues 7, I (2002): 8-10. [Electronic]. Available at: 
http://www.ideajournal.com/articles.php?sup-ll [January 2009J. For an example of the functional approach in 
Holocaust studies, see Christopher Browning, The Path to Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and 
Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men (New York: Harper Collins, 1993). For the intentional approach, see Daniel Jonah 
Goldhagen, Hitlers Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: Knopf, 1996); For some attempt at 
synthesis between the schools, see Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001). 
21 This point is made most extensively in Johan Pottier, Re-jmaging Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Misinfonnation in the 
lAte Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
2Z Available at: 
http:((web.worldbank org/WBSITE(EXTERN ALI COUNTRIES/ AFRlCAEXT (RWANDAEXTN(O, menuPK' 368660 
-pagePK: 141159-piPK: 14111 O-theSitePK 368651 ,00.htm!. 
23 See, for example, annual reports by Freedom House (Electronic]. Available at: 
http://www,freedomhOllse.org/template,cfm?page-1 5 {January 2008]. See also the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) reports on Rwanda [Electronic]. Available at: 
http:((www.oecd.org(LongAbstractlQ,3425.en 2649 33731 38562992 70750 119687 I LOO.html[January 2008]. 
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decisively shaped by military victory. 24 A convincing military victory by the RPF over the 
MRND (D) regime enabled the unfettered utilisation of state resources, meagre as these 
were, for genocide prosecutions. Victory ensured RPF control of state institutions and the 
judiciary, as well as, significantly from transitional justice, the apprehension of a high 
number of alleged perpetrators. By 1998,120,000 allegedgenocidaires were behind bars.2' 
The scope and nature of the violence also clearly places Rwanda in the category of other 
countries that had suffered genocide. A number of studies of the Rwandan genocide include 
comparison with similar cases, such as the Holocaust and the Balkan ethnic cleansings. 26 
Rwanda's efforts to prosecute genocidaires may thus be compared with other cases where 
transitional justice prioritised the prosecution of perpetrators of past political atrocities. In 
this connection, the 'Rwandan approach' to prosecute as many genocidaires as possible was 
also in line with the provisions in the so-called Rome Treaty, that amnesties amounting to 
legal impunity are no longer acceptable for crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide. Although the Treaty was only enacted some years after the Rwanda genocide, it 
has, since its ratification, added momentum to international efforts to prosecute 
genocidaires.27 Moreover, the United Nations-sponsored ICTR has added significantly to 
international genocide case law and has been the subject of various studies.28 
In these ways, Rwanda has been compared with other cases where the international 
community conducted organised efforts to sponsor transitional justice, as, for example, in 
For relevant discussions, see Huntington, The Third Wave, 124-151~ Nino, Radical Evil on Trial, 118-127. See also 
Peterson, Me Against My Brother, 247·303. 
25 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Paul Nantulya and Tyrone Savage, Building Nations, Transitional Justice in the African Great 
Lakes Region (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2005), 86. 
26 See for example, Eltringham, Accountingfor Ho"or, 51f., Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 264f. and Stover 
and Weinstein, My Neighbor, My Enemy, If. 
27 [ElectronicJ. Available at: httj);/ Iwww.icc,cpi,int/library/aboutiotlicialjournaIlRome Statute English pdf [July 
2007J. 
28 See for example, Payam Akhavan, 'The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics 
of Punishment, ' The American Journal of International Law 90 (1996): 501-510; Payam Akhavan, 'Justice and Reconciliation 
in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: The Contribution of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,' Duke Journal 0/ 
Comparative and International Law 7, 2 (Spring 1997): 338; as well as Oliver Dubois, 'Rwanda's national criminal courts and 
the International Tribunal,' lnternational Review of the Red Cross 321 (1997): 718; see also International Crisis Group (ICG), 
'International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Justice Delayed' (Nairobi, Arusha and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
7 June 2001): 11-12, [ElectronicJ. Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup org/library/documents/report archive/ A400442 02 10200I.pdf [9 October 2007]; Alison Des 
Porges and Timothy Longman, 'Legal responses to genocide in Rwanda', in My Neighbor, My Enemy, ed. Eric Stover and 
Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 53f; Madeline H. Morris, 'The Trials of Concurrent 
Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda,' Duke Journal o/Comparative and International Law 7, 2 (Spring 1997): 363; Oomen, 
'Justice Mechanisms,' 19. See also Reydams, 'The ICTR Ten Years On,' 977-988; Helena Cobban, 'The Legacies of 
Collective Violence: The Rwandan genocide and the limits of law, ' Boston Review 7,2 (April/May 2002) [Electronic1. 
Available at: www bostonreview.ne'/BR27.21cobban.h'ml [ApriI2008J. 
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Sierra Leone, Liberia and the former republics of Yugoslavia. Although an obvious point of 
comparison between Rwanda and other countries is found in the work of the ICTR, my 
particular focus is on Rwanda's domestic transitional justice processes. The ICTR was the 
result of the fact that the Rwandan case was important for a humiliated and chastised United 
Nations, which had failed to intervene to stop the genocide. The new RPF government 
constantly reminded the international community that, in their view, these failures generated 
obligations to help Rwanda serve justice to genocidaires.29 
There are also a number of studies that analyse Rwanda's quasi-judicial transitional justice 
efforts, such as the Gacaca process, in relation to internationallaw.30 A prominent feature of 
the comparative literature has been to emphasise the distinctive ways in which Rwanda's 
transitional justice processes have developed. It had, firstly, to fmd ways to deal with 
extraordinary numbers of victims and perpetrators involved provide grounds to argue for the 
exceptional nature of Rwanda's challenge. Studies in this vein include a number of book-
length studies,ll as well as chapters and journal articles. 
The result was a (possibly uniquely) ambitious domestic transitional justice process. With 
more than 120,000 perpetrators in prison awaiting trial, a complementary community court 
system, the Gacaca courts, was implemented. Initially, this led to an even greater 
proliferation of cases as even more people were implicated by witness testimonies. At the 
29 For an elaborate illustration of this diplomacy by the Rwandan government, see Pottier, Re-imaginjng Rwanda, 
151-179. 
30 Phil Clarke' Judging Genocide on the Grass,' review of Rwanda's Gamble: Gacaca and a new model o/Transitional 
Justice, by Paul Harrel, The Oxonian Review of Books 4, 2 (Hilary 2005) [Electronic]. Available at: 
http·;/www.oxonianreview.org/jssues/3-2/3.2.4.htm [10 April 2008]; Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 'The Gacaca 
Process: Eradicating the Culture ofImpunity in Rwanda?' Situation Report, (5 August 2005) [Electronic), Available at: 
http://www.issco.za/AF/current/2005/050805rwanda.vdf[l1 April 2008]; Barbara RoelofHaveman and Olaoluwa 
Olusanya (The Hague: Intersentia, 2006); Uvin and Mironko, 'Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda,' 226; 
Clarke. 'Hybridity,' 117; Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 3; Timothy Longman and Theoneste Rutagengwa, 'Memory, Identity 
and Community in Rwanda/ in ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 162. 
31 Book length studies on transitional justice as it applies to Rwanda include Phil Clarke and Zachary D. Kaufman, 
ed., After Genocide - Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconst1UCtion and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009); Jean Hatzfeld, Machete Season - The Killers in Rwanda Speak (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 
2003); Neuffer, The Key to My Neighbor's House - Seeking Justice in Bosnia and Rwanda; Temple·Raston, Justice on the Grass, 
Heidy Rombouts, Victim Organisations and the Politics a/Reparation: a case study on Rwanda (Oxford: Intersentia, 2004) as well 
as Eltringham, Accountingfor Horror and Pottier, Re-/magining Rwanda. A number of important essays are also contained in 
Stover and Weinstein (eds.), My Neighbor, My Enemy. See also Peter E. Harrel, Rwanda's Gamble: Gacaca and a new Modelfor 
Transitional Justice (New York: Writer's Club Press, 2003) and the following Amnesty International Reports: AI, 'Rwanda: 
Crying out for Justice', (April 1995) [Electronic]. Available at: 
www.metafro.be/grandslacsl grandslacsdirO/OI I O.pdf! download [January 2008) and AI, 'Rwanda: Arming the 
Perpetrators of the Genocide'. (June 1995) [Electronic). Available at: www,grandslacs.nel/doc/2671.pdf[January2008). 
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beginning of the full-scale rollout of the actual Gacaca hearings, this total grew to 818,564 
cases.32 
The differences and similarities with other cases thus invoked have given rise to a debate 
between the two main normative frameworks relevant to the literature on transitional justice 
in Rwanda. Retributive justice (a framework associated with a human rights and 
international law approach)" and reconciliation (another framework associated with the 
rebuilding of relations adversely affected by the conflict, especially those between victims 
and perpetrators of human rights violations)'4 are often perceived to be conflicting normative 
paradigms. Indeed, much of the debate about evaluating Rwandan transitional justice 
processes has been waged by adherents from one or the other of these schools, the retributive 
justice school measuring these processes against their compliance with due judicial process 
and international human rights standards, and the reconciliation school asking about the 
extend to which these processes have brought together, and helped made sustained peace 
between, erstwhile enemies.'s 
In so far as this thesis primarily deals with the domestic Rwandan approach to transitional 
justice and not with international transitional justice interventions such as the ICTR, it will 
also be less concerned with the latter normative framework of retributive justice and 
international human rights law and more with the notions of reconciliation and restorative 
justice which have enjoyed a high priority in domestic Rwandan processes. From a 
transitional justice perspective, the key question will be whether processes sensitive to 
12 Mukantaganzwa, 'National Service of Gacaca Courts, op.cit. 
33 Diane F. Orentlicher, '$ettlingAccounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations ofa Prior Regime,' in 
Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Fonner Regimes Volume J I ed. Neil J. Kritz, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 375f. 
34 See Elizabeth Kiss, 'Moral Ambition within and beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative Justice,' 
in Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Troth Commissions, ed. Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 68f.; Chris Cunneen, 'Exploring the relationship between reparations, the gross violation of human 
rights and restorative justice,' in Handbook 0/ Restorative Justice - a Global Perspective, ed. Dennis Sullivan and Larry Tift 
(London and New York: Routledge), 355f. See also the Truth and Reconct1iation Commission 0/ South A/n'ca Report Volume 1 
(Cape Town: CTP Printers, 1998), 114, 125-131. 
35 The most systematic attempt to analyse this debate is found in Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, eds., My 
Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath o/Mass Atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
See also Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, 'Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda,' Global Governance 9 
(2003): 226; and Jeremy Sarkin, 'The Tension Between Justice And Reconciliation In Rwanda - Politics, Human Rights, 
Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide,' Journal Of African Law 45: 2 (2001): 143-
172. [ElectronicJ. Available at: 
http://journals.cambridge. org,ezproxy. uct. aC,za! download.php?file=%2FJAL %2F JAL45 02%2FS022185530 I 00 1675a.p 
df&code-ad50c46alb94f8256dc05fe2f918880a [January 2008J. See also Phil Clarke, 'Hybridity, Holism And "Traditional" 
Justice: The Case of the Gacaca Courts in Post~Genocide Rwanda,' George Washington International Law Review 39, 4 (2007): 
101-171; and Lars Waldorf, 'Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as Transitional Justice,' Temple Law 
Review 79, I (Spring 2006). 
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communal concerns, local identities and historic ethnic relations can help a post-genocide 
society, such as Rwanda, to 'deal with the past' in a way that reduces the risk of a recurrence 
of mass violence. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This study focuses neither on a description of the genocide history, nor On a critical analysis 
of the historical antecedents, causes and consequences of the genocide itself. Rather, in 
positioning itself within a growing corpus of work on post-genocide recovery efforts, not 
least those concerned with transitional justice, this study wiII critically examine a claim often 
taken for granted: that addressing political crimes promote positive peace and reconciliation. 
Rwanda is seeking to address genocide and its consequences through one of the most 
comprehensive, and arguably innovative, set of transitional justice measures yet developed. 
In these efforts there are similarities with other cases largely in relation to retributive justice 
as a normative framework for transitional justice. A range of studies compare Rwanda's 
efforts to cases elsewhere, where retributive justice was utilised to settle past political scores. 
This study, however, focuses on another feature of Rwanda's domestic transitional justice 
process, more aligned with a framework based on reconciliation. It provides a critical 
analysis of this domestic 'Rwandan approach' to dealing with genocide with a focus on the 
key claim that transitional justice furthers post-conflict reconciliation. 
The transitional justice processes are examined, not only in terms of their stated goals and 
mandates, but also in terms of their operational histories as these have begun to unfold. 
Presently there is a dearth of analysis in this area, and although this study does not claim to 
offer new empirical evidence, its novelty within the literature lies in the way it 
conceptualises reconciliation as an outcome of transitional justice and applies this 
framework to the Rwandan case. 
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Chapter 3: Countering Cultural Violence through 'Reconciliation 
with History' 
In post-genocide Rwanda, 'reconciliation' has meant bringing all citizens to embrace 
'Rwandanicity' at the cost of 'Hutu', 'Tutsi' or 'Twa' identities. The strongly promoted goal 
of nation-building is supported by an 'official narrative' that portrays the genocide as the 
result of the external influence of colonialism and its continuing impact on post-colonial 
rule. The 'official narrative' further postulates a benign pre-colonial period shared by flexibly 
differentiated Hutu, Twa and Tutsi groups, whose relations hardened into immutable, 
reinforcing cleavages only under colonial rule. It was the harmful legacies of the externally 
imposed ethnic divisions that were primarily responsible for the genocide. 
The aim here is to determine the consequences and implications of Rwanda's transitional 
justice programmes for reconciliation. I use reconciliation in a double sense: as defined by 
Rwandans themselves (reconstructed identities within the framework of national belonging) 
as well as within the normative framework which I develop, equating reconciliation with the 
removal of cultural and structural violence. 
With this in mind, the argument is developed in several stages. First, a conceptualisation of 
'history as cultural violence' is provided in order to identify more precisely, the ways in 
which history may function as cultural violence. Thereafter, a description of the 'official 
narrative' of Rwanda on reconciliation is offered, followed by a critical analysis of this 
narrative, pointing to various implications and consequences which it may have for its own 
stated goal of reconftguring ethnic identity within a framework of national belonging. 
The fmal part of the chapter provides a critical assessment of the Rwandan approach in 
terms of a range of analyses from theorists and commentators further afield. The aim is to 
examine the role of transitional justice more generally in cultivating an approach to history 
more conducive to reconciliation (understood as, inter alia, the eradication of cultural 
violence). 
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If reconciliation as an objective of transitional justice is thus understood as doing away with 
both 'structural' and 'cultural violence', it remains to consider to what the latter refers mor 
precisely in a context marked by a political transition. 
3.1. History as 'Cultural Violence' 
For our purpose, 'cultural violence' is taken to refer to those aspects of cultural or symbolic 
resources available to motivate and justifY direct or structural violence. The question is what 
this might mean in more specific terms relevant to Rwandan transitional justice as a quest 
for reconciliation. 
From the literature, it is clear that in the Rwandan context certain political, cultural and 
social narratives and discourses, including notably the founding myth of the Tutsis as an 
'alien race' espoused by the protagonists of 'Hutu Power', had a major part in preparing the 
way for mass participation in the genocide.36 Pre-genocide, the mobilisation of cultural 
resources in motivating violence by the genociciaires is well-recorded, not least in the court 
records of the ICTR. In the trials of individuals, such as Professor Ferdinand Nahimana and 
others, the ICTR succeeded in documenting the role that history played as one such cultural 
resource to support the propaganda of the genociciaires37 In these ways, history, myths and 
narratives were utilised to favour one ethnic group above another. 
Put together, these cultural beliefs and ideologies rooted in a specific approach to history 
amount to a form of 'cultural violence' in Galtung's sense; i.e. before and during the mass 
killings they provided the resources of a 'symbolic sphere' available to justifY genocidal 
36 As founding myth ofHutu Power, the so-called 'Hamitic' thesis attributed any form of advanced social or 
political organisation on the African continent to groups who had moved there from elsewhere, and who were the 'cursed' 
progeny of Ram, son of Noah, unable to settle down and pre-ordained to be slaves. Ironically, during the colonial period in 
Rwanda, being a 'Hamite' had the positive implication of superiority over against the 'native Rwandans' who were often 
effectively viewed as subhuman. One step up, 'Ramites' were seen as 'Caucasians under a black skin'; see Mamdani, When 
Victims become Killers, 83; see also Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 9. 'Hutu Power' became a popular slogan amongst Hutu 
extremists convinced of the veracity of the claim implicit in the Hamitic thesis that the Tutsi was an 'alien race' to Rwanda, 
not 'an indigenous ethnic group'. 'Hutu Power', Mamdani claims, had been a fringe phenomenon among Rwandan Hutu 
elites during the late nineteen-eighties, but became a mainstream ideology in the early nineties. See Mamdani, When Victims 
become Killers, 190. The emblematic expression of the racism that fuelled the 1994 genocide is found in the so-called 'Ten 
Hutu Commandments', published in the Kangura newspaper. For a copy, see Dina Temple-Raston, Justice on the Grass: 
Three Rwandan Journalists, Their Tria/for War Crimes and a Nation's Questfor Redemption (New York: Free Press, 2005), 116-
117. Two of the 'commandments' include: 'consequently shall be deemed a traitor any Hutu male who manies a Tutsi 
woman, any H utu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine; any Hutu male who makes Tutsi women his secretary or protegee.' 
And 'Hutu must cease having any pity for the Tutsi'. 
37 An example is the case of the 'media trial where the trio of accused included history professor Ferdinand 
Nahimana, editor Hassan Ngeze and Coalition pour/a Defense de /a Republique (CDR) party leader Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza; 
sec Prosecutor v: Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza. Hassan Ngeze Case No. ICTR-99-52-T. [Electronic]. Available 
at: http://www.crdi.ca/genociderwanda/ev·lOB222·201·1-DO TOPIC.hlml[12 April200BJ. For a discussion of the 'media 
trial', see Temple-Raston, Justice on the Grass, 230f. 
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violence. The role of history is thus central to this investigation. Cultural violence was 
involved in the invocation of history to motivate and justify the genocide. In post-genocide 
Rwanda, history is now called upon to support reconciliation. This amounts to an ironic 
reversal, from history as a cultural resource for genocide, to the construction of an 'official 
history' as a motivation for reconciliation. It also suggests the need for critical analysis of the 
implications of history in the new official Rwandan narrative - not only in the 'official 
narrative', but also in those transitional justice processes shaped by this narrative. 
Once the actual killings were brought to an end, the further question facing the Rwandan 
post-genocide transitional justice project was how to deal with this underlying cultural 
violence. Ideally, the Rwandan approach to transitional justice needed to be able to draw on 
elements of alternative 'symbolic spheres' to counter the 'cultural violence' that had 
contributed to the genocide. If different accounts of the past, often specific to Hutu or Tutsi 
Power, had the potential to generate, sustain or justify cycles of structural and direct 
violence, any attempt to bring about social and political reconciliation must of necessity also 
need to address these conflicting histories to the ext nt that they continued to hold sway 
over the post-genocide society. 
The prominence of historical narratives in the shaping of Rwandan conflict over many 
decades, as well as their potential uses post-genocide, necessitates what Mahmood Mamdani 
calls 'reconciliation with history'. Mamdani provocatively describes Rwanda's key dilemma 
as the quest to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty majority alongside an 
aggrieved and fearful minority.38 And yet Mamdani claims that, despite the public nature of 
the genocide, the identities of neither the perpetrators nor the survivors are as transparent as 
they, at face value, might seem. 'This is because the identification of both perpetrators and 
survivors is contingent on the historical narratives that frame the events of the genocide. 
This is why it is not possible to think of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda 
without a prior "reconciliation with history": History in Rwanda comes in two versions: 
Hutu and Tutsi.'39 From this statement, Mamdani concludes that 'to break the stranglehold 
of Hutu Power and Tutsi Power on Rwanda's politics, one also needs to break their 
stranglehold on Rwanda's history writing, and thus history making'. 40 
l8 
J9 
... 
Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 266. 
Mamdani. When Victims become Killers, 267 . 
Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 268. 
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For our purposes, it follows that an account and assessment of the Rwandan approach to 
transitional justice will need to ascertain how the genocide, as historical event, is 
conceptualised and presented to Rwandans in and through the transitional justice process, 
and what the wider implications are for the way history is presented to Rwandans today. 
In what follows, the focus shifts to an analyses of the cultural beliefs and historical narratives 
fostered by the RPF regime in the context of their transitional justice project, followed by a 
description of their role in the quest for 'reconciliation with history'. Whereas for Mamdani 
this mainly requires 'putting the genocide in the correct historical perspective', I use the 
concept of 'reconciliation with history' in an expanded sense. 'Reconciliation with history' is 
conceptualised, not primarily as the correction of historical fallacies, important as that may 
be, but as the conscious effort to construct a new historical narrative and framework able to 
accommodate the needs and interests of both sides so as to provide a basis for facilitating 
further discussions while remaining open to critical engagement. 
The notion of 'reconciliation with history' involves creating deeper insight into the opposing 
Hutu and Tutsi accounts of past and conflicts and atrocities, and so, in the longer term, 
enabling a shared understanding of the past. In Galtung's terms, it may be viewed as an 
important dimension of the agenda for removing possible sources of 'cultural violence' and 
thereby furthering reconciliation-through-transitional-justice in Rwanda. More specifically, 
the question is whether the Rwandan approach to transitional justice, as it has been 
conceptualised and implemented in Rwanda, is suited to assist in this quest for 
'reconciliation with history'. First however, we need to determine what the 'official 
approach' entails and how this relates to its own definition of reconciliation, namely the 
reconfiguration of ethnic identity within a framework of national belonging. 
3.2. 'Official Narrative' in Post-Genocide Rwanda 
Since taking power in July 1994, the RPF government has made a concerted effort to 
promote the national unity of all Rwandan citizens through the creation of 'an official 
narrative ofmemory'.41 This official post-genocide narrative of reconciliation has been at the 
41 See Longman and Rutagengwa, 'Memory, Identity and Community in Rwanda,' 164. These efforts need to be 
understood agains the essentialist and racist narrative of Rwandan history espoused by radical elements in the MRND (D) 
government which prepared the ground for the genocide - as a form a cultural violence, it contributed to direct violence 
against the Tutsis before and during the genocide. 
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core of the Rwandan programme of transitional justice and its efforts to promote 
reconciliation, so counteracting the cultural violence contained in the narratives of the 
genocidaires. 
The preamble to the Rwandan Constitution, adopted in 2003, states that' ... we enjoy the 
privilege of having one country, a common language, a common culture and a long shared 
history which oUght to lead to a common vision of our destiny;' and' it is necessary to draw 
from our centuries-old history the positive values which characterised our ancestors that 
must be the basis for the existence and flourishing of our Nation'. 42 Accordingly the 
Constitution prohibits political mobilisation on the basis of racial or ethnic identity. A 
common national identity, one precluding the recognition of distinct racial or ethnic 
identities, is thus postulated as both the basis for and the objective of reconciliation. The 
Constitution further determines that 'political organisations are prohibited from basing 
themselves on race, ethnic group, tribe, clan, region, sex, religion or any other division 
which may give rise to discrimination.''' 
The Constitution states that' freedom ofthought, opinion, conscience, religion, worship and 
the public manifestation thereof is guaranteed by the State in accordance with conditions 
determined by law'.44 Nevertheless, it determines in the same article that the 'propagation of 
ethnic, regional, racial or discrimination or any other form of division is punishable by law.' 
It limits political parties to those not associated with the 1994 genocide or with any kind of 
ethnic constituency. Consequently, the MRND (D), which historically represented Hutu 
peasants (but also presided over the genocide) was outlawed, as well as the extremist 
Coalition pour la defense de la Republique (CDR).4' Furthermore, the Constitution demands 
that political organisations 'must constantly reflect the unity of the people of Rwanda and 
gender equality and complementarity, whether in the recruitment of members, putting in 
place organs ofleadership and in their operations and activities'. 46 
42 The Constitution of the Republic o/Rwanda, (The Rwandan Constitution). [Electronic}. Available at: 
wwwcjcr.goy.rwieng/constitution eng.doc [4 Apri12008J. 
43 Article 54, The Rwandan Constitution. 
44 Article 33, The Rwandan Constitution. 
45 Prunier describes the CDR as a 'radical racist party working on the right of the MRND and goading it and the 
regime for the supposed "softness" towards the RPF and its democratic ibyitso (accomplices)'; see Prunier, The Rwanda 
Crisis, 128. 
46 Article 54, The Rwandan Constitution. 
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These views are echoed in the mandates of the various transitional justice mechanisms, as 
well as that of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). The NURC was 
established in 1999 to serve as a forum for Rwandan people to exchange views on, and find 
solutions to, mutual challenges through a variety of 'national programs for the promotion of 
national unity and reconciliation'. These include, for example, 'solidarity camps' called 
'ingando seminars' for released prisoners and returning refugees about to be reintegrated into 
society." Ingando, taken from the Kinyarwanda verb, Kuganda, refers to a breaking-off from 
normal activities in order to reflect on issues of importance. The customary practice carrying 
this name was first developed by pre-colonial military leaders, but fell into abeyance during 
the post-colonial period.4s Today, ingandos take the form of residential camps hosting 
between 300 and 400 released prisoners, former officials and returning refugees for between 
3 and 8 weeks, during which they are lectured on topics such as 'analyses of Rwanda's 
problems', 'the history of Rwanda', 'political and socioeconomic issues in Rwanda and 
Africa' and 'rights, obligations and duties and leadership' .49 In addition to mounting a range 
of community-based reconciliation initiatives, such as 'cultural festivals' and 'mediation 
panels', the NURC also conducts a national reconciliation summit, chaired by the President, 
every second year. In the words of the President: 'The Commission is propagating and 
promoting a new philosophy and outlook that is Rwandan, rather than being Hutu, Tutsi or 
Twa. In that respect, the Government has abolished the use of labels in our National 
Identity Card. ,50 
A similar emphasis on bringing about post-genocide reconciliation informs the Rwandan 
approach to transitional justice. Thus, the Gacaca Service Commission received a mandate to 
promote 'national unity and reconciliation'. 51 Gacaca's founding act states that the aim of the 
47 See the official website of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. [Electronic]. Available at: 
www.nurcgov.rw [11 April 2008]. 
48 See www nurc.gov.lw/. 
49 Students about to enter university are reported to have undergone this training, too. In addition, the NURC has 
trained Abakangurambaga, or peace monitor volunteers, who can be called upon to intervene in local disputes anywhere in 
Rwanda. See ~w,nurc.gQv.rw.(. 
so Paul Kagame, 'Managing Post Genocide Era: Managing Ethnic Relations and National Reconciliation in a Post-
Genocide State' (public address delivered at California State University, Long Beach, 14 April 2005). See also Anastase 
Shyaka, 'The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies,' Commissioned by the Rwandan National Unity 
and Reconciliation Commission (28 January 2005) [Eleclronic]. Available at: http://www.nurcgov.rwlindex.php7Res [II 
April 2008] . 
.51 Significantly, the Security Council resolution that gave birth to the ICTR used language reminiscent of this official 
Rwandan emphasis on post-genocide 'reconciliation'. While it mandated the ICTR with the task of bringing to justice the 
perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda because they were a threat to 'international peace and security', it also charged the 
ICTR with the objective to help foster reconciliation in Rwanda. The preamble to the resolution reads: 'convinced that in 
the particular circumstances ofR wanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other above-mentioned 
violations of international law would enable this aim [bringing effective justice] to be achieved and would contribute to the 
process of reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace ...• The explicit reference to 'reconciliation and to the 
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Commission is 'to achieve reconciliation and justice in Rwanda, to eradicate for good the 
culture of impunity and to adopt provisions enabling to ensure [sic] prosecutions and trials 
of perpetrators and accomplices without only aiming for simple punishment, but also for the 
reconstitution of the Rwandese society made decaying [sic] by bad leaders who prompted 
the population to exterminate one part of that society'." 
The 'official narrative', reflected in these official documents of post-genocide Rwanda, has a 
number of tenets:" firstly, it encourages Rwandans to reconcile by recalling a pre-colonial 
past of harmonious and fluid ethnic relations. It calls to unity all Rwandans on the basis of a 
historical narrative that emphasises Rwandan society's pre-colonial, 'natural' unity. The 
'official narrative' claims that pre-colonial Rwanda had been essentially unified and that 
distinctions between Twa, Hutu and Tutsi demarcated occupational differences only. They 
all shared a religion and language, often intermarried and were loyal to the same royal 
house. 'Fluid occupational' identities were facilitated through the institution of 'cattle 
clientship' or ubuhake. 54 Pre-colonial Rwandan history was not exempt from localised tit-for-
tat skirmishes, but ethnic mobilisation on the basis of these identities did not take place. The 
official RPF narrative therefore implies that post-genocide reconciliation of Rwandan 
society can happen on the basis of the recovery of Rwanda's pre-colonial unity." 
Secondly, the 'official narrative' views distinct ethnic identities as a colonial imposition. The 
thesis that the Hutu were indigenous Rwandans and the Tutsi 'Hamitic' settlers, thereby 
reinforcing Hutu and Tutsi divides, was first voiced by European observers. The post-
colonial ideology of Hutu Power effectively developed from colonial ideology in this way. '6 
By organising the colonial state according to these categories, the colonial powers imported 
forms of structural violence (fed by ideas that were culturally violent) that had not only 
survived colonial rule, but played an important role in motivating the genocide. Imposed 
restoration and maintenance of peace' in the Security Council resolution clearly takes a similar line to the nation-building 
narrative of the Rwandan government. The fact that 'reconciliation' (however it was conceptualised) is acknowledged as 
the objective of the ICTR, enables Rwandan authorities to articulate and interpret its work in terms familiar to its own 
'official narrative' of unity and reconciliation. 
52 See http'/Iwww jnkiko-Gacaca.gov.rw/pdflLaw.pdf 
" Office of the President of the Republic of Rwanda, The Unity O/Rwandans -Before The Colonial Period And Under 
The Colonial Rule, Under The First Republic (1999) [Electronic]. Available at: hup' / /www.grandslacs net! doc/23 79 .pdf[ 4 
April 2008]. 
54 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda, 110. 
ss Office of the President, 63. 
56 For years prior to the 1994 genocide, Hutu propaganda belaboured the Tutsis' 'foreign' Hamitic roots and 
therefore their status as settlers. This ideology evoked parallel theories of ethnic hierarchies imposed by colonialism. During 
colonialism, much was made of the Tutsis' fine, angular features suggesting a different heritage; see Prunier, The Rwanda 
Crisis, 5, 6. 
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racism, so the official history goes, was at the root of the internal conflict, and the colonial 
powers were to blame for the ultimate result, namely, genocide. President Kagame put it 
thus: 'But if you remember the main features of our history, the leading aspect would be that 
our nation was never an aggregate of brute savages, inclined to kill each other at the slightest 
opportunity. This outlook of a dark continent where primitivity prevails, long popularised 
mainly by western anthropology and sociology, and echoed by some in African scholarship, 
has evident faults and must be discarded. The different sections of Rwandans, Bahutu, 
Batutsi and Batwa, are and were, until the colonial adventure, Banyarwanda - or Rwandan 
people.''' 
Thirdly, the 'official narrative' views the post-colonial period as an extended preparation for 
the genocide. The Hutu government that replaced the Belgium-led Tutsi elite as rulers of the 
country adopted the colonial world-view it sought to replace. Ironically, their acceptance of 
the colonial creation of Hutu and Tutsi ethnic divisions provided the groundwork for 
developing the 'final solution' to this problem, namely, the complete extermination of the 
Tutsi. The key point here is that the official history does not see the genocide as a latter-day 
development, but as part and parcel of the Hutu-Ied government's initial plan, even as it 
assumed power in 1959, which had also been responsible for the large-scale exodus of Tutsis 
(known today as the 'Fifty-Niners') to the Congo in anticipation of Hutu revenge at that 
time. PARMEHUTU58 is represented as driven by a Hutu leadership sold on 'elitist, North-
Rwanda-dominated, anti-Tutsi ideology'. The 'official narrative' further denies the role of 
other motivations, such as anti-royalist sentiments, in the 1959 regime change. Neither does 
it recognise the significance of any democratic gains in achieving post-colonial self-rule. 
Instead of calling the 1959 regime change a 'revolution', the RPF sees it as the first step in a 
progressively comprehensive genocide against the Tutsis. The period from 1959 to 1994 is 'a 
history of genocide in slow motion,.'9 
57 Paul Kagame, 'Beyond Absolute Terror: Post-Genocide Reconstruction in Rwanda, I (public address delivered in 
San Francisco, 7 March 2003), in Rwanda: Towards Reconciliation, Good Governance and Development, ed. Uma Shankar Jha 
and Surya Narayan Yadav (New Delhi: Association ofIndian Africanists, 2003), 114. 
58 PARMEHUTU was the party 'of the revolution', During the 1959 transition of political power to Hutu Power, 
PARMEHUTU was the major political force representing Hutu interests. See Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 118, 
Mamdani describes PARMEHUTU as 'militantly Hutu'; Kagame, 'Beyond Absolute Terror', 119. Helen Hintjens, 
'Genocide and Obedience in Rwanda,' (paper presented at the conference Conflict and Identity in Afn'ca, University of Leeds, 
African Studies Unit, September 1997): 7, 12. 
59 Kagame, 'Beyond Absolute Terror', 115. President Kagame further stated: 'Well, the genocide has a long history, 
if you know a bit of what happened in 1959 alone. There was a civil strife which led to many refugees moving out ofthe 
country in hundreds of thousands and tens of thousands of people being killed. More or less, genocide started around that 
time. There had been other genocides in 1963, 1967, 1973 and 1993 while we were negotiating a peace agreement in 
Arusha (people living in the north-west of the country were exterminated by the then government forces). So you can see 
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On this basis, the 'official narrative' presents a view of post-colonial rule as fundamentally 
(culturally and structurally) violent. Two successive regimes (those of Kayibanda and 
Habyarimana) were both in denial, reproducing the very colonialist ideology they had 
suffered under, and took it to new genocidal extremes whilst relying on the 'blind obedience' 
of uneducated Hutu peasants. 'The genocide was the result of a hundred-year betrayal by the 
state', the RPF President claims elsewhere, i.e. a form of structural violence embedded in the 
systematic promotion of ideas that contained cultural violence"o 
Fourthly, the 'official narrative' exhorts the Rwandan nation to remember the RPF's role in 
liberating the country from the horrors of a government actively pursuing genocide within its 
borders. The implication is that the RPF's unique role as liberation movement provides the 
basis for its right to govern post-genocide Rwanda. The 'official narrative' represents RPF 
rule as inherently liberating and as the antithesis of the previous regimes, which are 
represented as jimdamentally genocidal and therefore criminal. These assertions have served 
as justification, not only for the banning of the MNRD (D), but also for a complete rejection 
by Kigali of any possibility of political reconciliation with Hutu forces, which remain 
stationed in South Kivu,,1 
Fifthly, the official history encourages all Rwandans to denounce their ethnic identities as 
false and to embrace 'R wandanicity' .62 An entirely new national symbolism has been 
developed, including a flag, national colours and a national crest. 'Rwandanicity' is 
reinforced by a national campaign seeking to 'educate' returning exiles and freed genocidaires 
who have served their time or have successfully plea-bargained a lesser punishment of 
that genocide is not just a result of the downing of Habyarimana's plane. It has been taking place for quite a long period. A 
section of our population has always been targeted by the government and its forces. Huge sections of the population were 
wiped out from different parts of our country. This had been going on over thirty years. See Adam Gaye, 'Paul Kagame: 
My side of the Story', West Africa Magazine (not dated). [Electonic). Available at: 
http://www.gov.rw/government/president/interviews/ZOOO/interviewsmysidePRINT.htm![January 2008]. 
60 Kagame, 'Beyond Absolute Terror', 114. 
61 The International Crisis Group estimates that the Forces Democratiques de Liberation De Rwanda (FDLR), a mix of 
genoct'daire elements and other scattered Hutu groups, has roughly 6500 fighters spread over a territory four to five times the 
size of Rwanda itself. Following a recently brokered agreement between Kigali and Kinshasa, Rwandan and DRC troops 
are now working together to effect a 'military solution' to the problem of the remaininggenoct'daire forces in the DRC, 
effectively aiming to conquer and forcibly disarm the FDLR. See International Crisis Group, 'The Congo: Solving the 
FDLR Problem Once and for All', Africa Briefing 25 (12 May 2005). [Electronic). Available at 
http://www.crisisgroup org/homelindex.cfm?l-I&id-3426 [19 February 2008). 
62 Says Kagame: 'The history of that has a lot to do with the make-up of our society. There were divisions in our 
society with three ethnic groups. But despite the fact that we were one people sharing a lot of things together, with one 
culture, the colonialists and the politicians who took over from them at independence, tried to build on the artificial or 
superficial division in our society to entrench themselves. That led to the tragic situation of 1994; see Kagame, 'My side of 
the Story'. 
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community service instead of prison time. The 'solidarity camps' are tasked to stimulate 
historical education and public debate.63 The official history is further institutionalised 
through an ambitious campaign of memorialisation, in which the RPF's liberation of 
Rwanda from the genocidal ideology is celebrated as a milestone founding event of the 
Rwandan nation. 
In line with these perspectives, the 'official narrative' therefore conceives transitional justice 
primarily as punishment for the perpetrators of a genocidal ideology, while the project of 
national reconciliation is conceived as a strategy of inclusion through adopting and 
propagating a version of history that portrays racial otherness as a colonial imposition -
thereby eliminating the notion of racial and ethnic 'otherness' as political reality in post-
genocide Rwanda. On this basis, it claims the moral high ground over its Hutu predecessor, 
which did not seek to eradicate racial or ethnic 'otherness' as such, but rather individuals 
deemed as racially and ethnically' other'. 
3.3. Problematising Rwanda's 'Official Narrative' 
Earlier, I argued that the way the Rwandan population had been categorised into Hutus and 
Tutsis entrenched both cultural as well as structural violence within the pre-genocide society, 
eventually contributing to the massive direct violence of the genocide. The question of 
whether reconciliation is possible has to be closely related to the extent to which these social 
categories, which helped to motivate the genocide, continue to operate in the post-genocide 
society, and how - if stilI present - they interact with new modes of (post-genocide) 
categorisation that emerged since 1994 on the basis of the new 'official narrative'. 
With the aim to develop a more accurate assessment of the extent to which these categories 
remain operative, I discuss four questions raised by the 'official narrative' - each with 
important implications for post-genocide social categorisation and thereby also for 
reconciliation. My aim is not, in the first place, to question the historical accuracy of the 
'official narrative' as such, but rather the implications it has for transitional justice and post-
genocide reconciliation. The analysis is first and foremost concerned with the function and 
significance of particular modes of categon'sation inherent in this narrative - in order to 
determine more precisely how reconciliation is conceived. The historical accuracy of the 
" 
Longman and Rutagengwa, 'Memory, Identity and Community in Rwanda,' 163. 
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'official narrative', often criticised, is only a concern to the extent that it has implications for 
the way that post-genocide reconciliation is structured. 
The first critical question in relation to the 'official narrative' concerns its portrayal of ethnic 
categories during the pre-colonial era as essentially benign, and the way in which this picture 
is used as a basis for reconciliation in the present. Effectively, the 'official narrative' of the 
post-genocide government claims that by reverting to the benign ethnic interactions of pre-
colonial times, a framework of national unity once again becomes possible as a foundation 
for post-genocide reconciliation. This may underplay, or even ignore, the extent to which 
categories that structured the genocide were entrenched as a form of structural violence, not 
only in colonial and post-colonial times but through the genocide itself. By viewing post-
genocide reconciliation through the romanticised lens of pre-colonial harmony, the 'official 
narrative' runs the risk of underestimating the extent to which ethnicity contributed to 
structural and cultural violence in pre-genocide Rwanda, and potentially therefore, in the 
post-genocide society, too. 
Calling on Rwandans to refute identification patterns that shaped their society for so long 
and in such dramatic ways, does not guarantee that these categories have indeed 
disappeared. This means that, in principle, Rwanda's can to reconciliation through its 
transitional justice processes denies making provision for the possibility of the ongoing 
influence of previous categories and does not begin to address in any effective way their 
underlying functions as a form of structural or cultural violence. 
In line with the Rwandan Constitution's prohibition of political activity based on ethnic 
affiliation, the Rwandan transitional justice mechanisms have been designed so as to avoid a 
discussion of the continuing role of ethnic categories. The assumption of the Rwandan 
approach to transitional justice appears to be that the legacy of ethnic categorisation can be 
overcome by an appeal to national belonging. In so doing, the transitional justice 
mechanisms actuany create the possibility for ethnic categorisation to continue operating 
under the guise of the official assertion of'Rwandanicity', which may remain an ideal rather 
than become reality. The question is in what ways such an approach to transitional justice 
would promote, or rather obstruct, reconciliation by covering up the unwitting continuation 
of the structural violence of ethnic categorisation in Rwanda. 
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Secondly, there are strong indications that at least some form of Hutu/Tutsi rivalry predates 
colonialism. The implication is that ethnic rivalry is not simply a colonial import, as the 
'official narrative' claims. Pottier remarks that 'despite uncertainty about the exact use of 
ethnic labels in nineteenth-century social and political discourse, there is today certainty that 
the European colonisers were not the first to rule Rwanda along divisive ethnic lines ... The 
[colonial] interventions were racist, but the seeds for a racialised ethnic division had well 
germinated by then.'64 Pottier also contends, more controversially, that the 'blame-it-all-on-
the-European-colonisers position' serves largely to justify Tutsi elite rule, because it does not 
take into account how Tutsi rulers collaborated with, and benefited from, colonialism.65 
If ethnic fault lines predate colonialism, this has important implications for the prospects of 
post-genocide reconciliation. It raises the question whether reco ciliation, including the 
removal of this dimension of structural violence, is possible without a more in-depth 
acknowledgment of Tutsi complicity in, and accountability for, the hostilities and atrocities 
of the past. The issue of the need for acknowledgment of Tutsi gUilt and complicity for past 
hostilities and atrocities is a crucial condition for some form of reconciliation 'with history' 
between Tutsi and Hutu, quite apart from the historical accuracy of the 'official narrative'. 
There are ways in which the two sets of issues are related but they should not be conflated. 
Of primary importance to us at this point is that the 'official narrative' makes scant provision 
for the need to acknowledge Tutsi accountability. 
Thirdly, while the 'official narrative' tends to represent post-colonial Hutu Power in an 
exclusively negative way, Hutu Power had in fact been a more nuanced and complex 
phenomenon. The 1959 revolution had the democratic objective of empowering a 
disenfranchised majority of peasants. These aims were articulated in a document central to 
the 1959 revolution, originally entitled Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native Problem in 
Rwanda. Popularly known as the Bahutu Manifesto, and signed by a group of nine Hutu 
intellectuals, it put forward and defended efforts to bring about a post-colonial revolution 
and to establish a (Hutu-dominated) majority government. The Bahutu Manifesto revolved 
around the core assertion that the Bahutu historically suffered a double oppression by 
colonisers as well as by the Tutsi. The democratising significance of Hutu Power as a force 
64 
" 
Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 112. 
Pottier, Re-jmagining Rwanda, 118. 
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for liberation has been lost in the 'official narrative' of post-genocide Rwanda." In the 
'official narrative', Hutu power is portrayed exclusively as the 'oppressor', whereas it may 
rightly also lay claim to the label of having been the 'oppressed', at least during colonialism. 
The consequences are doubly significant. Not only does the 'official narrative' not 
acknowledge the legitimate historical ideals of Hutu Power, but over time it risks 
permanently demonising Hutu identity - not least in how criminal guilt is linked to Hutu 
identity. A more nuanced understanding of Hutu Power is required if transitional justice is 
to promote reconciliation in the sense of eradicating cultural violence perpetrated in, and 
through, 'history making'. At the very least, it needs to take into account the evidence of the 
historical role of Hutu Power in the democratising thrust of post-colonial self-rule (as well as 
that of some Hutu resistance to genocide). 
Fourthly, the 'official narrative' is characterised by a curious paradox in its treatment of the 
genocide itself, both privileging it as the central event of Rwandan history but at the same 
time removing it from historical scrutiny. On the one hand, the' 1994 genocide is singled out 
as an event producing the only politically correct categories for identification and guidelines' 
of actions by the state.'7 In order to ensure that genocide never happens again, the 1994 
genocide has been made the ideological and historical cornerstone of the new regime. On 
the other hand, and at the same time, the 'official narrative' serves to block any thorough-
going public and historical analysis about what had caused the genocide, beyond its own 
tenets and assertions. Mamdani calls this the 'official narrative's' failure to put the truth of 
genocide in historical context. 68 
The representation of the more immediate dynamics of the genocide in the 'official 
narrative' needs to be questioned. The genocide could, for example, be conceptualised not 
only as the result of 'bad leadership', 'Hutu racism' and 'blind obedience of rural peasants', 
as the official history holds, but also as a defensive tactic on the part of the incumbent 
regime in a situation of war, strategically aimed at the elimination of possible civilian 
strongholds of the RPF, and consolidating power amongst the country's Hutu majority. In 
" 
" 68 
Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 83. 
Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 266. 
Mamdani. When VICtims berome Killers. 268. 
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these ways, the genocide could be seen as 'one outcome of defeat in the civil war', as 
political violence and as an outcome of the power struggle between Hutu and Tutsi elites.69 
This does not mean that one needs to 'dissolve' the genocide into the war as if it does not 
merit significant attention as a historic event in itself, as some revisionist Hutu ideologues 
tend to do. Yet the RPF, too, needs to take responsibility for its part in instigating and 
committing political atrocities both in Rwanda and in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC).70 However, the implication for the agenda of reconciliation through 
transitional justice is that while the 'official narrative' posits the 'genocide' as 'prime evil', it 
has also ensured that the underlying causes of the genocide, including sources of cultural 
and structural violence, have been inadequately investigated and examined. 
3.4. 'Recondliation with History ': A Challenge to the 'Offidal Narrative' 
Cycles of violence can be perpetuated by lingering structural inequalities, as well as by 
conflicting narratives and memories of past atrocities that continue to hold sway after direct 
violence ceases. Reconciliation therefore requires addressing the lingering impact of 
conflicting accounts of the past as it influences the present. 
Moving from 'negative' to positive peace' in post-conflict societies therefore ultimately 
requires the building of common ground between conflicting historical accounts of the past. 
Mamdani calls this process 'reconciliation with history': 'The identification of both 
perpetrator and survivor is differently constructed in conflicting historical narratives. This is 
why it is not possible to think of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda without 
a prior reconciliation with history,' writes Mamdani. 71 
69 Mamdani, When Victims become KiOers, 268. 
70 Lemarchand offers an explanation of the difference on this point between Hutu and Tutsi ideologues. 'For most 
Hutu ideologues there is only one explanation: the RPF invasion. Everything else is secondary, except the shooting down 
of Habyarimana's plane on Apri16, 1994, for which they do not hesitate to blame the RPF. From this vantage point the 
invading Tutsi army must bear the full onus of responsibility for the tragedy they brought onto themselves and their people 
in Rwanda. Much the same blinkered view of history, though admittedly closer to the truth, can be seen in the argument set 
forth by some Tutsi intellectuals, to the effect that (a) the invasion is not at issue, for it would never have happened if the 
Habyarimana regime had given them a chance to return to their fatherland~ (b) historically, the roots of genocide are 
traceable to Belgian rule, which introduced divisions where none previously existed; (c) the immediate cause of the tragedy 
must be found in the sheer perversity ofHabyarimana's genocidal clique, as well as in the dual complicity of the French in 
abetting his regime, and the international community in failing to intervene,' See Lemarchand, 'Coming to terms with the 
~ast.' 
Mamdani, When Viaims become Killers, 267, 
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Mamdani's notion needs to be developed further. First we need to identify what kind of 
approach to history is needed for the creation of historical common ground between former 
enemies. Secondly, we must identify the key dimensions or components of the process of 
achieving 'reconciliation with history'. And we need to clarify what level of agreement about 
the past would qualify as 'reconciliation with history'. 
3.4.1. 'Forgetting-but-not-Denying' versus 'Denying-through-Excessive-Remembering' 
Pragmatic notions of the need for' a usable past' in the context of nation-building should be 
differentiated from the more specific concerns of transitional justice approaches as ways of 
dealing with past political atrocities. 72 Similarly, Nietzsche's distinction between 
'antiquarian', 'monumental' and 'critical' history delineates different 'uses of the past' in 
general but does not specifically focus on dealing with past atrocities. 73 However, they can 
readily be adapted to transitional justice concerns." 
To overcome the past, it must be remembered in appropriate ways (even more so in the case 
of a past of political atrocities). Whereas 'antiquarian' history reveres and preserves the past 
for its own sake, the 'monumental' approach to the past has typically been concerned with 
'celebrating the greatness and glory of the past' while 'critical' history is concerned with 
'accountability for the past'.7S Of these, a 'critical' history would be most suited to general 
conceptions of transitional justice, not least to the extent it is shaped by human rights 
discourses. However, Nietzsche claimed that there is also a place for a 'monumental past' if 
the past is to be overcome. 76 This would apply, for example, to the recognised need of 
reconciling a post -conflict society through appropriate symbolism and memorialisation 
efforts - by convincing opposing groups to accept a common, new symbolic order rooted in 
a celebrated past." Nietzsche described this as 'an attempt to give oneself, as it were a 
posteriori, a past in which one would like to originate, in opposition to which one did 
72 See, e.g., Ernest Renan, 'What is a nation?' (Lecture presented at the Sorbonne, Paris, 11 March 1882); 
Henry Steele Commager, The Search for a Usable Past (New York: Knopf, 1967); Terence O. Ranger, 'Towards a Usable 
African Past,' in African Studies since 1945 - A Tribute to Basil Davidson, edited by Christopher Fyfe (Longman, London, 
1976). 
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ed. Daniel Breazeale (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
For one such attempt, see Andre du Toit, 'The Truth & Reconciliation Commission as Contemporary History,' in 
Toward New Histon"esfor South Africa: on the Place o/the Past in our Present, ed. Shamil Jeppie (Lansdowne: Juta Gariep, 2004), 
74 
I. 
" 
" 
Du Toit, 'The Truth & Reconciliation Commission,· 3. 
Du Toit, 'The Truth & Reconciliation Commission,' 3. 
77 See the following articles asserting the need for memorialisation and symbolic reconstruction in the Rwandan 
context: Longman and Rutagengwa, 'Memory, Identity and Community in Rwanda,' 177i Cobban, 'The Legacies of 
Collective Violence'; Lemarchand, 'Coming to terms with the Past'; Catharine Newbury, 'Ethnicity and the politics of 
history in Rwanda' Africa Today 45, 1 (January-March 1998): 7-25. 
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originate in - always a dangerous attempt because it is so hard to know the limits to denial 
of the past'. 78 
Nietzsche, however, importantly and provocatively also warned against 'an excess of 
history' in the sense of being dominated by a past that cannot be forgotten, a condition that 
can become life-threatening, and which he elsewhere calls 'a malady of history' .79 The 
question is therefore how to develop a monumental history, ensuring that history is not 
'denied', while at the same time avoiding 'an excess of history', in the sense of being 
dominated by that past. This is in line with what Paul Ricoeur refers to as the twin dangers 
of either having 'too much memory' or of having a 'lack of memory'. The former occurs 
when post-conflict societies are 'haunted by the recollection of the humiliations they suffered 
in a distant past as well as by that ofgiory past'. The latter, on the other hand, is the result of 
such societies refusing to acknowledge the past, 'as if they were fleeing from an obsession 
with their own past'.80 In the Rwandan context, both the Tutsi and Hutu communities are 
haunted by specific traumatic episodes, framed and narrated as directly attributable to the 
opposite group. 
The distinction between denial of, and dominance by, the past needs to be further refined. 
How is the middle position, somewhere between 'too much memory' and 'too little 
memory', to be conceptualised? To this end, I propose a further distinction - that between 
'forgetting' and 'denial' .81 While transitional justice approaches tend to insist on the need for 
remembering past atrocities and stress the dangers of' denial', Nietzsche rightly observes that 
overcoming the past requires the ability to forget in order to move on (which would 
evidently have to be different from simply denying past atrocities). 
This paradoxical Nietzschean notion of overcoming the past by, what can be called 
'forgetting-but-not-denying' provides a point of departure for this analysis. Denial, or what 
18 As quoted in Du Toit, 'The Truth & Reconciliation Commission,' 4. 
79 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, 64,102, 109. 
80 Paul Ricoeur, 'Can Forgiveness Heal?' in The Foundation and Application o/Moral Philosophy, ed. Hcndrik J. 
Opdebeeck (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2000), 31f. 
81 A similar attempt to arrive at 'an understanding of the many blind spots in Rwanda's official memory', is offered 
by Lemarchand, based on Ricoeur's distinction between 'thwarted memory', 'manipulated memory' and 'enforced 
memory'; see Rene Lemarchand, 'The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda,' in After Genocide - Transitional 
Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, ed. Phil Clarke and Zachary D. Kaufman (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 69-73. 
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Ricoeur calls 'oblivion', is characterised by a refusal to engage with the past at al1.82 
However, denial does not necessarily imply not talking about the past. In fact, denial often 
coincides with obsessive and oppressive remembering and fervent documentation of history, 
designed, however, to exclude and thereby subjugate opposing groups. This form of denial 
could indeed be seen as one way in which history becomes a form of cultural violence, 
justitying the use of direct violence against those one-sidedly portrayed as perpetrators, 
outsiders and as dangerous to society. 
By contrast, to 'forget' one has to remember first. One cannot forget publicly that which was 
not known in a deliberate and public way. Yet, reconciliatory forgetting engages the past in 
order to move beyond it, not to entertain it for its own sake. 'Forgetting-but-not-denying' 
lays the past to rest only after a thorough confrontation with it. Forgetting therefore 
presupposes a vigorous engagement with the past, whereas denial shuns such engagement in 
favour of silence or glib and inaccurate histories.B) 
'Forgetting-but-not-denying' entails a move beyond the preoccupation with one's own 
traumatic experiences, powerful as these may have been during an event such as a genocide, 
towards a shared understanding of the past. It includes the ability to interpret one's own 
experience within a broader context. Ricoeur writes: ' ... the meaning of what happened to 
us, whether we have actively done it to ourselves or have undergone it, is not fIXed once and 
for all ... So what can be changed to the past is its moral load, its burden of debt which 
weighs both upon the project and the present. ,84 
'Forgetting-but-not-denying' thus involves a move towards democratising the debate about 
the past, because it allows others to engage with the history of one's own suffering (for 
victims) or one's own crimes (in the case of perpetrators). Such a form ofremembering that 
takes into account divergent views, lies at the root of desirable forms of post-conflict 
memorialisation - of remembering collectively, inclusively and with a view to future 
82 Ricoeuf, ICan Forgiveness Heal?' 33. The standard work on 'denial' in the transitional justice literature is that of 
Stanley Cohen, States o/Denial-Knowing about Atrocities and Suffen'ng (Oxford: Polity Press, 2001). Cohen provides a 
psychologically oriented analysis rather than one oriented to the politics of history and memory, like Nietzsche and 
Ricoeur. 
83 'Forgetting-but-not-denying' in this sense is akin to what is often called 'closure' in psychological tenns, the ability 
to place traumatising events in a proper context and so 'forgetting' the singular horror of the immediate experience of gross 
human rights violations in favour of a more historical and comprehensive view of what happened. See, for example, Denise 
R. Beike, and Erin T. Wirth·Beaumont. 'Psychological closure as a memory phenomenon,' Memory 13, 6 (2005): 574-593. 
84 Ricoeur, 'Can Forgiveness Heal?' 33. 
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stability. In this way, forgetting eventually enables deeper and foller remembering. As Ricoeur 
remarks: 'This modifying of the past, consisting in telling it differently and from the point of 
view of the other, becomes crucially important when it concerns the foundations of the 
common history and memory.''' 
Reconciliatory forgetting of this kind cannot be achieved in abstraction but requires specific 
and concrete preconditions. For 'victims' and 'perpetrators' to be willing to forget past 
atrocities and to be reconciled as citizens, a number of basic conditions need to be met, such 
as a representative political dispensation and a reasonable chance to attain better living 
conditions. In the absence of at least some political justice and economic development, 
patterns of exclusion which marked the previous dispensation are bound to be perpetuated 
and the willingness to 'forget' severely compromised. 
'Forgetting-but-not-denying' may thus be described as the positive or desired outcome when 
survivors of violent intra-state conflict declare themselves willing to relinquish the identities 
of 'victim' and 'perpetrator' in favour of a common citizenship in order to share political 
rights and pursue post-genocide reconstruction across social fault lines and within a single 
political and economic community.86 The willingness to 'forget' past suffering most 
decidedly therefore does not equate denial. In fact, it allows, after deliberate remembering, 
victims and perpetrators to embrace their identities as 'citizens', thereby escaping a future 
dominated by 'too much memory'. 
However, where voices representing opposing perspectives are systematically excluded in a 
hegemonic, all-consuming and coercive portrayal of the past, and where this exclusion is 
experienced as an ongoing form of cultural violence, it becomes difficult or impossible for 
those who are excluded to 'move on', that is, to forget. This situation represents 'denying-
through-excessive-remembering' - the opposite of 'forgetting-but-not-denying'. 
If 'reconciliation with history' requires an approach of 'forgetting-but-not-denying', but not 
'denying-through-excessive-remembering', what are the practical steps or components of 
such a process? 
as Ricoeur, 'Can Forgiveness Heal?' 33. 
86 For an extended version of this argument, see Mark A. Drumbl, 'Punishment, Post-Genocide: From Guilt to 
Shame to Civis in Rwanda,' New York University Law Review 75,5 (November 2000): 1292-1308. 
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3.5. Towards 'Reconciliation with History' 
A minimalist understanding of 'reconciliation with history' would entail no more than a 
non-violent engagement (in the form of entering into debate or dialogue without necessarily 
reaching agreement) between rival groups about the interpretation of key events in the 
country's history and their significance for the new dispensation. A 'thicker' conception of 
reconciliation, by contrast, would require more than 'an agreement to disagree'. It would 
seek a 'settling of accounts' between victims, perpetrators of past atrocities, as well as 
bystanders and other citizens. 
3.5.1. From Historical Exclusion to Debate to a Settling of Accounts 
A first, modest step towards Mamdani's 'reconciliation with history' would presumably be a 
process of non-violent engagement between the perspectives and historical claims of 
opposing groups in an effort to generate deeper mutual insight into opposing views. To begin 
with, this could take the form of engaging in open-ended historical debate on key issues 
regarding past political atrocities. 
It is important to acknowledge that debating history in the context of a post-conflict society 
could well prove counter-productive. Therefore the reopening of historical controversies 
between erstwhile enemies carries considerable risks. Such historical debates could spark 
fresh cycles of violence unless they are inclusively framed. Contrasting historical narratives 
produced for sectional and partisan constituencies could, in fact, consolidate and even 
deepen divisions in post-conflict society. This could motivate revenge attacks, but could also 
favour the newly powerful, and therefore contain subtle forms of cultural violence that 
support ongoing forms of structural violence. The perpetuation of violence is not only due to 
conflict between histories, but to the manner in which history is debated and produced in the 
wake of conflict. 
There is therefore an important difference between the sectional and partisan uses of 
narratives of past political atrocities, such as those used to motivate revenge or consolidate 
victor's power and former adversaries formulating 'stories' about these atrocities and the 
conflict more generally in inclusive and more self-reflexive ways. In truth and reconciliation 
commissions, for example, contradicting perspectives, such as those of victims and 
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perpetrators, are recorded within the same process. These views, standing side by side, 
profess to the inclusive nature of such a process and moreover the nature of the project of 
creating a shared history beyond the conflict - not by absolutising one side or the other, but 
by allowing adversaries to offer their differing perspectives to a shared project designed to 
make sense of the past. 
By contrast, it seems that the official policy in Rwanda does not allow for this kind of 
historical debate. Imediately after the genocide, the Ministry of Education, for example, 
placed a moratorium on the teaching of Rwandan history in schools out of fear for the 
conflict that such as debate might engender. 'Almost a decade later', researchers comment, 
'this emergency measure remains in place.'87 Maria Hodgkin claims that this process of 'the 
repression of discussion of divisive and contested moments in Rwandan history, both within 
and outside the school curriculum, will only serve to create new dynamics of social 
exclusion. ,88 
3.5.2. Including 'Little Narratives' 
The latter leads us to a second dimension of 'reconciliation with history' , over and above the 
non-violent engagement between historical perspectives that might have been at the root of 
the original conflict, namely, the chance for individual victims and perpetrators to contribute 
to the official historical record of a post-conflict society within a framework of reconciliation 
and truth-seeking. It concerns the measure to which a post-conflict society, in addition to 
facilitating an engagement between the master narratives of former adversaries, enables 
ordinary citizens (as victims and perpetrators) to tell their own particular stories concerning 
past atrocities. 'Reconciliation with history' not only entails engagement across major social 
divisions, but also a 'bottom-up' process that enables individual narratives to impact on the 
national consensus. Openness across conflict lines needs to be augmented with openness 
towards the 'grass roots'. So far, this chapter has worked around the notion of the 'official 
narrative', describing its structure and logic, problematising it and arguing for the need to 
87 Sarah Warshauer Freedman, DeD Kambancta, Beth Lewis Samuelson, Innocent Mugisha, Immaculee 
Mukashema, Evode Mukama. Jean Mutabaruka, Harvey M. Weinstein and Timothy Longman, 'Confronting the past in 
Rwandan Schools'. in My Neighbor, My Enemy, ed, Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 248. 
88 Marian Hodgkin, 'Reconciliation in Rwanda: Education, History and the State'. Journal of International Affairs 60, 
I (Fall/Winter 2006): 199-210 [ElectronicJ. Available at: 
http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/ehest! detail?vid-3&hid -120&sid -7cc45419+2e7a-451 e-8e06· 
02Q1326d8bd2%40sessionmgr9&bdata - JnNpdGU9ZWhyc30tbGI2Z0%3d%3dlldb-aph&AN -23532432 [June 2008J. 
See also Freedman et.al., in My Neighbor, My Enemy, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 248f. 
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open it to critical questioning and debate, including a possible engaging with counter-
narratives. All of this concerns narratives at the level of macro- or master narratives. Now, I 
would like to extend that to the level of the need to allow space for 'little narratives'. 
Whereas the former manner of exclusion relates to the relationship between political 
opponents with radically different views of history, favouring the one above the other in a 
culturally violent way, this paragraph contends that cultural violence may also occur in the 
relation between the 'official narrative' and ordinary citizens, when individual accounts of 
past atrocities are ignored in favour of the 'official narrative' presented as complete and 
adequate in and of itself - without the recording of individual memories regarding the past. 
Ordinary victim narratives are similar to what Lyotard, in a different context, called 'the 
little narrative [that) remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention'; they not only 
challenge established meta-narratives, but hegemonic representation of the past as such. 8' 
Lyotard writes within the context of the postmodern challenge to totalising modernist 
discourses, a challenge which he defines as the fundamental 'incredulity towards meta-
narratives'.'o On the one hand, he affirms the epistemological validity of such little narratives 
as legitimate knowledge, but on the other hand also makes a case for what has become 
known as constructing 'history from below' or building a picture of the past through the 
painstaking labour of piecing together individual narratives. 
In transitional justice, a similar endeavour has received increasing recognition in the form of 
public truth-telling at victims' hearings as a legitimate counter to the official record of a 
conflict. Victims allowed to tell their own stories of past atrocities, typically do not present 
comprehensive perspectives; rather, they serve to challenge and unravel claims of hegemonic 
narratives to represent a comprehensive and authoritative account of past political atrocities. 
Truth processes in the context of transitional justice are particularly well suited to create 
opportunities for these 'little narratives' to proliferate, in the form of victim testimonies and 
perpetrator statements." These incomplete, often incoherent and even conflicting 'histories', 
the memories and perspectives of particular victims and perpetrators, form an important 
89 Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard, The Postmodem Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1979), 60. 
'10 Lyotard, xxiv. 
9] See Stephanus F. Du Toit, 'Ideas of Truth and Revelation in the Light of the Challenge of Post modernism' 
(D. Phil diss., Oxford University, 1995), 68f. 
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component of reconciliation with history during times of transition, ensuring that the new 
rapprochement does not result in fresh exclusions and new forms of cultural violence. 
There are therefore two related dangers when seeking to construct a historical common 
ground (or monumental history) after conflict, namely, preventing debate between 
competing histories by simply replacing one hegemonic history with another - thus avoiding 
transformative engagement between opposing historical views - and excluding individual 
stories or narratives that might challenge the notion that the 'official narrative' contains a 
complete representation of the past. As we move on to assess the Rwandan cultural 
framework for transitional justice, as reflected in its 'official narrative', we need to establish 
whether it is constructing historical narratives as a resource of 'cultural violence' or, 
conversely, enabling truth processes in such a way that these might serve the goal of helping 
to eradicate or at least minimise cultural violence by finding new, less exclusionary ways for 
history to function in Rwanda, by stimulating engagement between Hutu and Tutsi versions 
of Rwandan history as well as by enabling ordinary Rwandans in voicing their memories, 
experiences and perspectives. 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter determined that Rwanda's colonial and post-colonial eras had been marked by 
high levels of cultural violence (in the form of exclusionary historical myths such as the 
'Hamitic thesis'), that served to provide justifications for ongoing structural violence (first 
against Hutus and later against Tutsis) and eventually provided the ideological framework 
for the genocide ideology ofHutu Power as the impetus behind the genocide's extraordinary 
high levels of direct violence. Today this ideology continues in the form of genocide 
denialism. 
Moreover, I argued that Rwanda's official post-genocide narrative likewise runs the risk of 
perpetuating fresh cycles of cultural violence by silencing credible alternative historical 
perspectives and closing down space for public participation in producing a shared view of 
Rwanda's past. The 'official narrative' has a central significance in Rwanda's domestic 
approach to transitional justice. Next to Gacaca it is the central component of that domestic 
approach to transitional justice. For their part revisionists (and those who can be accused of 
'genocide-laundering') seek to either deny or downplay the magnitude of the genocide. The 
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prevalence of both these historical frameworks underscores the need for 'reconciliation with 
history' to counter these invocations of history which otherwise might serve to justify 
renewed cycles of cultural or other forms of violent exclusion. 
To understand more precisely what this would mean in a post-genocide society, I used 
Nietzsche's distinctions between 'monumental' and 'critical history' to develop the ideas of 
'forgetting-but-not-denying' as against that of 'denying-through-excessive-remembering'. 
'Forgetting but not denying' as a desired outcome of a process of reconciliation, would entail 
that survivors of violent intra-state conflict declare themselves willing to relinquish the 
identities of 'victim' and 'perpetrator' in favour of a common citizenship in order to share 
political rights and pursue post-genocide reconstruction within a single political and 
economic community. 
Through this analysis we arrive at the point where concrete steps could be identified towards 
realising 'reconciliation with history', defined not as the reconfiguration of conflicting 
identities within a common national framework per se, but primarily as the eradication of 
violence in all its forms - including, in this case, cultural violence. These steps include, but 
are not limited to, the creation of opportunities for engagement with historical difference as 
part of the quest for national unity, together with space for individual narratives to be 
voiced, recorded and formally acknowledged. This reasoning leads me to conclude that, for 
a transitional justice process to be contributing to reconciliation in the sense of eradicating 
cultural violence, it would have to contribute to more open debate about the past, as well as 
the recording and acknowledgment of 'little narratives'. 
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Chapter 4: Challenging Structural Violence through the Rule of 
Law 
'All human beings are equal before the law. They shall enjoy, without any 
discrimination, equal protection of the law.' 
Article 16 of the Rwandan Constitution 
In Chapter 1, post-conflict 'reconciliation' was conceptualised as the removal of cultural and 
structural violence. Whereas the previous chapter focused on cultural violence, this chapter 
considers the removal of structural violence as an underlying obstacle to reconciliation in 
Rwanda. To what extent are Rwanda's transitional justice measures conceived so as to 
contribute to the establishment of the rule of law within the context of a post-genocide 
society? As in the previous chapter, the focus here is on the mandates and founding conditions 
of the various transitional justice measures and not on an evaluation of their outcomes. 
Following Galtung, we have earlier defined structural violence as forms of state-sanctioned 
inequality, not least the institutions and practices shaped by the racial and ethnic 
classifications which also structured the genocide. For our purposes, this raises the question 
of how Rwanda's transitional justice processes, and their efforts to classify the popUlation in 
order to execute their respective mandates, relates to the legacy of racial and ethnic 
classification. 
This question can be answered, like in the case of cultural violence discussed in the previous 
chapter, first by judging Rwanda's transitional justice processes against their own criteria. 
Secondly, a different set of criteria can be postulated, derived from broader normative 
discourses in the transitional justice literature more generally. In the first instance, 
transitional justice processes need to be judged against the benchmark of reconciliation 
defined in Rwandan terms and, in the second case, against reconciliation defined more 
broadly with reference to the eradication of forms of structural violence which impedes 
democracy, the rule oflaw and human rights. 
This chapter seeks to lay the foundation for the discussion of the Gacaca courts in the next 
chapter about the extent to which transitional justice in Rwanda has contributed, or could 
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contribute, to building the rule of law, formally and substantively, through its own practices 
and its likely impact on the broader jUdiciary. 
It does so in four sections: the first section defines more carefully and specifically those areas 
of 'structural' violence that transitional justice in Rwanda need to address in order to 
promote reconciliation; the second section describes the broader legal context in which 
transitional justice took shape in Rwanda, in order to better understand the forms of 
structural violence that were likely to exist within the post-genocide judicial system and 
which transitional justice would have to counter; the third section looks more closely at how 
Rwandan transitional justice defined its participants in order to see to what extent previous 
discriminatory categories (including importantly those of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi'), and thus the 
discriminatory legal framework represented by these categories, were reproduced or 
transcended in the proceedings of the transitional justice programmes; and the fourth section 
looks at how Rwandan transitional justice programmes sought to handle the vexed issue of 
attributing individual accountability for genocide in a context where collective action played 
such an important role. This last section, which entails a more critical discussion of 
Rwanda's transitional justice programmes, as measured against broader norms and 
standards, finally sets a benchmark for the Rwandan context in order for transitional justice 
processes to be seen to act according to human rights standards, thereby helping to overcome 
structural violence in the judicial system and thus promoting reconciliation. 
4.1. Law as 'Stmctural Violence' 
The massive and direct violence of the 1994 genocide has come to dominate Rwandan 
history and politics so much that it may seem inappropriate to emphasise the importance of 
structural violence in relation to the genocide. Yet any investigation of the pre-genocide 
period, the genocide itself or its aftermath soon uncovers a range of social, institutional and 
structural features without which the 1994 events simply cannot be understood. 
'Structural violence' is taken here to designate 'violence (that) is built into the structure and 
shows up as unequal power and consequently unequal life chances':' The most obvious 
example of such state-sponsored structural violence in Rwanda was the official system of 
ethnic categorisation, exemplified by the identity documents issued first by the colonial 
92 Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research'. Journal of Peace Research, 6 (January 1969): 171. 
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rulers and maintained by post-colonial regimes, which classified Rwandans into Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa groups, each with significantly different 'life chances':3 These identity documents, 
and the policies that supported and flowed from such official differentiations, provided the 
basis for a discriminatory legal dispensation covering every aspect of life, much like in 
apartheid South Africa. This, commentators claim, had the effect of hardening historically 
fluid ethnic divisions into immutable 'racial' boundaries between 'Hutu', 'Tutsi' and 'Twa'.94 
Significantly, structural violence in this form persisted despite two post-colonial regime 
changes, which merely inverted relations between victims and oppressors - targeting Hutus 
with discriminatory legislation in the colonial era and Tutsis under the post-colonial Hutu 
regimes.95 
From a perspective that looks further than merely bringing to an end the mass killings in 
some form of 'negative peace', the relevance of these underlying structural features must be 
vital. If transitional justice aims to build 'positive peace', it follows that it should aim at 
removing the vestiges of structural violence, not least in the form of institutions and practices 
shaped by the dreaded racial and ethnic classifications that eventually issued in the genocide. 
These were closely associated with violations of the rule of law. The way the law was 
applied in pre-genocide Rwanda represented an important instance of structural violence, 
where 'leaders consistently used the law to protect themselves and their supporters from 
prosecution for serious violations of human rights. Over time, this pattern of legislative 
behaviour became so entrenched that, instead of signifying the rule of law, it resembled the 
'institutionalisation of impunity'. 96 
The notion of the rule oflaw (conceptualised as including formal equality before the law and 
fair administration of judicial processes) is used here in both a formal and a substantive 
sense.97 Formally, and in a minimalist sense, the rule of law is concerned with the consistent 
application of rules and procedures, as wen as a general acceptance of this fact by the 
" See Timothy Longman, 'Documentation and Individual Identity in Africa: Identity Cards and Ethnic Self· 
perception in Rwanda,' in Documenting Individual Identity; The Development alState Practises in the Modem World, ed. Jane 
Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
94 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 76f. 
95 See Longman, 'Documentation and Individual Identity'; Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 76f. 
96 For an exposition of ' the institutionalisation of impunity' in the pre-genocide Rwanda, see Martin Ngoga, 'The 
Institutionalisation of Impunity: A Judicial Perspective on the Rwandan Genocide,' in After Genocide - Transitional Justice, 
Post-Conflict Reconstrnaion and Recondliation in Rwanda and Beyond, ed. Phil Clarke and Zachary D. Kaufman (New York: 
Col umbia University Press, 2009), 321-332. 
97 rule of law in its formal sense refers to the consistent and fair application of the laws of a country by its judiciary, 
regardless of the background or power of an individual appearing before it, whereas the rule of law in a substantive sense 
refers to the measure to which a country's laws conform to human rights standards. 
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citizenry, not in the fIrst place as a result of the content of this body of law, but rather on 
strength of the fact that laws are applied consistently and comprehensively (i.e. to all 
individuals). In this sense, the rule oflaw could be consistent, not only with societies where 
there is a just legal order, but also with a (consistently applied) legalistic discriminatory 
order, as was the case of apartheid South Africa. In this sense the rule of law could thus in 
fact be compatible with structural violence. Having the rule of law in the formal sense does 
not exempt a society from experiencing structural violence in and through the law. 
Substantively, the rule of law requires a normative and proactive commitment to human 
rights and freedoms in addition to the consistent application of these principles in all cases. 
This latter objective is derived from the view that Mani calls the 'maximalist' defmition of 
the rule of law, which holds that human rights and values are a 'fundamental underpinning 
of the rule of law' .98 In this substantive sense, the rule of law would not be consistent with 
legalist apartheid or the discriminatory uses of the Rwandan ethnic and racial classifIcatory 
scheme. It would presumably also be incompatible with structural violence, as a substantive 
commitment to the rule of law would imply, not only the consistent application of the rule 
oflaw, but also a fair, non-discriminatory and just legal order. 
Impunity, a situation where certain perpetrators are not held accountable under the law for 
their crimes, represents one form of structural violence. Another form of structural violence 
would be when individuals are wrongfully prosecuted and punished (often in the name of a 
formalistic commitment to the rule of law), either because they broke unconscionable laws, 
or because they are targeted, for whatever reason, by those with the power to manipulate the 
courts. For our purposes, impunity as well as wrongful prosecution both imply instances of 
structural violence, whether through actions taken by the courts or another authority, such 
as the executive or military command issuing a formal amnesty, or through simply by failing 
to act at all. Whereas impunity typically results from either a diminished capacity of the 
judiciary (implying that certain individuals or categories of individuals remain effectively 
outside the ambit of the law) or the discriminatory application of the law (exempting certain 
individuals or categories of individuals from accountability under the law but not others), 
wrongful prosecution is most often the result of either a discriminatory legal system or 
911 See for example, Paul Craig, 'Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework: Public Law (Autumn 1997): 467-487; Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, 'Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: 
Implications for Practitioners,' Carnegie Paper 55, Carnegie Endowment/or International Peace (2005): 6f.; Joseph Raz, 'The 
Rule of Law and its Virtue,' Law Quarterly Review 93 (1977): 195, 198; see also Mani, Beyond Retribution, 28. 
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discriminatory application of the legal system. When such practices become widespread 
and/ or institutionalised, this would amount to structural violence. In post-genocide 
Rwanda, a culture of impunity threatened not only as a result of the destruction of the 
judiciary, resulting in virtually no capacity to exercise the rule of law (let alone hold 
accountable those responsible for the genocide), but also through a history of unfair and 
unjust application of the law.99 
A judiciary with an entrenched history of discriminatory practice, and marked by the 
institutionalisation of impunity, typically lacks legitimacy and is ill suited to establish a new 
culture of the rule of law. 100 The public perception of the judiciary then becomes that of an 
institution complicit in a history of structural violence. This perception in itself constitutes 
an obstacle to building the rule oflaw. 
In these circumstances, the challenge for transitional justice must involve firstly ensuring 
that citizens are treated fairly within its own processes regardless of their positions or 
background, but secondly also helping to eradicate structural violence in the broader 
judiciary - by recommending and stimulating institutional reform. Dealing with the 
perpetrators of past political atrocities in a manifestly fair manner would be an important 
step towards addressing impunity, provided that it succeeded in holding accountable those 
who perpetrated genocide, as well as to extend the ambit of the fledgling jUdiciary to areas 
where it had previously not been able to reach. At the same time, transitional justice 
measures would need to be careful not to become guilty of wrongful prosecution. 
It is widely accepted, also within Rwanda, that transitional justice should aim to help restore 
the rule of law. In this regard, the objective of Rwanda's post-genocide 'reconciliation' and 
transitional justice processes significantly prioritises the removal of the pre-genocide racial 
and ethnic classification system and thus of the structural violence associated with that. It 
needs to be kept in mind however, that 'reconciliation' as an objective of transitional justice 
has, as we have seen, a quite different normative content for the 'Rwandan approach' as 
compared to 'reconciliation' as an objective of transitional justice where that is linked to 
99 For a discussion of structural impunity in Rwanda, see Ngoga, 'The Institutionalisation oflmpunity,' 321f. 
100 Mamdani states of the colonised Rwanda, for example, that 'the legal basis of group discrimination was race' 
whereas in the post-colonial state 'this two-fold discrimination, civic and ethnic, became the basis of a distinction between 
two types of citizenship in the post-colonial period: Civic and ethnic'. Thus concludes Mamdani: 'Even if conservative 
nationalism turned the world designed by the settler upside down, it did not change it'; see Mamdani, When Victims become 
Killers, 24f, 31. 
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democratic transitions. Nonetheless, if reconciliation in the sense of the eradication of 
structural violence through the law is to be enhanced through transitional justice, it would 
have to help build the rule oflaw, both formally and substantially, in its own operations and 
in the jUdiciary more generally. It furthermore has a unique opportunity to help overcome 
entrenched perceptions about the judiciary as an instrument of impunity or wrongful 
prosecution, given its typical prominence during political transition. This is true of 
transitional justice measures in Rwanda as much as anywhere else. 
4.2. Domestic Attempts at Genodde Justice since 1994 
The Rwandan genocide obviously posed an urgent challenge to bring the perpetrators to 
account. However, the criminal justice system had been all but destroyed during the 
genocide. In these circumstances, there was an obvious danger that a 'culture of impunity' 
might result. 
The Rwandan state sought to deal with this threat of impunity in a number of ways. The 
imperatives of securing justice in the face of such crimes against humanity also prompted a 
more systematic and ambitious response by international agencies than any previous 
genocide had done. Initiatives to bring perpetrators to book included the ICTR in Arusha, 
Tanzania, prosecutions in national courts in Rwanda as well as in Belgium, Switzerland and 
the United States and community trials in a revived traditional arbitration system called 
Gacaca - where approximately one million cases have been heard to date. 
On closer analysis, it appears that three factors bolstered this expanded response to the 
demands for 'justice'. Firstly, a convincing military victory of the RPF over the MRND (D) 
regime enabled the unfettered concentration of state resources, meagre as these were, on 
genocide prosecutions. Victory ensured control over state institutions and the judiciary but 
also the apprehension of a large number of alleged perpetrators. Once the RPF gained 
control of Kigali, arrests of suspected perpetrators began without delay.lOl 
Secondly, the massive scope and horrific nature of the genocide provided powerful moral 
support to the new rulers to pursue justice against their political opponents. This moral high 
ground was further strengthened by a growing international consensus, captured in the 
101 VilIa.Vicencio, Nantu}ya and Savage, Building Nations, 86. 
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Rome Statute, that amnesties and legal impunity are not acceptable for crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and genocide. Although the treaty only came into effect after the 
Rwandan genocide, it nevertheless added considerable international pressure and resolve to 
the prosecution of the genocidaires. 102 
Thirdly, 'justice' was not only advocated by the new government, but also by a chastised 
international community, which pledged substantial resources in an effort to make amends 
for its obvious failure to intervene during the genocide. The new government of Rwanda 
regularly reminded the international community that the failure to intervene timeously 
created 'obligations'.103 Gerald Gahima, secretary-general of Rwanda's ministry of justice, 
for example, argued: 'If the international community had acted, the Human Rights 
Violations of 1994 would not have taken place. It was possible to stop [the genocide]. 0104 
Early efforts to bring genocide perpetrators to book were shaped by two major sets of factors: 
on the one hand, the magnitude of the task posed massive logistical and operational 
challenges; on the other hand, an adequate legal framework was required within which the 
operation could be conducted. We will briefly consider each of these challenges in tum. 
Firstly, enormous logistical challenges faced the new regime. Although Rwanda had been a 
relatively well-organised state before 1994, the combination of war and genocide left the 
country, and its judicial systems, in ruins. Gourevitch remarks about post-genocide Rwanda 
that 'everything needed doing - at once' .105 Similarly, Rene Degni-Sequi, UN Special 
Rapporteur, wrote in his report after a second visit to Rwanda in May 1994: 'The FPR 
[RPF], which has won a military victory, has only an embryonic administration, a war 
administration, which at the present time is fulfIlling a transitional role; in fact, everything 
remains to be done. The country needs to be rebuilt virtually from nothing.'l06 A displaced 
popUlation amounting to millions of scattered Rwandans had to be stabilised and basic 
102 [Electronic]. Available at: http://www icc-coi.jnt/Hbrary/about/officiaijournal/Rome Statute English pd[[12 
July 2007J. 
103 For an elaborate illustration ofthis diplomacy by the Rwandan government, see Pottier, Re.imagining Rwanda, 
151-179. 
104 Gerald Gahima, 'What is understood by Justice in Rwanda today?' (Paper presented at the Newick Park Initiative 
conference entitled The Role of the Churches in the Restoration of Justice in Rwanda, Kigali, 19-21 August 1997, in Re.lmagining 
Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Misinjonnotion in the Late Twentieth Century, Jahan Pottier (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 177. 
105 Gourevitch, We Wish to Infonn You, 229. 
106 UN, 'Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr. R. Degni-Segui, Special Rapporteur 
of the Commission on Human Rights', UN Doc. E/CN4/1995/12. Hereafter Un Doc. E/CN4/1995/12 (12 August 1994.) 
[ElectronicJ. Available at: h.tp:llwww.metafro.be/grandslacs/grandslacsdir200/2433.pdr/base view [9 Apri1200BJ. 
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security arrangements made. At the same time basic state institutions and core infrastructure 
had to be rebuilt. The army had to be stabilised, the economy restarted and a transitional 
government installed. Two objectives dominated this agenda: preventing further violence 
between large numbers of displaced Hutus, returning Tutsis, the RPF and groups of armed 
interahamwe poised across the border in the DRelO7 
Given these circumstances, early initiatives to affect genocide justice were extensive, but also 
had considerable limitations. During the fIrst few months, thousands of genocide suspects 
were arrested. The fust genocide cases in Rwandan courts commenced in 1995 but the 
majority of suspects continued to await trial in dire prison conditions for long periods of 
time. By 1999, some 120,000 suspected genocidaires were in prison, the vast majority still 
awaiting trial. The prosecutor in Kigali later estimated that as much as twenty percent of 
these early detainees were, in a11like1ihood, innocent.108 
The legal system, already weak before the genocide, was decimated during it. Before the 
genocide, there were 758 'judges' and investigators, 70 prosecutors and 631 staff in the 
jUdiciary. After the genocide, these fIgures dropped to 244 'judges', 12 prosecutors and 137 
staff. 109 The new government, with the help of foreign donors, undertook an extensive (and 
in retrospect largely successful) rebuilding process of the judiciary, which saw judges and 
other staff trained and appointed, a bar association established in 1997 and courts restored. 110 
Despite this progress, numerous problems continued to beset genocide prosecutions. By 
1997, only 322 of the thousands in jail had been tried in 105 trials. Of these, III were 
sentenced to death while 9 were acquitted. In April 1998, in the only official executions to 
date for genocide crimes, 22 death row inmates were executed by fIring squads in various 
sport stadiums around the country. 
107 
10. 
Longman and Rutagengwa, 'Memory, Identity and Community in Rwanda', 162. 
Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, Conclusion. 
IIl9 Villa-Vicencio, Nantulya and Savage, BUIlding Nations, 86. These figures afe counter-intuitive. They imply that 
there were more 'judges' in the judiciary pre-genocide than either 'prosecutors' or 'administrative staW. While these figures 
are corroborated by the United States Embassy of Rwanda website; [Electronic] Available at: 
http://www.rwandemb orgliustice/justice html [18 June 2009]. they beg further explanation. The high number of 'judges' 
compared to other legal personnel is explained by Rwanda's decentralised system, which had many local courts where the 
large majority of 'judges' have historically - both before 1994 and up till 2003 when important reforms took place - been 
non-professionals with no formal law qualifications, but only six months' training. 
110 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, Conclusion. 
58 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
In August 1997, Vice-President Kagame remarked: 'this is an incomprehensible situation 
and this is the most essential: there are innocent people, arbitrarily detained. Justice must be 
done for these innocent people; no one should be unjustly detained.'111 Having 
acknowledged the unacceptably slow rate of prosecutions, authorities began to explore 
alternative measures to deal with the vast backlog of cases. A year after Kagame's 
comments, the government publicly mooted the possibility of releasing significant numbers 
of genocide suspects. Two previous screening exercises by the government, in 1995 and 
1997, enabled the release of 3,365 detainees in 1998, despite protests from the survivor 
community, but this initiative was curtailed by the possibility (and in some cases the 
eventuality) of revenge attacks once prisoners returned to their villages. This prompted 
renewed government resolve to see the cases dealt with as full criminal trials. A target of 
trying 5,000 cases by 1998 was subsequently set, but the state succeeded in producing only 
864 judgments. 1I2 By 2002, still only 7,211 trials had been completed. At the same time, 
numerous deaths in detention occurred due to dire overcrowding in detention facilities 
across the country. By March 2003, 24,873 detainees in total had been released including 
14,636 'confessed detainees', that is, detainees who made use of a special plea bargain 
dispensation included in the 'Organic Laws' described in more detail below. 
Despite all these various efforts, by 2003 there were still some 100,000 genocide accused in 
jail, many of whom had, nine years on, not yet been charged. Not only did this constitute a 
legal crisis, but, writes African Rights (AR) , 'the ever-growing prison population was a 
source of political tensions and social division within Rwanda'.w Moreover, since all 
genocide accused were Hutu, these efforts to achieve genocide justice threatened to divide 
the popUlation along ethnic and racial lines. 
Secondly, the absence of an adequate legal framework posed aforther major challenge in the 
quest to prosecute genocide suspects. Before 1994, Rwandan law did not recognise genocide 
as a crime. Creating a legal framework within which to prosecute genocide crimes proved 
complex and frustrating. An early attempt to pass a law in 1995 was declared 
unconstitutional by Parliament. A second law in 1996, known as the first in a series of 
111 
112 
III 
As quoted in Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, Conclusion. 
Des Forges, LeaYe None to Tell the Story, Conclusion. 
AR, 'Confessing to Genocide: Responses to Rwanda's Genocide Law,' Report 17 (June 2000), 1. 
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'Organic Laws', officially incorporated genocide as a crime into Rwandan law and provided 
the basis for prosecutions to follow. 114 
Frequently amended smce 1996, the 'Organic Laws' have provided the main legal 
framework for genocide justice in Rwanda. Originally 3 I December 1997 was set as the 
deadline for all genocide cases to have been heard, but, when this proved unrealistic, the 
deadline was extended to 3 I December 1999.115 When the next deadline also proved 
unattainable, efforts to find alternative means to deal with genocide accountability gained 
momentum. This eventually resulted in the adoption of Gacaca, an entirely new quasi-legal 
system designed to deal exclusively with genocide crimes, and comprising thousands of 
community courts across Rwanda running parallel to the formal judiciary as a codified form 
of traditional justice. 
From this discussion, it is clear that in order to reaffirm accountability under the law after 
genocide a serious, if initially flawed, attempt was made to bring genocidaires to account. To 
this end, an elaborate set of laws was developed to ensure that prosecutions were conducted 
consistently and fairly. In terms of punishment, executions were kept to a minimum, but 
continuing mass incarceration remained a major logistical and human rights dilemma -
recognised as such by the government as well as by external observers. In response to these 
challenges, the government eventually turned to the adaptation of customary justice 
practices as measures of transitional justice, to which we return below, for an alternative 
process of dealing with genocide crimes. 
Taken together, this amounts to a sustained quest by the Rwandan state for genocide justice 
instead of a culture of impunity. To what extent did it also comply with, and contribute to, 
the rule of law and thus to the eradication of structural violence associated with impunity 
114 The first 'Organic Law' categorised perpetrators into four categories: Category 1 included those who had planned, 
organised, incited, supervised and instigated genocide. The Supreme Court prosecutor subsequently published a list of 
1,946 names of those suspected of masterminding the genocide. Category 2 consisted of suspected perpetrators of murder, 
or of attacks resulting in death. Category 3 comprised those suspected of causing serious injury, and Category 4 those who 
committed property crime. Category 1 convictions carried as maximum sentence the death penalty; Category 2, life 
imprisonment; Category 3, imprisonment and payment of damages; and Category 4, the payment of reparations. 
Perpetrators convicted in Category 1 were 'jointly and severally' liable for the genocide as a whole, while those convicted in 
the other categories were held responsible only for their own immediate actions. Included in the 1996 'Organic Law'. was a 
system of confession and reduced sentences subject to an apology and full confession. including details about the actions of 
accomplices. A detainee who apologised and made a full confession could benefit from a much reduced sentence. The law 
also established special chambers for genocide crimes in the civil and military courts. See Organic Law No 08/96 of 30 
August 1996; [Electronic]. Available at; http://www.preyentgenocide.org/law/domestic/rwanda.htm [9 April 2008J. See 
also Dubois, 'Rwanda's national criminal courts', 720. 
115 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, Conclusion. 
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and wrongful prosecution? Given the overwhelming logistical challenges of the initial 
circumstances, the obvious way out for the RPF government could have been sought in 
summary trials on a mass basis. By comparison, going the route of full criminal trials, 
developing alternative policies to deal with the backlog of cases, and eventually developing 
and fine-tuning a legislative framework, arguably indicates a strong commitment to the rule 
of law, at least in the formal administrative sense. Yet, the steady rise in extrajudicial 
executions by the police since late 2006 may be a symptom of an erosion (or failure to take 
hold) offaith in the rule oflaw.1I6 
However, in terms of establishing a rule of law culture in a more substantive sense, this 
Rwandan approach to transitional justice has also received criticism. A central question 
concerns the almost exclusive focus on 'crimes of genocide', which, by definition, involves 
only one side of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict. In consequence, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity allegedly committed by some holding power in the current government have been 
ignored in domestic prosecutions, inevitably creating the impression of political influence 
and bias in the process.117 Justified by the official narrative, which postulates the genocide as 
the single most decisive event in Rwandan history, efforts to deal with the genocide past 
have not sought to include other categories of crimes. The official argument seems to be that 
genocide, as the decisive moment in Rwandan history, is also the most fundamental crime 
of the past, in response to which all other crimes committed during this period (including 
war crimes and crimes against humanity) need to be judged, and in comparison to which all 
these other crimes pale into insignificance. 
Bearing in mind the central question of building the rule of law through transitional justice, 
both formally and substantively, we are specifically interested in how these early forms of 
genocide justice conceptualised its participants. It is on this issue that one can detect an 
important example of the confluence of past and present categorisation schemes - inherent 
in attempts to subject one group or another to structural violence. In large part, this is due to 
the historical fact that the genocide was a Hutu-driven crime aimed primarily against Tutsi 
victims. As genocide justice dominated the dawn of the post-genocide state, Tutsis therefore 
found themselves perpetually cast by and large as 'the genocide victims' and Hutus as the 
116 Freedom House. '2007 Country Report - Rwanda,' [Electronicl. Available at: 
www freedomhouse,org/modules/publications/ccr/modPrintVersion [5 January 2008]. 
117 Des Forges and Longman, 'Legal Responses', 49. 
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perennial 'genocide perpetrators', this despite the fact that during the preceding years 
political atrocities were committed on all sides of the conflict. However, the more 
substantive commitment of developing a legal framework equally concerned with all victims 
of human rights violations in the country regardless of the side they fought on during the 
genocide, and not only with those who were regarded victims of the genocide, is in need of 
further investigation. 
4.3. The Transitional Justice Framework/or Categon'sing Rwandans 
In this section, we investigate in more depth how the categories employed by the transitional 
justice programme in Rwanda to conceptualise 'victims' and 'perpetrators' of genocide relate 
to the prior categories 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' as racial and ethnic identities. Our analysis will be 
especially concerned with the question to what extent the function of these categories in the 
transitional justice process served to remove the 'structural violence' of that prior categorical 
framework in favour of a more equitable framework for the rule of law - based not only on 
formal or consistent application of the law, but also on a substantive commitment to human 
rights. To determine this, we need to look quite closely at who could claim 'victim' status in 
the context of this transitional justice process, who would face genocide justice as a 
'perpetrator' and who was seen as complicit 'bystanders'. 
4.3.1 Who is the 'Genocide Victim'? 
The 1985 United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Powerl18 defines a victim of genocide states without an explicit reference to human 
rights. Yet, subsequent UN documents have stressed the importance of international rights 
and humanitarian law.119 Significantly for our purposes, the defmition is specifically 
u. : '1. "Victims" means persons who, individuaIJy or collectively, have suffered hann, including physical or mental 
injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions 
that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States. including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of 
power. 2. A person may be considered a victim, under this Declaration, regardless of whether the perpetrator is identified, 
apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, 
The term "victim" also includes, where appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim and persons 
who suffered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimisation,' 'Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power; , adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 40134 of29 November 
1985; see [Electronic]. Available at: http://www.uohchr.ch/html/menu3/b/hcomp49.htm [June 2009]. 
\19 A later UN document, the 'Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to remedy and reparation for victims of 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law', submitted to the Second Consultative Meeting of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva on 23 October 2003, defmes a victim as follows: 'For purposes of this 
document a victim is a person or a collectivity who suffers harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, 
economic loss, or impairment of that person's fundamental legal rights, A "victim" may also be a legal personality, a 
dependant or a member of the immediate family or household of the direct victim, as well as a person Who, in intervening 
to assist a victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations, has suffered physical, mental or economic harm, For the 
purposes of this document a victim as defined above is one who suffers harm as a result of acts or omissions that constitute 
a gross violation of international human rights or serious violations of humanitarian law, A person's status as a "victim" 
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formulated in terms of 'victims' as individuals and not in terms of membership of ethnic or 
other collectivities. 
These definitions, together with the international legal principle of the right to reparation for 
victims, render the term 'victim' legally as well as morally significant by imposing correlative 
duties on states."o On the one hand, it indicates a legal right to reparations, enforceable in a 
court of law, and, on the other hand, it designates a moral right to reparations, not because 
of legal status in the first place, but because of sympathy and solidarity with those 
suffering. 121 In post-conflict situations, designations of individuals and groups as 'victims' 
have important political implications by either legitimising or delegitimising political elites 
as a result of their actions during the conflict. 
The question is how the concept of 'victim' was applied in the Rwandan approach to 
genocide justice, and what its legal, moral and political implications are. In this regard, a 
significant precedent was set by an official finding on 28 June 1994 by the then United 
Nations High Commission for Human Rights Special Rapporteur, Rene Degni-Segui, who 
concluded in his report to the Security Council 'that the term "genocide" should henceforth 
be used as regard the Tutsi' (my italics). 122 This assumption, that genocide victims in Rwanda 
were exclusively Tutsi, lent ideological support to the arrest and early efforts to prosecute 
thousands of Hutu genocidaires immediately after the genocide as perpetrators and to render 
support to Tutsis as victims of genocide. The Rwandan authorities themselves never asserted 
that Tutsis had exclusive claim to victim status. The official narrative recognised at least two 
caveats to the exclusivity of Tutsi-victimhood, namely firstly that a group of 'Hutu 
moderates' were also targeted and died at the hands of the genocidaires, and secondly that a 
number of civilian Hutu refugees suffered isolated incidents of violent crime committed by 
the RPF at places like Kibeho and in the eastern forests of the DRC. However, despite these 
should not depend on any relationship that may exist or may have existed between the victim and the perpetrator, or 
whether the perpetrator of the violation has been identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted,' See Commission on 
Human Rights, E/CN.412003/L.44. 
120 For a discussion of the debate of whether individuals have a right to reparation under international1aw, see 
Rombouts, Victim Organisations, 19f., where she concludes that the 'global "right to reparation" is only a principle, not a 
fully fledged right.' However, 'well·established and beyond dispute is the duty of the state to provide reparation for any 
wrongful act under international law'. 
12\ See Rombouts, Victim Organisations, 21. Solidarity was mentioned by an international working group at the 
invitation of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice tasked to consider the establishment of an 
international fund for victims of crime and abuse of power. See Proposal for the Foundation of an International Fund for 
Support to Victims of Transnational Crime, 2000. [Electronic). Available at: 
http://www.victimology.nl!onlpub/fundproposal.pdf9 June 2009 
122 UN Doc. E/CN4/ 199517. 
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caveats, the overwhelming number of victims acknowledged in the domestic trials remained 
Tutsi.123 Effectively, this implied that, because the genocide was seen as the defining event in 
Rwandan history, and Tutsis suffered uniquely during this event, it was reasonable to accept 
the arrest, incarceration, prosecution and punishment of Hutu genocidaires, even if this meant 
potential ethnic tension. At stake was the post-genocide state's symbolic distancing itself 
from the racism of the past, by punishing those responsible for its most heinous crimes. 
Mamdani argues that this position led the Rwandan state eventually to re-adopt a 'genocide 
framework' categorising the entire population, not only victims and perpetrators of 
genocide. 12• Because of the magnitude of the event, it was only a small step to extend the 
twin identities of 'perpetrator' and 'victim' by proxy to the entire population. Furthermore, 
by responding to past political crimes exclusively within the framework of genocide, 
Mamdani claims that the population was not only drawn in as either perpetrators or victims, 
but also once again divided along the same categories which shaped the genocide, although 
this time not explicitly stated but nonetheless enacted within transitional justice efforts.12s 
The implication of this claim, if correct, is that by giving the genocide predominance in the 
domestic criminal justice approach, the Rwandan approach runs the risk of reifying the 
categories which motivated the genocide in the first place, namely, the ethnic and racial 
categorisation scheme inherited from colonial and post-colonial regimes. 
We need to look in more depth at the official notion of victimhood in Rwanda. Mamdani 
identifies five categories of transitional justice participants, namely refugees, returnees (i.e. 
refugees), victims, perpetrators and survivors: RejUgees, Mamdani claims, are divided into 
two groups, the 'old case load' referring to the mainly Tutsi pre-genocide refugees known as 
the 'fifty-niners' because they left Rwanda after the 1959 transition, and the 'new case load' 
referring to post-genocide refugees - virtually all Hutu and associated with the genocidaires. 
Returnees are those mainly Tutsi (and some Hutu) refugees who returned to Rwanda during 
the RPF campaign in 1994 and who are acknowledged to have legitimate claim on 
123 Exact numbers cfHutu victims are deeply contested, with some international observers, such as Lemarchand, 
implying that Hutus died in numbers comparable to those of the TUlSi: 'The official number ofHutu killed by Hutu during 
these events ranges from 30,000 to 50,000. But if we add the Hutu losses at the hands of the RPF within and outside 
Rwanda during and after the genocide. including those refugees who were killed by Rwandan troops in the Congo, as well 
as those who died of disease and starvation, we reach at least half a million deaths,' writes Lemarchand. To these may be 
added the events in Burundi in 1972 and 1993 - the latter the fIrst genocide in the region and directed by Tutsis against 
Hutus. This remains a matter of intense historical contestation, with other commentators, induding the Rwandan 
~overnment, rejecting in the strongest terms any notion of a' second genocide'. 
24 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 266. 
125 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 266. 
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reparation. Those exiles who did not return to Rwanda in 1994 are 'old case load' refugees. 126 
Although there have been millions of Hutu 'returnees', these tended to be vanquished Hutu 
refugees who returned to Rwanda 'under a cloud of suspicion or outright condemnation', 
and who did not qualifY in official parlance as 'returnees' with claims for compensation such 
as those enjoyed by returning Tutsis. 127 
Significantly, the category of 'victim' thus does not apply only to those who were killed or 
abused in the genocide, as distinct from those who were not. Both Hutu and Tutsi are 
recognised as 'victims', though not in the same respect. Tutsis are 'victims' by virtue of being 
Tutsi, since all Tutsis were targeted by the genocide. Accordingly Tutsi survivors are also 
(living) 'victims of the genocide'. Hutu 'victims' were those who paid with their lives for 
associating too closely with the Tutsi cause. An important implication is that Hutu 'victims' 
all died during the genocide whereas all Tutsis who survived the genocide are categorised as 
'victims' .128 It follows that no Hutu 'victims' survived the genocide whereas all Tutsi 
survivors are automatically 'victims'. 129 
When it comes to identifYing living 'victims', Mamdani claims that this is limited to 'Tutsi 
genocide survivors' and 'old case load refugees' (that is, mainIy Tutsi pre-genocide refugees, 
such as the 'fifty-niners'), some of whom have returned while others have elected to stay in 
their adopted communities, most often in the eastern DRC. However, whether returning or 
not, these individuals are seen as victims of genocide which Kagame claims started in 1959. 
'New case load' refugees (Hutus who fled advancing RPF forces or expected retribution 
from the post-genocide government) are not considered 'victims', nor are any Hutu survivors 
who may have been a target for genocidaires. 130 This scheme, offered by Mamdani, coheres 
with my description of the official narrative in Chapter 3. The most important conclusion is 
that, officially in Rwanda, to be a 'victim' in Rwanda is to be a 'genocide victim'. 
Victimhood as a result of political crimes in the past is thus reduced to violence that 
happened during and as a consequence of 'the genocide', as it is figured in the 'official 
narrative' . 
126 This scheme therefore implies that there are no refugees within Rwanda. The assumption is that the 'new case load' 
of mainly Rutu refugees have all gone into exile and that there remained no internally displaced persons in Rwanda. 
127 Cyprian F. Fisiy, 'Of Journeys and Border Crossings: Return of Refugee, Identity and Reconstruction of 
Rwanda,' African Studies Association 41,1 (April 1998): 17-28. 
128 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 267. 
129 Eltringham concurs by asking whether 'Hutu moderate' does not simply designate a 'deceased "righteous 
minority",' Eltringham, Accountingfor Horror, 98. 
1)0 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 267. 
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4.3.2 Who is a 'Genocide Perpetrator'? 
The flipside to the danger of categorising most or all Tutsi as 'victims' emerges as the 
consequence of viewing most or all surviving Hutu as 'perpetrators' of genocide. This is the 
result of effectively equating past political crimes with the perpetration of the genocide: to be 
a 'perpetrator' of political crimes in Rwanda is to be a 'genocide perpetrator'. This stance 
was taken to an extreme and extrapolated into the post-genocide era when (former) 
President Pasteur Bizimungu was arrested. 
While in the process of establishing a political party in competition to the RPF he once 
headed, he was accused of propagating 'genocide ideology' and imprisoned. 131 It seems that 
the post-genocide government has difficulty in recognising any other political crimes than 
perpetrating 'genocide' in some form. The obvious danger is that democratic opposition is 
mistaken for an effort to undermine the project of national unity and reconciliation and thus 
of spreading 'divisionism' and 'genocide ideology'. 132 
Consider Mamdani's analysis of how the related term 'genocide survivor' is used. The term 
'survivor' can of course be used in two distinct ways, either as a living 'victim' or, in 
Mamdani's words, as anyone who is 'blessed with life after genocide,.133 However, officially 
it pertains only to those Tutsis who had been in the country during the genocide and who 
are alive today. This is because of the assumption that 'the genocide was aimed only at 
Tutsi'. 134 If no Hutu is a genocide survivor, then the implication is that every innocent Hutu 
victim or sympathiser with Tutsis was killed. This means that every Hutu who is alive today 
was either a perpetrator or a bystander/onlooker. 
While perpetrators are presumed to be guilty, the position of 'onlookers' or 'bystanders' is 
more complicated. At best, they could be argued as 'complicit' rather than 'guilty'. The 
fundamental dilemma however, says Mamdani, is 'that to be Hutu in contemporary 
Rwanda is to be presumed a perpetrator' . 135 
13\ Filip Reyntjens, 'Post-1994 Politics in Rwanda: problematising "liberation" and 'democratisation",' Third World 
Quarterly 27,6 (2006): 1106. 
132 Reyntjens provides an extended discussion of this point in Reyntjens. 'Post-1994 Politics,' 1106f. 
Il3 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 273. 
134 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 267. 
1).5 Mamdani, When VictimsbecomeKillers,267. 
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In actuality, writes Rene Lemarchand, most informed observers would agree that only some 
10 percent of a Hutu population of roughly 6.5 million did in fact participate in the killings, 
either as organisers, executioners or unwilling accomplices. This leaves millions of Hutus 
who are not guilty of killing, who were bystanders or perhaps even assisted Tutsis to escape 
the genocide: 'Suffice it to note that thousands of Tutsi were saved from the interahamwe's 
machete by their Hutu neighbours and this at considerable risk to themselves and their 
families. But this is never officially acknowledged by the Kagame regime.'136 
At the same time, it must be conceded that the levels of participation in the killings were 
extraordinarily high. Not only did thousands of civilians take part as perpetrators of killings, 
but these killings took place mostly in full public view of women, children, priests, teachers 
and mayors, who, in some cases, assisted the killers, in others looted from victims in the 
wake of the killings, and in others simply observed. 137 The spectrum listed here requires a 
closer differentiation between the guilt of perpetrators and the degrees of complicity of 
bystanders and! or onlookers depending on how close or removed they were from the actual 
killings. 
Meanwhile, we may conclude that even when the tertns 'victim' and 'perpetrator' were not 
overtly linked to ethnic categories, they nonetheless harboured a distinct and consistent 
relationship to the categories of 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi'. 
4.4. Building the Rule of Law after Genodde 
The Rwandan government has consistently shunned any use ofracial and ethnic categories 
like 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi', insisting rather on an official narrative of national unity and 
belonging as described in Chapter 3. However, the preceding analysis shows the implicit 
links between such terms as 'genocide victim' and 'genocide perpetrator', and those of 
'Tutsi' and 'Hutu'. At the very least, this raises questions about the transitional justice 
programmes categorisation framework. Indeed, one needs to ask whether the Rwandan 
transitional justice process does not involve, in some ways, what Lemarchand terms the 
'ethnicisation of guilt and innocence' .138 Lemarchand describes this phrase as the failure to 
recognise that Hutus and Tutsis share, albeit unevenly, guilt and innocence. A key question 
Il. 
m 
'38 
Lemarchand, 'Coming to terms with the past, I 2. 
A point first made by Mahmood Mamdani; see Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 185,266. 
Lemarchand, 'Coming to terms with the past,' 9. 
67 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
in determining if transitional justice can contribute to the eradication of structural violence, 
is whether it operates as a forms of ethnicised justice, or indeed has been able to contribute 
towards a dispensation built on the rule of Law. 
4.4.1. Ethnicised Justice or the Rule of Law? 
The 'ethnicisation of guilt and innocence' involves attributing blame or guilt to ethnic 
collectivities rather than to the individual members of such collectivities. Mamdani's 
conclusion, that to be a Hutu is to be presumed gUilty by the transitional justice regime in 
Rwanda, is a case in point. He has argued that in Rwanda justice historically is pursued as a 
form of revenge where power relations are not subverted but rather inverted. 139 Such 
'ethnicisation of guilt and innocence' risks being unfair to both the individuals and the 
groups concerned; it would be unfair to individuals in so far as 'innocent' members are 
included in the 'guilt' of the groups to which they belong, and it may be unfair to 
characterise groups as either 'guilty' or 'innocent' in so far as these are unevenly shared by 
members of each group. 140 Lemarchand notes that 'guilt and innocence do not run parallel to 
ethnic lines'. 'Nonetheless', he continues, 'seen through the prism of the Rwandan media, 
victimisation and guilt are concepts that are becoming increasingly "ethnicized"; because the 
Tutsi are the epitome of a victimised community, they can do no wrong.' 141 International 
commentators, scholars, NGOs and diplomats often fall into the same trap of associating 
guilt and innocence with one group or another, claims Lemarchand. 142 
It is important not to homogenise the Hutu community as perpetrators, not least because the 
often quoted figure of 175,000 to 210,000 genocide perpetrators implies that this does not 
include a large majority of Hutus. 143 Moreover, the presence of 'moderate Hutu' at the time 
of the genocide points to the political diversity within the Hutu group. It is equally important 
not to homogenise the Tutsi group, not least because of the important fault line between 
'returnees', 'victims' and 'survivors'. Thus, exiles from Uganda and Tanzania who joined in 
the RPF military campaign are English-speaking and form the core of the RPF power base. 
139 See Mamdani's discussion of the "'Social revolution" ofl959' in Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 101-131 
but especially p. 126; his discussion orthe 'Second Republic' on pp. 132-157 but especially pp. 133, 134 and finally his 
discussion ofpost~genocide politics pp. 264-282, especially 275, where he states; 'the result was to reproduce the bifurcated 
world created by colonialism: the distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous, abolished in the civic sphere, 
remained in the ethnic sphere. Even if turned upside down, the political world remained as designed by the settler,' 
140 Lemarchand, 'Coming to terms with the past,' 9. 
141 Lemarchand, 'Coming to terms with the past,' 2. 
142 Lemarchand, 'Coming to terms with the past,' 2. 
143 Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 33. 
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By contrast, the largely Francophone genocide victim groups, such as Ibuka, often express 
some measure of marginalisation by the post-genocide leadership. 144 
Nor are all genocide victims automatically at one with the RPF regime's approach. Waldorf 
draws attention to several issues over which the government of Rwanda has clashed with 
victims: victims opposed the reintegration of perpetrators into their communities; survivors 
clashed with the government over how to commemorate the genocide; some groups objected 
to the official policy of publicly displaying skulls, bones and corpses at memorial sites, 
claiming that these violate Rwandan cultural sensibilities; and survivors and victims have 
complained bitterly about the lack of reparations. 145 In 2000, the government of Rwanda 
accused several prominent Tutsi elites of corruption and, as Waldorf states, 'plotting the 
return of the Tutsi king from exile'. This led to some fleeing the country and others being 
arrested. One person was assassinated. 146 Moreover, during the 2003 elections, the RPF 
accused the Liberal Party of promoting 'ethnic divisionism' by its advocacy on behalf of 
Tutsi survivors. 
In this context, the ways in which transitional justice mechanisms attribute guilt and 
innocence to individuals and collectivities may either serve to challenge the 'ethnicisation of 
guilt' or in fact reinforce it. On the basis of the preceding analysis, it must be concluded that 
the Rwandan transitional justice mechanisms are, in some ways, reinforcing the historically 
established racial! ethnic categorisation. 147 The implication of this discussion for our analysis 
of transitional justice and its implications and consequences for reconciliation in Rwanda is 
that, despite the stated objective of national reconciliation transcending the former 
racial! ethnic categories, transitional justice may still in effect discriminate in its treatment of 
ethnic groups, thereby perpetuating rather than removing structural violence. In short, 
, ... 
'45 
See Rombouts, Victim Organisations, 366£. 
Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 37. 
146 Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 37. 
141 Indeed, in this much-contested context the international literature commenLing on the Rwandan conflict also runs 
the risk of contributing to the further 'ethnicisation of guilt or innocence'. Lemarchand writes: 'In France the historian 
Jean-Pierre Chretien has long been identified as the most articulate and persistent champion of the good guys (Tutsi) vs. 
bad guys (Hutu) school of thOUght. This tendency to ethnicise guilt is also shared by the London-based human rights 
organization African Rights, headed by Rakiya Dmaar and Alex de Waal; their position on the Hutu-Tutsi problem is at 
considerable variance with that of, say, Amnesty International, which, rightly or wrongly, is perceived by other analysts as 
being overly sympathetic to the Hutu cause (assuming that such a cause can be readily identified);' see Lemarchand, 
'Coming to terms with the past,' 4. Eltringham notes: I ••• the concern is with the interplay between two abstract notions of 
"ethnicity" deployed by two visible groups: the perpetrators of the genocide and "international commentators";' see 
Eltringham, Accounting/or Honvr, 5. Pottier concurs with this analysis: by . upholding the image of an undifferentiated Hutu 
collectivity, UNHCR and the implementing NODs encouraged and reinforced the notion that it was right to essentialise 
ethnicity; by clearly siding with the RPF·led authorities in Kigali ... , the international aid effort indirectly promoted the 
notion of a Hutu collective responsibility;" see Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, 150. 
69 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
transitional justice measures that strive to reconcile Hutus and Tutsis may instead result in 
ethnicising genocide guilt and innocence. 
The challenge is to allow the categories of transitional justice to function in ways that do not 
reinforce the historical legacy of ethnic cleavages. Positively, the challenge is to make space 
for adequate ascriptions of guilt through notions of individual as well as collective 
accountability, and so to build the rule of rule of law. In contrast to the 'ethnicisation of 
guilt', the rule of law acts as a mechanism fostering cross-cutting identifications, precisely 
because all are presumed equal before the law regardless of ethnic or any other affiliation. If 
the formal concern of the rule of law after a genocide is to treat people equally and fairly 
(and the danger is that hidden inequalities may be perpetuated in the name of transitional 
justice), then the substantive concern after a genocide is to be able to give adequate meaning 
to the notion of accountability within a framework that acknowledges the complex layers of 
collective responsibility and complicity prevalent during an event such as a genocide. 
It is the unique challenge of transitional justice to develop appropriate ways for balancing 
individual accountability with collective complicity, which neither render entire groups 
guilty nor provide overly individualist (and therefore simplistic) accounts of popular 
participation in collective atrocities. While the literature on transitional justice is concerned 
with these issues at a general level, particular societies must in practice devise their own 
approaches to dealing with a past of political atrocities. Transitional justice mechanisms, 
based on international law and a human rights framework, are well equipped to establish 
individual criminal accountability. Post-genocide Rwanda has developed a different 
approach to transitional justice aimed at national reconciliation, seeking to transcend the 
historical legacy of ethnic/racial identities - though it is questionable whether this has not 
served to reinforce the underlying structural violence of this categorical framework rather 
than remove it - so as to establish a new rule-of-law culture. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Transitional justice is often promoted as a means to counter a 'culture of impunity' after 
conflict by establishing accountability for past political atrocities. It is also seen as a counter 
to the development of new forms of structural violence in the judiciary through a skewed, 
biased and partisan application of rules and regulations. 
70 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
From the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that there is a lack of convergence between the 
evaluative framework developed in terms of reconciliation as structural violence and the 
Rwandan approach. The RPF government argued from the outset that to function effectively 
in the aftermath of the genocide when an entire justice system had been delegitimized, 
debilitated or destroyed, the legal system would have to regain a basic capacity to administer 
the law. 148 By hauling genocidaires before a court of law, or before a Gacaca hearing, so the 
government claimed, impunity was being countered and the important principle of 'equality 
before the law' was being practised and strengthened, in a society that had become 
accustomed 'a culture of impunity' - not least because some of the ginocidaires had been 
powerful individuals who, previously, operated with impunity. 
Whereas the ruling elite of the RPF profess their satisfaction with the official project to 
dissolve ethnicity into a transcendent national identity, our analysis has raised questions that 
the structural violence of the ethniclracial categorical framework may have been reinforced 
rather than removed. The main difficulty is that the Rwandan approach, through its 
exclusive focus on genocide and its defmitions of who victims and perpetrators of the 
genocide were, seems to keep alive the ethnic categories they are ostensibly seeking to 
overcome. I called this unintentional consequence of the quest to build the rule of law the 
'ethnicization of justice' . 
Some claim that Hutus bear the brunt of transitional justice prosecutions whereas Tutsis are 
almost universally cast as victims. If so, then Rwandan transitional justice amounts to little 
more than what Mamdani terms 'victor's justice' - that is, justice to serve the exclusive 
interests of the new political elite. 149 In our terms, it would also amount to little other than a 
continuation of structural violence in Rwanda - this time in the name of transitional justice. 
Reconciliation-as-rule-of-law however does appear, from this discussion, to enjoy 
considerable convergence with the more general international human rights discourses. Yet, 
there are also differences here. The notion of 'structural violence' (together with 'cultural 
violence') has the advantage, I would contend, that it allows for determining accountability 
for genocide crimes in, through more than a focus on individual gUilt. Structural violence 
'<8 
'49 
Mani, Beyond Retribution, 6. 
Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 270. 
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also take into account collective issues, so important in genocide and post-genocide 
societies, not least on how power is organised in society. In a context where the 
extermination of one group was an explicit objective of the conflict, a focus on structural 
violence, in addition to direct violence, enables the analysis of impunity to move beyond the 
preoccupation with 'bad apples' to a more systematic and systemic understanding of how 
genocide became possible. 
A more detailed analysis of Rwanda's transitional justice processes, which now follows, will 
help to further determine the implications and consequences they may have for the quest to 
eradicate structural violence in the post-genocide society, not only as a remnant of past 
abuse, but in ways, more generally in Rwanda, in which all Hutus are rendered guilty of 
genocide, and all Tutsis identified as victims of the same crime. 
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Chapter 5: Gacaca and Reconciliation 
This chapter will provide an account, discussion and assessment of the Gacaca process as an 
integral part of the Rwandan approach to transitional justice and reconciliation. More 
specifically, we will consider the Gacaca process In terms of its consequences for two 
dimensions of reconciliation, namely, its ability to address residual forms of cultural 
violence as well as its relation to the legacies and present-day practises that perpetrate 
structural violence. 
Promulgated in the 2000 Organic Law and further refined in the 2004 law, the National 
Service of Gacaca Courts (SNJG), a body to oversee the implementation of a system of 
community courts nationwide, was launched as a direct response to the logistical and other 
challenges of bringing to justice some 120,000 individuals accused of genocide and held in 
prolonged detention. I Based on traditional practices of communal reconciliation, the Gacaca 
hearings were officially instituted as an elaborate and sustained exercise of transitional 
justice in local settings with grass-roots participation. As such, Gacaca represents a mainstay 
of the Rwandan approach to transitional justice: Gacaca falls under the jurisdiction of the 
Rwandan government, the Gacaca hearings took place in local Rwandan communities and 
the SNJG comprises exclusively Rwandan staff. 
The chapter opens with a brief overview of the operational history of Gacaca, as an example 
of the increasingly prominent phenomenon of transitional justice at a local or community 
level. This is followed by a summary discussion of some main issues and arguments in the 
literature on the Gacaca process. Like other traditional and community-based forms of 
justice, especially prevalent on the African continent where large swathes of citizens are 
governed (most immediately) by traditional rulers, the Gacaca hearings tend to be criticised 
for their perceived lack of legal due process, or praised for their indigenous and accessible 
Organic Law No 40/2000 of26/01/2001 set up the various I Gacaca jurisdictions' and institutions with 
responsibilities for prosecutions of offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against humanity committed 
between I October 1990 and 31 December 1994; [Electronic). Available at: http;!lwww.inkiko· 
Gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/Law.pdf[9 April 2008). Organic Law No 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 established the organisation, 
competence and functioning of Gacaca courts charged with prosecuting and trying the perpetrators of the crime of genocide 
and other crimes against humanity, committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994, and its amendments; 
[Electronic). Available at: http://www.inkiko-Gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/new!awl.pdf [9 April2008}. 
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nature. For our purposes, the significance of the Gacaca process relates to the extent to which 
it represents key elements of the Rwandan approach to transitional justice. 
The second half of the chapter is divided into two sections, one containing a discussion of 
Gacaca as a way of overcoming cultural violence, and the other an assessment of Gacaca as a 
way of eradicating structural violence. The discussion of the consequences of Gacaca for the 
residual forms of cultural violence will focus specifically on the extent to which these 
community courts are able to promote a 'reconciliation with history' in the two senses 
discussed in Chapter 3, namely, as initiating debate about Rwanda's new monumental 
history, as well as its openness to the incorporation of the personal narratives of ordinary 
Rwandans, not least those of particular victims and perpetrators. 
This concerns its ability to accommodate both Hutu and Tutsi narratives of the genocide. At 
a local level, the more than 12,000 courts will have access to, and eventually written 
recordings of, individual victim and perpetrator narratives from ordinary Rwandans at every 
level of society. Depending on how these narratives are handled, preserved and published, 
they could provide an unprecedented repository of personalised narrations of the genocide. 
The latter section analyses Gacaca's role in assisting the process of removing structural violence 
from Rwanda's judicial systems and thus promoting reconciliation. Here, the focus is on 
ways that Gacaca is able to extend the reach of the law, how it fares in relation to the danger 
of 'ethnicising human rights', and thus its contribution to the ways that Rwandan 
transitional justice defines and attributes accountability for the genocide. 
5.1. Implementation - An Overview 
The RPF regime realised in 1999, after several self-imposed deadlines had been missed, that 
the formal justice system, even if taken together with the ICTR, would only ever be able to 
deal with a small, symbolic number of genocide cases. Either the state would have to release 
the hundred thousand or so genocide accused back into society, a decision which could have 
major destabilising effects, or it would have to find another, less rigorous but credible 
process to handle the case load. 2 
In the words of President Kagame: 'We are in a very difficult situation. It is like we are damned if we do and 
damned if we don't. We have to find a way to manage our problems. The problems are likely to be there, we must therefore 
find ways to manage them. But we have a huge problem on our hands, that is, 115,000 people in prison. We simply cannot 
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In June 1998, the possibility of revitalising the customary practice of Gacaca was raised by a 
group of provincial prefects. 3 On 17 October 1998, then President Bizimungu established a 
commission to investigate the possibility of building the fledgling Gacaca community 
structures that had survived the genocide into a national mechanism designed to address 
post-genocide justice. Traditionally, these meetings 'on the grass' (Gacaca literally means 'on 
a patch of grass') were presided over by Inyangamugayo, or elders. They were designed, by 
and large, to handle less complicated communal disputes relating to land use, livestock or 
damage to property. Male heads of households oversaw proceedings. Women could not 
participate, even as witnesses. It was now proposed that these customary communal 
practices be adapted to meet the urgent need to achieve accountability, as well as 
reconciliation, in post-genocide Rwanda. 
Consequently, Gacaca was reinvented as a state-sponsored quasi-legal mechanism to deal 
with the enormous number of outstanding genocide cases - and to do so in close proximity 
to the communities where the crimes were committed. The aim of Gacaca was not to mete 
out punitive justice exclusively, but also to restore social harmony by finding appropriate 
ways to manage processes of restitution between former adversaries. 4 Gacaca was to operate 
at four levels, namely cell and sector levels (where the least severe cases would be tried, e.g. 
those involving property crimes), dis rict level (where Category 2 suspects would be heard 
on charges ranging from murder to that of inflicting grievous bodily harm') and provincial 
level (where appeals arising from district-level hearings would be heard).6 
The new Organic Law provided for the creation of at least 10,000 courts, one in each cell, 
sector, district and province in the country - eventually 12,103 courts would be established.7 
Judges were to be elected by communities from within their own ranks. Criteria for election 
included that persons be 'of outstanding integrity', and those elected then had to undergo 
limited legal training. By 2004, 170,000 judges had been elected and trained.· Prior to the 
continue with this situation indefinitely. We had to devise a solution to this problem. But in solving this problem, other 
problems may arise. We shall deal with them and devise solutions as we go along.' BBC interview with President Kagame. 
Clarke, 'Hybridity: 117. 
4 Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' to. 
Please see the discussion in section 4.1. on the various categories of crime provided for in the Organic Laws. 
Cobban, 'The Legacies of Collective Violence,' 10. 
Uvin and Mironko, 'Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda, '226. 
Domen, 'Rwanda's Gacaca.' 
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commencement of Gacaca hearings, elected judges in each community compiled histories 
and determined lists of victims and crimes based on a range of sources, including state flles 
and prisoner testimonies. The accused were then categorised and their flles sent to the 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution. All cases that had not been referred to Rwandan 
courts were to be taken up by Gacaca.9 Only Category 1 cases, dealing with the so-called 
'masterminds of the genocide', and suspects of sexual crimes, initially fell outside the 
jurisdiction of Gacaca and had to be referred directly to national courts (a feature that was 
reversed through later legislation). 
A nationwide trial-run for Gacaca courts, involving 751 courts in 118 sectors, commenced in 
June 2002 and continued for just over four years, a period during which operational 
problems were identified, data collected and the accused categorised. to An amended Gacaca 
law, promulgated in 2004, took into account the 'lessons learnt' during the pilot phase, such 
as, for example, collapsing cases previously categorised as Categories 3 and 2. Gacaca courts 
commenced full operations in July 2006. In 2007, a final round of refinements was 
promulgated by law, such as, for example, increasing the number of judges in each court." 
To begin with, the number of outstanding genocide cases that Gacaca was expected to try 
amounted to around 100,000. In a development that surprised managers and observers alike, 
this total ballooned to 818,564 when Gacaca commenced duties, as the number of 
individuals implicated by testimonies mushroomed. I2 Yet, looking back at this point, it 
seems that the system was indeed able to process this eight-fold increase in cases. 
As of April 2007, 12,103 courts nationwide had heard 84,125 cases, returning 76,371 
verdicts. By April 2009, the projection was that the courts, staffed with about 250,000 
'judges', would by the end of that year have handled the cases involving 760,446 individuals. 
Taking into account other participants, the process would involve around 85 percent of the 
ISS, 'The Gacaca Process.' 
10 Domitilla Mukantaganzwa, 'National Service of Gacaca Courts,' (Paper presented to Institutefor Justice and 
Reconciliatjon Africa-Wide Consultation, Johannesburg, 7-10 June 2007. 
II Organic Law No 1012007 of I March 2007. (Electronicj. Available at: http://www.jnkiko-
gacaca.gov.rw/pdf/L O%20N%201O.2007%20YERSION%20FINALE.pdf (January 2009j. The Organic Law of 1996, 
together with the 2001 Gacaca Law, modified five times, forms the legal basis of Gacaca; see Phil Clarke, 'The Rules (and 
Politics) of Engagement', in After Genocide - Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and 
Beyond, ed. Phil Clarke and Zachary D. Kaufman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 298. 
1Z Mukantaganzwa, 'National Service of Gacaca Courts, op.cit. 
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population. I3 Despite this massive workload, the Rwandan authorities remams confident 
that the Gacaca courts will be able to hear all their cases by December 20 I 0. 14 
5.2. Community Justice - Politicised or Progressive? 
From the extant literature, it is clear that the Gacaca system has sparked intense debate 
internationally as well as domestically, The literature typically exhibits two opposing points 
of view, Arguments against community justice highlight the perceived politicised and 
compromised nature of Gacaca, but also its lack of due process. Arguments in favour of 
community justice present Gacaca as a progressive option because it is able to operate in 
close proximity to victim communities, thus rebuilding the rule of law at grass roots while 
employing restorative, non-adversarial processes. 
From a pronounced human rights perspective, activists and commentators have strongly 
criticised the Gacaca process. Amnesty International and other human rights agencies, but 
also various international commentators, view the Gacaca process primarily, or even 
exclusively, as an exercise in criminal justice; and to them, lapses in due process are so grave 
as to compromise the entire effort. I5 As Clarke notes: 'The form of justice that most 
commentators (such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) employ when 
analyzing Gacaca, is formal in method and deterrent in outcome.' 16 From this perspective, 
Gacaca is mainly criticised for its lack of judicial rigour, for example, in not employing 
legally qualified judges. 
Waldorf has taken this criticism further: Gacaca does not only fail to deliver justice but 
actively undermines whatever post-genocide reconciliation might have happened, and 
I) [RIN, 'RWANDA: Reconciliation still a major challenge', KIGALI, (14 April200B) [ElectronicJ. Available at: 
http://www irinnews org/Report.aspx?ReportId-7774B [16 Apri1200BJ. 
14 Mukantaganzwa, 'National Service.' 
U Amnesty International, for example, commented: 'On the contrary, consistent reports that fair trials guarantees 
are not being applied in the Gacaca process, which is investigating and prosecuting a massive amount of the crimes 
committed during the 1994 genocide, undermines the whole legal system and raises concerns about the importance that will 
be attached to these rights by other sectors of the justice system.' See AI: 'Rwanda: Suspects must not be transferred to 
Rwandan courts'; (2 November 2007) [ElectronicJ. Available at: 
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/librarv/Index/ENGAFR470132007 [January 2009J; See also AI, 'Rwanda. The Troubled 
Course of Justice', (April 2000) [ElectronicJ. Available at: 
<http://www.amnestY.org/en/librarv/info/AFR47/01012000/en [9 April2008J; AI, 'Rwanda: Gacaca: A Question of 
Justice', (December 2002), [ElectronicJ. Available at: htlp:llwww.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR47/007/2002 [9 
April2008J. See also HRW, 'Rwanda: Killings Threaten Justice for Genocide: Authorities Must Ensure Full, Impartial 
Accountability for Recent Killings', New York, (22 January 2007) [ElectronicJ. Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/0Ill9/rwandaI5l26.htm [Apri1200BJ; HRW, 'Rwanda: Gacaca Trial 
Condemns Activist to Prison: Judge Fails to Recuse Himself Despite Past Conflict With Defendant', New York, (30 May 
2007), [ElectronicJ. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/0S/30/rwandaI6024.htm [9 Apri1200BJ. 
" Clarke, 'Hybridity,' 139. 
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threatens to worsen ethnic relations. As Gacaca was about to commence duties, Waldorf 
asked whether the direct involvement of communities might lead to the intimidation of 
witnesses and reprisal attacks. Moreover, he speculated that, within a society already so 
deeply traumatised, community dialogue sessions during the Gacaca hearings could serve to 
rekindle animosity. In his view, furthermore, the customary practice of Gacaca was 'warped 
beyond recognition' by turning it into a quasi-state institution, robbing Gacaca of its potential 
reconciliatory content and thus not only risking causing fresh agitation but also courting 
irrelevance.17 Moreover, Waldorf claimed, Hutu and Tutsi perceived Gacaca quite 
differently: 'Hutu generally view it as a way to release family members wrongly imprisoned, 
while Tutsi survivors often see it as a disguised amnesty for those who killed their family 
members'.IS As a result, 'a few' survivors and perpetrators had fled their communities and 
approximately fifteen witnesses had been killed by 2005. This indicates that Gacaca 'upends 
a shaky peace' and disturbs the fragile 'modus vivendi' that survivors have worked out with 
their neighbours over the past eleven years. 19 
More fundamentally, Waldorf concluded that Gacaca results in the gross and large-scale 
'ethnicisation of guilt' because it is so heavily 'politicised' .20 In this way, the Gacaca process 
would 'wind up criminalising a vast swath of the Hutu population' .21 The inescapable 
conclusion is that a post-conflict government could never render justice for a mass atrocity 
such as the Rwandan genocide, and by attempting to do so it not only saddled the justice 
sector with an impossible task but 'most cruelly diverted resources away from survivors'. 
This, according to Waldorf, amounted to 'victor's justice'. 22 
In stark contrast, there were other commentators who viewed Gacaca as an exemplary model 
of best practice for transitional justice. Paul Harrel's Rwanda's Gamble - Judging Genocide on 
the Grass is the first book-length academic investigation of Gacaca as a response to genocide 
crimes. Harrel's core argument is that the 'liberal-prosecutorial model of transitional justice' 
dominates international interventions after conflict. Consisting of three elements -
international tribunals, domestic prosecution and truth commissions - this model did not 
pay sufficient attention to issues of truth and reconciliation. To this, Harrel juxtaposes 
17 
18 
l' 
20 
21 
22 
Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 85. 
Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 74. 
Waldorf, 'Mass Justice', 74. 
Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 78. 
Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 81. 
Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 85. 
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Gacaca as a 'communitarian restorative' model that utilises justice to facilitate reconciliation. 
The gamble of Gacaca is the hope that the Rwandan communities would accept this 
initiative to pursue community reconciliation peacefully and truthfully. 23 
These observations, however, were also based largely on speculation. In a review of this 
study, Phil Clarke pointed out that Harrel's 'investigation' is based largely on a single visit of 
ten days to Rwanda and thirteen interviews conducted during this time, mostly with 
functionaries of western NGOs and with government officials. He notes that Harrel failed to 
attend test-run Gacaca sessions then under way in prisons and in selected communities. 
The challenge in analysing the implications and consequencs of Gacaca, it would seem from 
this sample of commentators, both positive and negative, is to steer between an a priori 
rejection of its informal, localised justice and, alternatively, the a priori affirmation of Gacaca 
as a new model for restorative and transitional justice.24 It is thus important to determine 
how Gacaca has faired during its implementation phase. 
5.3. Gacaca as Measure against Cultural and Structural Violence 
Reconciliation, for our purpose, involves the building of positive peace through the removal 
of violence in all its forms, direct/personal, structural and cultural. Accepting that physical 
violence within Rwanda has largely been stopped,25 our concern is with the conceptualisation 
and analysis of structural as well as cultural violence. In previous chapters I identified 
'reconciliation with history' and 'building the rule of law' as the two major goals of 
reconciliation-through-transitional-justice in Rwanda. We now tum to Gacaca in order to 
determine some of its consequences for these goals. 
I attended a Gacaca court hearing, on 30 November 2008 in the Kimisagara Sector in Kigali, 
of a Category 1 accused, Narcisse Bitenderi (two other accused were absent). The hearing 
lasted from 09.30 until 20.00 in the evening. It was the sixth session of this particular case, 
which, along with a number of other Category 1 cases, had been referred from the national 
Paul Harrel, Rwanda's Gamble: Gacaca and a new Model of Transitional Justice (New York: Writer's Club Press, 
2003). 
24 Similarly, Oarke argues for 'qualified optimism' as opposed to the 'extremely pessimistic' assessments by human 
rights agencies on the one hand and 'extremely optimistic' assessments on the other. In some areas, there are signs that 
Gacaca will achieve 'impressive results, whereas in other areas, it faces 'serious problems'; see Clarke, 'The Rules (and 
Politics) of Engagement,' 301. 
25 Extensive physical violence related to the aftennath of the genocide has continued to this day in the neighbouring 
DRC, but this exceeds the limits of my discussion. 
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courts to Gacaca in order to expedite efforts to eradicate the backlog of genocide cases 
nationally.z. 
Bitenderi was accused of 'masterminding' the genocide in the area where, that day, he was 
standing trial. Evidence was provided by a string of witnesses, who claimed that he was 
spotted giving orders at the roadblocks where fleeing Tutsis were massacred; that the radical 
Hutu party, the CDR had a flag hung outside his house; that bodies were discovered in the 
septic tank behind his house; and that he regularly attended the meetings between the CDR 
and MRND (D) parties where the genocide was planned. Throughout the day he steadfastly 
denied all knowledge of the crimes, or even of knowing that there was genocide underway at 
the time. He said he never attended the road blocks, did not see any weapons in the streets 
and did not have a CDR flag in front of his house - and although he had a CRD 
membership card, he claimed that he had not been a member of the party, and that the card 
was merely kept as a convenient way 'to get what he needed.' 
After some six hours of testimony, during which the accused actively participated, cross-
examined the witnesses and made regular statements, the presiding Gacaca judge called the 
meeting to order and proceeded to read the minutes of all previous meetings related to this 
case. This lasted for more than an hour. Once this was completed, the accused stepped 
forward to challenge sections of the minutes, which were amended to his satisfaction. The 
accused, together with the judge, then signed the minutes as a true reflection of what had 
transpired during the hearings. 
The hearings adjourned at 15.45, when the panel of judges retreated to deliberate. At 18.25 
they re-entered the courtroom. After the judge inquired as to the whereabouts of the accused 
(who seemed to have left already), the verdict was read out: Bitenderi was gUilty as charged. 
Since this was a Category 1 case, and the accused showed no remorse, the court sentenced 
him to 30 years in prison. He would, however, have the right to appeal the sentence in a 
higher-ranked Gacaca court. 
26 Hirondelle News Agency reported in January 2008 that the Rwandan Government had approved the widening of 
Gacaca jurisdiction to cover all genOCide cases (including those in Category 1). Controversially, these cases also included 
rape cases. This, gender activists argued, would expose rape victims unduly to community pressures, including possibly 
those of the perpetrators; see Hirondelle News Agency, 'Rwanda/Gacaca -1994 Genocide: Gacaca Courts Will Start 
Trying Rape Cases Next Month' (25 June 2008) [ElectronicJ. Available at 
http://www.hirondellenews.com/contentlvjewi2169/291 I [June2008J. 
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It is important to emphasise that a single example such as this cannot serve as a basis for 
general conclusions about Gacaca as a whole. Yet this case does illustrate the measure to 
which retributive and reconciliatory considerations are intertwined within (at least this 
example of) Gacaca. Not only was the accused handed a severe punishment, but it was made 
clear that the punishment would be significantly reduced, should the accused have showed 
some measure of acknowledgment and remorse. Having failed to convince the judges of his 
contrition (mainly because he was not willing to acknowledge any complicity in, or even 
knowledge of, the genocide), he was sent to prison for 30 years. 
The discussion now moves into a more general analysis of Gacaca, not just in terms of due 
process (as has been the case within much of the international commentary on Gacaca), but 
specifically also in relation to the transitional justice objective of reconciliation conceived as 
the removal of cultural and structural violence. 
5.3.1. Gacaca's 'Little Narratives' as Contribution towards 'Reconciliation with Historv' 
It is unlikely that the legacy of cultural violence, entrenched over many decades by 
successive colonial and post-colonial regimes, could have disappeared in a mere fifteen 
years. Indeed, we have seen that this legacy takes many forms; some inherited from the past, 
but others the result of post-genocide developments. 
The question is about the implications and consequences of Gacaca, in years to come, on 
these residual forms of cultural violence in post-genocide Rwanda, and to what extent the 
proceedings of these community courts are able to promote a 'reconciliation with history'. 
Following on from our discussion in Chapter 3, there are two main parts to this question, 
namely, the significance of the Gacaca hearings for popular appropriation of the 'official 
narrative' of the genocide and Rwanda's new monumental history on the one hand, as welI 
as, on the other hand, the openness of the post-genocide 'official narrative' potentially to 
incorporate the multiple personal narratives of ordinary Rwandans, not least those of 
particular victims and perpetrators. 
Earlier we identified two major modes of continuing cultural violence in Rwanda, namely 
the denial of opposing viewpoints in and through the 'official narrative' of the genocide as 
well as the exclusion of the mUltiple and diverse experiences and perspectives of local rural 
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and peasant communities at grassroots level. Taken at face value, it might appear that there 
is an overt acceptance of the 'official narrative' by many Rwandans; even so, there are 
questions about the extent to which ordinary Rwandans, with their contested history of 
Hutu and Tutsi identities, have developed a shared understanding of, and approach to, 
dealing with the past that would allow not only for common ground and agreement but also 
for disagreement flowing from different opinions and perspectives.27 At the same time, 
questions remain about the extent to which rural peasants are being empowered by the 
Gacaca process to contribute to reconciliation in the post-genocide society. 
The first issue thus concerns the danger of renewed hegemony, and accompanying cultural 
violence, through the official narrative, emphasised by the fact that Rwanda's government-
sponsored programmes have sought to discourage engagement with historical inquiry and 
debate beyond the 'official narrative' on the grounds that competing histories and views 
would re-ignite the conflict. 28 In this vein, it seems that 'reconciliation with history' is 
equated by Rwandan authorities as the uncritical acceptance of the official version of events. 
Hutu historical revisionism - another source of cultural violence - is, of course, 
comprehensively rejected by the RPF 'official narrative' at the level of the macro-debates 
about Rwandan history. Hutu historical revisionism has, in these debates, been described as 
'genocide laundering,.29 Popular amongst various exiled Hutu groups based in South and 
North Kivu provinces in the DRC, such as the Forces Annees Rwandaises (FAR), as well as 
among the Rassemblement Republicain Pour La Democratie au Rwanda (RDR), based in France, 
the aim of these discourses are to minimise the Hutu-driven / Tutsi-directed genocide and 
place maximum blame on the RPF and its massacres, as provoking the mass killings by the 
government. Writes genocide survivor Tom Ndahiro: 'This historical account interprets the 
RPF invasion of Rwanda as the cause of all "violence" in Rwanda, deflecting blame for the 
genocide from the Habyarimana regime and its extremist ideologues. ,30 
27 In this regard, Mamdani finds evidence that Tutsis are still more likely to downplay or deny ethnic differences, 
whereas Hutus more often argue that real differences remainj see Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 43. Similarly, 
Prunier refers to the 'heavy bombardment with highly value-laden stereotypes for some sixty years ended by inflating the 
Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing the Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority 
complex'; see Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis. 9. 
28 See the discussion on this in section 3.3.1., p. 42f. 
29 See Tom Ndahiro, 'Genocide-Laundering: Historical Revisionism, Genocide Denial and the Role of the 
Rassemblement Republica;n Pour La Democratie au Rwanda', in After Genocide - Transitional Justice, Post-Conflia ReconsttUdjon 
and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond, ed. Phil Clarke and Zachary D. Kaufman (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009), 101r. 
30 Ndahiro, 'Genocide· Laundering,' 110-111. 
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Indeed, even if there is a case for more acknowledgment by the RPF of atrocities committed 
by its own ranks, it is clear that RPF atrocities never amounted to anything like a 'counter-
genocide'. President Kagame is correct when he says that 'in 1994 there was, on the one 
side, a government-sponsored genocide with perpetrators using the state machinery at their 
disposal, and on the other side, the RP A fighting to stop the genocide'. 31 However, what 
matters for this discussion, is not so much the comparative scale of past atrocities committed 
by Tutsis and Hutus, respectively, but the significance of the official RPF narrative in 
contestation with Hutu historical revisionism as a potential source for ongoing and future 
cultural violence. In this regard, the 'official narrative' cannot provide the solution as an 
alternative to Hutu revisionism of its own accord. 
In relation to the Gacaca process, the important issue here is whether there is evidence that 
the hearings were structured to exclude testimony diverging from the 'official narrative' or to 
suppress this when it occurred. 
A notable feature of Gacaca - with major implications for its potential to challenge cultural 
violence - is its exclusive focus on the crime of genocide, to the exclusion of other, equally 
deadly if less numerous, political atrocities. In so far as the 'official narrative' conceives of 
the genocide in terms of Tutsi victims only, this of course excludes other (non-Tutsi) victims 
of mass killings, including possible Hutu cases. This means that the Gacaca process, at the 
macro-level, does not challenge the perceptions engendered by the 'official narrative' which 
ethnicises gUilt and victimhood. 'If, as claimed by the UN-commissioned Gersony Report, 
between 25,000 and 45,000 Hutu were massacred by the RPA in only three communes of 
Rwanda between the months of April and August 1994, how many were similarly killed in 
the whole of Rwanda during the same period?' asks Lemarchand. 32 'Again', he continues, 
'the systematic extermination by Rwandan troops in the eastern DRC of tens of thousands 
ofHutu refugees ... has been virtually "airbrushed out ofhistory",.33 
Unfortunately, as a result of operating within the confines of this historical framework, the 
Gacaca hearings do not allow victims of such war crimes and crimes against humanity to 
31 Paul Kagame, 'Preface', in After Genocide - Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in 
Rwanda and Beyond, ed. Phil Clarke and Zachary D. Kaufman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), xxiv. 
31 Lemarchand, 'The Politics of Memory,' 71. 
H Lemarchand, 'The Politics of Memory,' 71. 
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bring their cases to its chambers, only those related to genocide. Crimes committed on the 
side of the RPF are therefore not acknowledged, and historical perspectives that 
accommodate this reality ignored. Gacaca represents, in this regard, an opportunity lost. 
Yet, there is more to the process than its implications for the macro-debates about history. A 
second area concerns the empowering effect if may have on ordinary citizens to participate 
in shaping historical debates. Some have questioned the wisdom of exposing a deeply 
traumatised population to intense public engagements and dialogue. 34 Time will tell. Yet, on 
the basis of the most extensive field work done to date on Gacaca,3S Clarke concludes: 'What 
distinguishes Gacaca from transitional justice institutions used elsewhere, is the central role 
played by the general population in all facets of its daily operations. The spirit of Gacaca, 
which is enshrined in the Gacaca Law and ... resonates throughout the general population, is 
the notion that the population must feel a sense of ownership over Gacaca and must be its 
primary actor.'36 This observation was confirmed by my impressions of the Gacaca hearing in 
Kimisagara. In similar vein, Alice, a Gacaca judge in the Buhoma district of Ruhengeri 
province, is quoted as saying: 'Gacaca is important because it brings everyone together, to 
talk together. When we come together, we fmd unity ... Sometimes there is even too much 
talking and I have to slow the people down.'37 
To what extent is this support for Gacaca hearings prevalent across Rwanda? Certainly in 
advance local communities had positive expectations of the Gacaca process. During a survey 
conducted in four Rwandan communities (Ngoma, Mabanza, Buyoga and Mutura) in 
February 2002, respondents overwhelmingly indicated that they expected transitional justice 
mechanisms, including Gacaca, not simply to punish the guilty, but also to reveal the truth 
about what happened, free the innocent, help to rebuild the community and recognise the 
suffering of the community. 38 More comprehensive empirical research still needs to be done 
now that Gacaca is approaching its conclusion, but reports by Longman et. aI., cited above, 
E.g. Waldorf, 'Mass Justice', 74. 
" Field work included 100 interviews with confessedgenocidaires in ingando, and a further 250 interviews with 
survivors, the general popUlation, Rwandan government officials and NGO workers; see Clarke, 'The Rules (and Politics) 
of Engagement,' 30 I. 
" Clarke, 'The Rules (and Politics) of Engagement,' 303, 304. 
37 Clarke, 'Hybridity,' 137. 
38 Timothy Longman, Phuong Pham and Harvey M. Weinstein, 'Connecting Justice to Human Experience: 
Attitudes towards Accountability and Reconciliation in Rwanda' in My Neighbor, My Enemy, ed. Eric Stover and Harvey M. 
Weinstein (Cambtidge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 222. 
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show that the project has provided, at least for some, the opportunity of a public voice, 
perhaps for the first time since the 1994 genocide. 
Based therefore on available evidence, and extrapolating from there, one can conclude with 
Clarke that it seems indeed that the Gacaca courts have developed a capacity, currently not 
replicated in any other format in Rwanda, to facilitate 'communal dialogue and cooperation, 
which are crucial to fostering reconciliation after the genocide' .39 Certainly the process 
enabled large numbers of rural peasants the opportunity to make their views on the past, and 
not least the genocide, heard. Gacaca is empowering rural Rwandans to participate in 
community dialogues about the past and about ways to move forward, at a scale and in 
numbers that has never been seen in Rwanda or, in fact, anywhere else in the world. 
Gacaca offers therefore a unique opportunity for ordinary Rwandans to recall, narrate and 
record their individual and communal accounts of the gen cide. Tutsis and Hutus carry, 
amongst themselves, a range of different experiences, memories and historical frameworks. 
Not all Tutsis, for example, share the same perspective on the genocide: the 'returnee' exile 
Tutsis who fought their way to liberation under the banner of the RPF have expressed 
divergent views on a number of issues compared to those of the local Tutsi civilians who 
survived the genocide as its main targets inside Rwanda, as the stand-off between various 
victim organisations and the government testifles.<o At the same time Hutus too have 
different stories among themselves, some as genocidaires, but others as victims of the 
genocide when they sided with their Tutsi neighbours, and still others who stood by 
paralysed, or fled into the DRC jungle pursued by the RPF. Could these many and diverse 
'little narratives' begin to unravel and challenge those aspects of living and popular memory 
which the 'official narrative' of memory excludes and silences? 
'Critical' history, in one of the senses I have identified in Chapter 3, seeks to provide 
precisely this kind of space for the many and diverse 'little narratives' to emerge. Giving 
public recognition to such 'little narratives' not only ensures that historical events are seen 
from a more personalised lens, but also serves to illustrate the radical differences within the 
broader ethnic/racial categories through which the genocide was structured. In this way, 
" 40 
65-<i7. 
Clarke, 'The Rules (and Politics) of Engagement,' 300. 
For a fuller account of the tensions within the 'Tutsi' group, see the discussion in section 4.3.1., specifically pages 
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recording the 'little narratives' would not only acknowledge divergent perspectives, it also 
challenges the sole claim of the 'official narrative' on historical truth, thereby rendering 
historical engagement more open-ended, less threatening and thus more likely to further 
'reconciliation with history' . 
Through Gacaca, millions of Rwandans are effectively engaging with their national history in 
a multitude of ways. As a dynamic, ever-evolving institution that takes different shapes in 
different parts of the country, Gacaca could thus engage citizens in ways that may also 
challenge certain ongoing forms of cultural violence in society, such as genocide denial on 
the one hand, but also the silencing of experiences, memories and historical perspectives of 
ordinary Rwandans,, 1 
Literally millions of personalised Gacaca testimonies cannot just be rejected by revisionists in 
the same ways that the 'official narrative' is dismissed. A particularly powerful antidote to 
revisionism is therefore provided by the confessions of former genocidaires, often obtained 
through Gacaca's system of plea bargaining based on remorse and much-reduced 
punishments (often community service instead of incarceration). To gather, for posterity, 
such a massive record of victim testimonies will go some way not only towards disabling 
revisionism but also in helping to develop a general resistance against the forces stoking 
renewed forms of 'cultural violence', and thereby helping to shape a 'modicum of 
agreement' about the Rwandan past. 
5.3.2. Fighting Impunity but Ethnicising Guilt: Gacaca's mixed Contribution to the Rule 
of Law 
Gacaca offers an unprecedented opportunity for ordinary Rwandans to participate in 
fashioning narratives of past atrocities, thus challenging ongoing forms and practices of 
cultural violence - and thereby furthering reconciliation. The question that concerns us in this 
section is how Gacaca relates to the quest to overcome structural violence associated with 
situations where, for example, the law would either fail to hold genocidaires accountable at all 
(impunity) or alternatively treat individuals differently based on their collective identities 
('ethnicisation' of human rights,)?42 
41 
42 
Clarke, 'The Rules (and Politics) of Engagement,' 304. 
See the discussion in Section 4.3., p.65f. 
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The latter challenge is particularly important in crimes where large numbers of perpetrators 
participated in mass atrocities and genocide. To expect the nation to 'move on' without 
taking any action against thousands of perpetrators, would amount to accepting impunity as 
the basis for a post-genocide dispensation. However, to pronounce the entire Hutu group 
either 'guilty' or 'blindly obedient' would likewise be over-simplistic and feed into the 
'ethnicization of guilt' and the racist stereotyping of Hutus. 
Thus it will be important to evaluate not only the fact whether Gacaca delivers accountability 
(thus challenging impunity), but indeed how Gacaca attributes accountability in local 
community contexts. This is all the more important given that, historically, impunity and 
not the rule oflaw had often been institutionalized in Rwanda. 
Evidently a major issue is the fact that the mandate of Gacaca excludes relevant mass killings 
which are not deemed to be part of the 1994 genocide. The result has been that RPF crimes 
have remained largely unaddressed. This both restricted the official acknowledgement of 
victims of the genocide to Tutsis only, excluding Hutus as genocide victims, and it also 
precluded investigations of Tutsis as perpetrators, limiting that to Hutus.43 This selective 
focus of the Gacaca hearings thus effectively strenghthened the culturally violent notion that 
genocide crimes could be accounted for on an ethnic basis. Although it is true that the 
genocide was an attempt by radical Hutus to kill as many Tutsis as possible, it is not true that 
these genocide crimes were the only ones that were committed, or that genocide was the 
result only of these 'bad leaders'. Genocide violence was, according to the best available 
analyses, the culmination of a complex mix of cultural, structural and direct violence against 
both ethnic groups throughout Rwanda's history.44 By reducing the causes of genocide to 
Hutu leadership and its ideology, Gacaca has arguably helped to mask rather than highlight 
the complex and entwined legacies of 'structural' (and 'cultural') violence embedded in 
Rwandan history. 
Consider what, counter-factually, the consequences and implications might have been if 
Gacaca, as the flagship reconciliation effort of Rwandan transitional justice, had been more 
inclusive in its focus on the mass killings, and had done so in an impartial way, including 
both RPF atrocities and Hutu victims. Arguably, the symbolism of addressing crimes on 
" .. 
See the discussion in Section 4.2, p.59f. 
See Mamdani, When Victims become Killers, 76·234; and Strauss, The Order of Genocide, 153·175. 
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both sides of the historical Hutu-Tutsi divide would have made an important impact at 
community level, enabling post-conflict reconciliation instead of reinforcing the traditional 
associations that bind perpetrators so closely and exclusively to Hutus and victims so 
intimately to Tutsis. Yet, Gacaca, in line with its 'official narrative', has not been structured 
in this way, thereby diminishing its own potential to help disassociate human rights 
terminology from historic ethnic divisions. 
Moreover, the Gacaca hearings have also been marked by procedural flaws. Some of the 
commonly-listed objections to the lack of due process result from the general lack of capacity 
to test testimonies in Gacaca. Judges are community members who have received minimal 
training. Given the incentives for witnesses to provide false testimony, such as the 
opportunity to retaliate against a fellow community member for whatever reason or out of a 
sense of vengeance, more experienced judges would have been a significant advantage. 
Similarly, confessions by alleged genocidaires are not readily verifiable. The inclusion of 
sexual crimes such as rape under Gacaca jurisdiction following the January 2008 legislation 
raises additional concerns of whether Gacaca would be able to provide adequate witness 
protection - despite the provision for in camera testimonies. 
In addition to these shortcomings, one could list accounts of intimidation of victims, revenge 
killings and political interference. An important issue is the absence of reparations to 
genocide survivors. The Rwandan government has thus far failed to implement the provision 
for a 'Compensation Fund for Victims of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity' 
contained in the 1996 Genocide Law and also in the 2001 Gacaca Law. Despite the creation 
of an urgent interim fund (the Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide [F ARG]), the 
government's actions in this regard may be deemed inadequate. Waldorf claims that the 
fund resulted in 'leaving the community service component as the only way to compensate 
survivors,.45 The aim of FARG is to provide basic health and educational services to 
survivors of the genocide.46 
Given this list of criticisms, one is tempted to ask what, if anything, could be an alternative 
to Gacaca as an attempt to address accountability for the genocide at the level of local 
communities? Waldorf counters that no such alternative exists, that community-level 
" 
46 
Waldorf. 'Mass Justice,' 56. 
For an evaluation of reparations in Rwanda, see Rombouts, Victim Organisations, 365-479. 
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accountability in the wake of genocide of the magnitude witnessed in Rwanda is, firstly, an 
impossibly complex task and, secondly, prone to political abuse and thus victor's justice (by 
criminalising political and ethnic opponents and thereby reinforcing genocide fault lines, 
rather than overcoming them). He concludes that any such attempt to establish 
accountability at the level of local communities is not only bound to be biased, but would 
also be counter-productive in terms ofreconciliation. Instead, the post-genocide state should 
content itself with international justice mechanisms: it should prosecute the main culprits 
and prioritise material reparations to victims, while at the level of local communities it 
should let grass-roots 'bygones be bygones', hoping, so it seems, that the population will 
work things out for themselves: 'The overarching lessons for transitional justice are that 
successor regimes should resist the temptation to co-opt or control local justice and to 
expand local justice's jurisdiction to reach genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes':7 In short, Waldorf suggests that, since community justice fails to overcome 
impunity in the ways listed above, asking communities to 'forget' the past is probably the 
best way forward. 
This argument is misconceived on at least two levels: the assumption that no process is 
better than a flawed process, but also in terms of the benchmarks against which it critiques 
Gacaca. Firstly, it is important to acknowledge the need for accountability in the wake of 
genocide, lest the structurally violent option of impunity is to be adopted as a hallmark of 
the post-genocide dispensation, with potentially catastrophic results, for transitional justice 
efforts, as well as the ultimate aim of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi. The building of 
the rule of law would consequently be seriously undermined and thereby the possibility of 
overcoming structural violence. 
It is also important at local, community-level, because in Rwanda's post-genocide 
communities, victims and perpetrators continue to live in a fragile truce. Waldorf's claim 
that the communities may work out a fragile modus vivendi illustrates precisely the point -
genocide left survivor communities vulnerable and brittle. It is therefore vital to fmd ways to 
support and strengthen whatever modes of coexistence may have emerged - not least 
through fmding ways to build the rule of law. This, in turn, will not be possible without 
some form of accountability for the crimes during genocide - implemented and performed at 
41 Waldorf, 'Mass Justice,' 9. 
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community-level where it can have an impact on how victims and perpetrators work out the 
terms of the post-genocide reconciliation process. 
In Rwanda, courts of law did not (and could never) deliver justice and accountability at 
community level - if only for the sheer number of cases. This leads one back to the position 
that alternative accountability mechanisms had to be found, i.e. to improvise some type of 
quasi-legal accountability system such as Gacaca. Facing this challenge, Rwanda opted not 
to impose a novel legal system on communities, but to build on the platform and credibility 
offered by a well-known traditional institution oflocal justice, and to adapt this as a tool for 
the establishment of accountability for genocide. 
Secondly, applying only legalistic procedural criteria to the Gacaca process is to 
misunderstand its mandate and goals. In a deliberate attempt to bolster community 
ownership and participation, the founding legislation prohibited the involvement in Gacaca 
of professionals such as judges, lawyers, politicians and the clergy. This means that there 
was a deliberate and calculated compromise of judicial rigour in order to achieve other, 
more reconciliatory outcomes. This latitude implies, amongst others, that communities have 
to determine the balance between the retributive and restorative justice considerations in 
attributing accountability. Gacaca has been adapted by different communities to fulfIl varying 
needs, including truth-telling: ' ... different participants can interpret Gacaca's raison d'etre in a 
multitude of ways; in this particular instance, it could serve as a forum for the broad search 
for the truth, a realm of truth-recovery within the limits of healing, a means for pursuing 
some form of retributive or deterrent justice or as a facilitator of long-term healing. ,48 
In what follows, I will further examme some of the implications and consequences of 
Gacaca's for attempts to build the rule of law at community-level (as a means to overcome 
structural violence associated with post-genocide impunity) could be assessed. More 
specifically, I will look at how Gacaca combines retributive and restorative dimensions of 
justice to fashion some sense of accountability suited to addressing the complex crime of 
genocide with its mUltiple levels of accountability - and in so doing helping to ameliorate the 
effects that structural violence inherent in Rwanda's criminal justice system may have on 
brittle communities of victims and perpetrators seeking to reconcile after genocide . 
.. Clarke, 'Hybridity,' 131-134. 
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5.3.3. Combining Restorative and Retributive Justice to build the Rule of Law at 
Community Level 
When the role of Gacaca in Rwanda's communities is evaluated, it should, first of all, be 
remembered that Gacaca was meant as a solution to logistical challenges posed for Rwanda's 
criminal justice system in having to deal with accountability for mass participation in 
genocide. Gacaca was conceived primarily as an answer to the lack of capacity of the 
criminal justice system to deal with the aftermath of genocide. 49 Gacaca was, after all, meant 
to ease the burden on normal courts by dealing with those in detention awaiting trial. At the 
heart of the debate about the legal standing of Gacaca is the question therefore whether the 
Rwandan authorities 'prioritised expediency at the expense of due process and fairness'. 50 
Commentators differ. Waldorf, as we have seen, answered this question in the affirmative 
and for this reason concluded that the Gacaca model is problematic. Other commentators 
such as Clarke, Drumbl and Wierzynska have evaluated the Gacaca process more positively 
as a quasi-judicial strategy to achieve more holistic outcomes than that of an inevitably 
limited number of regular criminal prosecutions. 51 For the same reasons, Sarkin advocated a 
South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Rwanda instead of Gacaca." 
In this section I first look at Gacaca's benefits towards the goal of fighting impunity by 
strengthening the rule of law in its traditional, retributive sense within Rwandan 
communities (as a quasi-legal complement to the national courts). I identify three areas of 
direct benefit - the third of which leads to an analysis of Gacaca's contribution to the rule of 
law through those dimensions of its work more akin to restorative justice. 
Firstly, then, it is hard to argue with the obvious relief that the Gacaca process did provide to 
Rwanda's criminal justice system since it commenced operations. By mid-December 2007, 
Hirondelle reports, around one million people had appeared before Gacaca courts. Some 
800,000 had been convicted, according to the SNJG, the governmental body charged with 
49 See Jeremy Sarkin, 'The Tension Between Justice And Reconciliation In Rwanda - Politics, Human Rights, Due 
Process And The Role Of The Gacaca Courts In Dealing With The Genocide,' Joumol Of African Law 45: 2 (2001): 143-172 
[ElectronicJ. Available at: 
http://journals,cambridge.org.ezproxy. uct.ac zal download php?file-%2FJAL %2FJAL45 02%2FS022185530 1 00 1675a.p 
df&code-ad50c46alb94f8256dc05fe2f9l8880a [January 2008J. 
so Sarkin, 'The Tension Between Justice And Reconciliation In Rwanda,' 164. 
51 Clarke and Drumbl's arguments have already been discussed and Wierzynska's will be analysed in the next 
Earagraph. 
2 Sarkin, 'The Tension Between Justice And Reconciliation In Rwanda,' 166. 
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overseeing these courtS.53 From these statistics alone, it is clear that Gacaca enabled the 
Rwandan criminal justice system to deal with a vast case load of alleged genoddaires and 
accomplices, which it would never have been able to do in a more formal court setting. This, 
I would argue, was a significant contribution towards providing some form of accountability 
for the genocide, involving significant numbers of the population as perpetrators. Without 
this form of accountability, the result would indeed have been a very serious case of effective 
impunity, amounting to an ongoing form of structural violence in Rwanda's criminal justice 
system. 
Secondly, as a state-initiated public process designed, in principle, to achieve accountability, 
Gacaca has undoubted community-level influence. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that, 
despite its structural and procedural shortcomings (the most important of which is that it 
does not prosecute RPF atrocities or war crimes), Gacaca must lead local community 
members to a deepened appreciation of the significance of justice - both in its retributive and 
restorative senses. In this regard, it is relevant that the Gacaca courts have the ability to mete 
out stiff sentences (albeit with an option of appeal to higher courts), but also the possibility 
to reduce or commute these sentences, should the perpetrator show signs of remorse or 
rehabilitation. Mark Osiel has argued that public demonstrations of retributive justice 
through criminal trials may serve significant functions of social and moral education. Osie! 
claims that public criminal trials 'when effective as public spectacle, stimulate public 
discussion in ways that foster the liberal virtues of toleration, moderation, and civil 
respect' .54 Osiel concludes that, despite the obvious dangers of political manipulation, and 
regardless of the procedural shortcomings of a particular process, 'courts in such societies 
might make full use of the public spotlight trained upon them at such times to stimulate 
democratic deliberation about the merits and meaning of liberal principles' .55 It is possible to 
make a similar argument to that of Osiel, about the influence of Gacaca in stimulating 
discourse and discussion about community-level application of accountability for mass 
atrocities, thereby not only fostering a greater grass-roots appreciation for the rule ofIaw, but 
also more social solidarity about these matters across the Hutu and Tutsi divides. 
Sl Hirondelle News Agency, 'Rwanda/Gacaca.' 
S4 Mark Osiel, Mass Atrodty Collective Memory, and the Law (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 
1997). 2. 
~s Osiel, Mass Atrocity, 300. 
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Thirdly, the system of grading accountability for the genocide in different categories with 
different levels and types of punishment attached to them - or what I will term 'stratified 
accountability' -- may produce an increased understanding of the complex relation between 
individual and collective accountability for the genocide. This is the more likely in view of 
the fact that Gacaca traditionally had the role of fmding appropriate ways to mediate 
between individual gUilt and community interest This aspect has not changed in its modem 
incarnation. Gacaca provides communities with an unparalleled opportunity to discuss, 
analyse and make a range of nuanced findings about levels of accountability during the 
genocide, always with an incentive to reintegrate those found guilty, and to pay reparations 
to those who suffered, if at all possible. 
Gacaca has thus succeeded in breaking new ground by implementing a nuanced system 
acknowledging different levels of accountability at community level (according to the 
different categories of crimes as explained earlier)56, thereby fmding ways not only to 
differentiate between the more and the less guilty within the Hutu group, but also to 
reintegrate, through deliberately restorative measures, the less serious and more contrite 
perpetrators back into communities. At the same time it retained the power to punish the 
more serious and less contrite perpetrators harshly. 
From this observation one could therefore conclude with Clarke that Gacaca was able to 
'achieve legal outcomes, especially punishing genocide perpetrators, in ways that facilitate 
important non-legal results, such as rendering a relatively sophisticated understanding of the 
relationship between individual and collective accountability, as well as to set in motion a 
process of beginning to restore fractured individual and communal relationships. The 
dominant discourse lacks an appreciation of this crucial hybrid approach to post-genocide 
accountability. ,57 
The Rwandan authorities, so it seems, accepted the merits of both formal criminal justice 
procedures and more informal quasi-judicial forms of local community justice, and found a 
way to integrate them into one hybrid system. We may note that a growing number of 
commentators point to the need for complementary forms of justice in post-conflict contexts 
and during periods of political transition. Morris, for example, calls for 'stratified-concurrent 
" 
" 
See Section 4.1 
Clarke. 'Hybridity,' 164. 
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jurisdiction', and sees Rwanda as a good example of such an approach. 58 Clarke identifies 
'hybridity' or 'legal pluralism', where 'two or more legal systems coexist in the same social 
field', as an increasingly common theme in transitional justice and post-conflict 
reconstruction. 59 This is because 'hybridity' facilitates 'holism', which provides 'multiple 
political, social and legal institutions, operating concurrently in a system maximising the 
capabilities of each' .60 
The second dimension of Gacaca's transitional justice methods and alms, namely, to 
facilitate processes of restorative justice6 ' stands alongside that of retributive justice. I do not 
propose a protracted discussion on the relative merits or demerits of restorative and 
retributive modes of justice. Suffice to say that an array of institutions and approaches 
covering both restorative and retributive dimensions of justice would be able, at least in 
principle, to contribute better to the reconstruction of the whole society than a single-minded 
focus on retributive justice only. Where perpetrators, victims and bystanders are required to 
live side by side, a strategy that makes provision for the needs for atonement, 'integrative 
shaming' and reintegration (while also catering for punitive needs) is well suited.62 
Gacaca, despite its procedural shortcomings when measured by strictly legal standards, does 
have restorative justice features and functions that benefit communities. 'Criminal trials may 
offer the lure of the easy solution to the complexities of mass atrocity', Drumbl writes, but 
are, on their own, inadequate to address the needs of Rwanda's 'highly interdependent, 
dualist society', which saw such 'widespread level of public participation' in the genocide:' 
Earlier, it was explained that for those perpetrators who show little or no remorse, 
particularly for graver offences such as murder and rape, Gacaca is able to mete out prison 
sentences. However for lesser crimes such as property crimes, or for perpetrators who 
convince the communal gathering that they are remorseful and rehabilitated, the option is 
" 
" 
Morris, 'The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction,' 367. 
As quoted by Clarke, 'Hybridity,' 101. 
60 Clarke, 'Hybridity,' 101 
61 For our purposes, restorative justice comprises a notion of justice that is based on a view of crime, not as the 
transgression of rules, but as the violation of the victim. Consequently, restorative justice's primary aim is not the 
puniShment of the wrongdoer, but the restoration of the dignity of the victim. To this end, restorative justice often entails 
mediation efforts between victims and perpetrators in order to enable victims to reach some form of psychological closure. 
62 Drumbl, 'Punishment, Post·Genocide,' 1323. 
61 Drumbl, 'Punishment, Post·Genocide.' 1323. 
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open of a restorative process where punishment is reduced, or commuted to community 
service (such as helping to build public amenities, for example).64 
Drumbl argues that in view of its effective uses of practices of're-integrative shaming' Gacaca 
may tum out to be more effective than trials in advancing the objectives of post-conflict 
reconciliation. Gacaca is thus, over and above its functions as justice mechanism, also 
interpreted 'as a test-run of reconciliation' .65 Reconciliation here is not interpreted in the 
romantic sense of complete restoration of a relationship between perpetrators and victims, 
but rather as 'practices involving honest, committed encounters with others, not least those 
with whom we disagree most.'66 Engagement, in this sense, where individuals are able to tell 
their stories to one another, and then return to the same community as Rwandan citizens, is 
becoming a critical component of Gacaca as it is being practised. 
It stands to reason that the particular 'mix' of retributive and reconciliatory elements in 
Gacaca would vary across the approximately 12,000 courts, and would be more or less 
appropriate to the conditions in different communities. However, it does also seem that, at 
least in this case, the ability to promote reconciliation (in the sense of reduced sentences and 
reintegration of perpetrators and victims into communities), but without relinquishing the 
option for punishment, provides Gacaca with the ability to adapt its strategy to varying needs 
in different communities. It also enables Gacaca to further a form ofreconciliation that does 
not equal impunity (in that perpetrators face serious consequences if they do not cooperate) 
as well as a form of retribution that does not simply equate to victor's justice (in the sense 
that options exist to fast-track the reintegration of perpetrators into communities). 
5.6. Conclusion 
Judging by international commentary, Gacaca is either lauded as a unique and ground-
breaking model of international significance for transitional justice, or derided as little more 
than an extension of the Rwandan offtcial narrative and its quest to control all levers of 
power in the post-genocide society. On the latter analysis Gacaca would amount to little 
more than another instrument of structural violence, this time in the name of building the 
64 In the session I attended, for example, both the judges and the witnesses consistently asked the accused whether 
he would acknowledge his complicity and whether he was sorry. His failure to do either, the judges eventually remarked, 
largely contributed to his being given the most severe sentence that the law allows. 
" Clarke, 'Hybridity,' 152. 
" As quoted by Clarke, 'Hybridity,' 161. 
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rule of law. On the former analysis, Gacaca may well be the most important milestone yet in 
overcoming structural violence and thus enhancing post-conflict reconciliation. 
My conclusion, a mIX of both sets of analyses, is that Gacaca offers both constructive 
prospects and alarming threats to Rwanda. While effectively countering genocide 
revisionism (with its implied cultural violence), it fails in effectively engaging with Hutu 
histories which can be differentiated from genocidaires ideology. This has negative 
implications for 'reconciliation with history' which must require an encounter between 
opposing histories, To the extent that Gacaca recognises only genocide as a political crime of 
the past, it COnflllIlS the basic tenets of the 'official narrative' and its 'denying-through-
excessive-remembering'. However, to the extent that Gacaca enables genuine community-
level participation and witness testimonies to emerge, it is contributing to the emergence of 
millions of 'little narratives', which have the potential to make a strong impact on any 
hegemonic claims which the 'official narrative' may harbour. 
Based on this discussion, we can further conclude that the failure to address cnmes 
committed by the RPF, as well as procedural deficiencies, are important shortcomings of 
Gacaca. However, I do not agree that we should reject Gacaca altogether since the structural 
violence associated with impunity (in not prosecuting genocide at community level) would 
be greater than these logistical and procedural shortcomings. Moreover, a strictly legalistic 
assessment of Gacaca fails to take account of equally valid social and political considerations 
(a point to which I return more fully below). However, the failure of Gacaca to address RPF 
crimes has a serious impact on its ability to overcome structural violence, replacing impunity 
with the 'ethnicization of guilt'. 
At the same time this is not the whole story regarding Gacaca's potential impact on the quest 
to overcome structural violence. It can also be concluded that Gacaca serves as a way to 
strengthen and expand justice and accountability capacities through alternative means, which includes 
quasi1udicial processes. It does so by providing ways to expedite judicial proceedings and in 
the process freeing up courts of law to focus on common-law crimes instead - and doing so 
through proceedings with undoubted community-level impact. In restorative terms, Gacaca 
provides an elaborate system not only to determine levels of accountability, but also levels of 
contrition and remorse, thereby opening the possibility for radical reduction in punishment 
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and speedier reintegration of perpetrators into communities. Given the scope and nature of 
genocide violence, simply leaving communities to work it out for themselves, would have 
been tantamount to the entrenchment of existing forms of structural violence thereby paving 
the way for future rounds of direct violence. Something had to be done to render 
genocidaires accountable. Gacaca, though flawed in some respects, offered this opportunity 
and in this way, constituted a step towards the eradication of structural violence. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Rwanda is seeking to overcome the impact of the 1994 genocide and other mass killings 
through a comprehensive and an innovative set of transitional justice measures. This study 
provided an account and a critical analysis of these measures with a focus on the key 
objective for transitional justice, i.e. that of post-conflict reconciliation. The question 
therefore was: to what extent are Rwanda's transitional justice programmes improving the 
chances for post-genocide reconciliation conceived not only as 'negative peace' but rather as 
'positive peace' involving also the removal of underlying conditions of cultural and 
structural violence, more specifically in such areas as that of dealing with conflicting 
versions of the past and establishing the rule oflaw? 
As a critical analysis of Rwanda's approach to post-genocide transitional justice and 
reconciliation the study had to take account of Rwanda's own distinctive objectives and 
features without however necessarily endorsing these. In important respects Rwanda's 
domestic approach to transitional justice differs from the prevailing consensus in 
international human rights discourse and law. For that reason the study did not deal with 
the proceedings of the ICTR which are more closely associated with the international 
approach to transitional justice and human rights. On the other hand, this did not mean that 
the Rwandan approach to domestic transitional justice was analysed and assessed in relation 
to its own stated objectives only. 
Building on Galtung's otion of 'positive peace', I developed a set of norms by which to 
assess Rwanda's transitional justice processes in terms of their contribution towards 
reconciliation. This was done by conceptualising reconciliation as the removal of lingering 
(or new) forms of structural and cultural violence in a post-conflict society. This was further 
explored in terms of Mamdani's notion of the need for 'reconciliation with history'. By 
contrast, Rwanda's 'official narrative' views reconciliation not as the removal of cultural and 
structural violence as such, but as the reconfiguration of racial and ethnic identities within a 
common framework of national belonging. Within this framework, the Rwandan objectives 
include the rebuilding of a strong state, based on a shared view of the past and its own 
conception of the rule of law, which may, or may not, adhere to international human rights 
norms and standards. On the basis of its high workload and the number of cases it has been 
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able to process, the government of Rwanda claims that the Gacaca process has been a 
success. 67 
My assessment of the implications and consequences of Rwanda's transitional justice 
measures, mainly Gacaca, therefore took into account both the extent ot which these 
succeeded in countering structural violence in terms of the culture of impunity as well as the 
extent to which it succeeded in countering lingering forms of cultural violence (or 
contributed to new forms of cultural violence) with a view to the prospects for effecting 
'reconciliation with history'. 
My aim was to develop a normative framework that would take into account the need for 
both accountability and reconciliation in a post-genocide society. Galtung and Mamdani's 
distinctions helped in this regard. The resultant framework, conceptualised in terms of 
cultural and structural violence, overlaps with the international human rights standards in so 
far as the objective of establishing the rule of law is concerned. At the same time it expands 
this consensus in terms of incorporating reconciliatory Irestorative aims. It also deepens the 
prevailing norms and standards, to the extent that it addresses, not only direct and structural 
violence, but also the mind-set, perceptions and belief systems which feed into, and 
constitute, cultural violence. Cultural vi lence is not frequently addressed within the 
frameworks of international human rights analyses, and it is also typically not recognised as 
an area of transitional justice. In this regard my own approach makes some contribution to 
developing an adequate normative framework against which to judge Rwanda's transitional 
justice measures aimed at post-conflict reconciliation, not only when measured against those 
standards developed by Rwanda itself, or by comparison to the framework offered by 
international human rights discourses in general but also in terms of these substantive 
components of a more holistic 'reconciliation with history'. 
6.1. The Rwandan Approach to Transitional Justice and Cultural Violence 
In what ways did the Rwandan approach to transitional justice including the Gacaca 
hearings succeed in promoting 'reconciliation with history'? Our analysis found that 
transitional justice processes in Rwanda operate within the confmes of this 'Rwandan narrative', 
namely, the reconfiguration of ethnic and racial identities prevalent during the genocide 
67 IRlN, 'RWANDA: Reconciliation still a major challenge.' 
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within a framework of national belonging. A notable feature in this regard was identified as 
both the official narrative as well as Gacaca's exclusive focus on genocide to the exclusion of 
other political atrocities. Just as the 'official narrative' conceives of the genocide in terms of 
Tutsi victims only, Gacaca in practice likewise excludes other (non-Tutsi) victims of mass 
killings, including possible Hutu cases. In this way, one important dimension of lingering 
cultural violence in Rwanda, namely the 'ethnicisation of guilt', is bolstered rather than 
challenged by both the official narrative and the Gacaca process through partisan avoidance 
of addressing RPF atrocities. To the extent that the official narrative as well as Gacaca serves 
to solidify the notion that to be Tutsi is to be a victim, and to be Hutu is to be a perpetrator, 
to that extent does this serve to consolidate the legacy of cultural violence. Historical 
frameworks that ascribes the guilt of the genocide to one ethnic group exclusively saddles all 
Hutus in the current post-genocide society with the immense historical burden of standing 
accused of having supported, if not commited, genocide. By strengthening the official 
narrative in this way, Gacaca will also lead to the sidelining of other historical perspectives, a 
feature that would further impede 'reconciliation with history'. 
Yet, on the other hand and despite this important flaw, I also found that even within the 
ambit of the official narrative Gacaca is likely to counter cultural violence by acting as a 
powerful rebuttal, at a macro level, to 'genocide denialism', through the recording of victim 
and perpetrator narratives. Genocide denial constitute a form of cultural violence. To give 
victims the chance to have their narratives recorded - albeit as witnesses in the trials of 
perpetrators - and perpetrators to record their versions of the events is to create an archive 
that should limit the potential of 'genocide denialism' and its attendant forms of cultural 
violence from attracting any following in Rwanda. Despite Gacaca being framed by the 
official genocide macro-narrative, these 1ittle narratives' at the Gacaca hearings may thus be 
able to provide independently effective testimonies of the genocide mass killings. It is the 
weight of the cumulative 'little narratives' that could serve as an effective counter to 
revisionist 'genocide-denialism' and the attendant forms of cultural violence; it may also 
prevent these from serving as legitimations for renewed cycles of violence in Rwanda. In this 
way, the official narrative, as well as Gacaca, may have produced both intended and 
unintended consequences. Although it was surely the intention for transitional justice to 
involve the public, the extent to which this participation would serve to bolster a more open 
discourse about the past, could be construed as unintended. It could indeed be argued that 
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Gacaca was probably intended to function as a forum also for entrenching the official 
narrative at local community level. But by allowing testimonies at grass roots level the 
proliferation of "little narratives" may serve the unintended consequence of actually 
countering the thrust of the macro-narrative. 
This broadening of public participation in interpreting the past, I found, would inevitably 
highlight a range of experiences, perspectives and patterns of identification within both the 
Hutu and Tutsi groups. This important, if unintended, consequence of Gacaca could counter, 
in ways set out above, cultural violence contained within Rwanda's 'official narrative' - in 
ways yet unforeseen. 
6.2. The Rwandan Approach to Transitional Justice and 'Structural Violence' 
In holding genocidaires accountable, Rwanda went one step further than holding perpetrators 
accountable in courts of law. Not only did it, together with the ICTR, seek to prosecute the 
genocidaires leadership, but through Gacaca the process was taken to rural communities 
which, previously, would not have enjoyed any significant level of access to justice. 
That Rwanda's transitional justice processes of bringing the genocidaires to justice both at 
the ICTR and through Gacaca indeed helped to eradicate a culture of impunity as a form of 
structural violence, is difficult to dispute. At different levels these prosecutions served to re-
establish albeit in compromised (quasi-judicial) form in the case of Gacaca. Yet, they also 
contributed to the continuation of structural violence through the very attempts to overcome 
it. Although Rwanda categorise transitional justice participants in human rights terms, and 
not in the ethnic or racial terms of past divisions, I found that the historical framework 
offered by the Rwandan 'official narrative' introduced a danger of the 'ethnicisation of guilt'. 
What happens to the rule oflaw in a context marked by an 'official narrative' that runs the 
risk of perpetuating a systematic 'ethnicisation of guilt'? Can, in such circumstances, the 
form and substance of laws be separated? Transitional justice's role, in such a context, begs 
careful scrutiny. Negatively, it may serve to legitimise forms of structural violence in the 
judiciary, not least by strengthening the formal judicial capacity without enhancing a 
substantive commitment to human rights. The consequences may be observed in the work 
of Gacaca, where transitional justice terminology relevant to the fair administration of justice 
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is subtly loaded with meaning relevant to past ethnic categories - i.e. 'victim' equals 'Tutsi' 
and 'perpetrator' equals 'Hutu'. 
Gacaca not only suffered from the 'ethnicisation of guilt', but also from important logistical 
shortcomings posing a threat to the fairness of its operations and a lack of an effective policy 
of reparations for victims. However, despite these shortcomings, and against a commentator 
like Waldorf, I would argue that Gacaca is still considerably 'better than nothing'. 
Demonstrating community-level accountability is essential for reconciliation within the 
brittle conditions of post-genocide co-existence and co-dependence. Although some 
procedural criticisms are indeed valid, many others would fall away if Gacaca is adequately 
understood, not in terms of international judicial standards, but as deliberately quasi-judicial 
in order to integrate retributive and reconciliatory aims at community-level on a national 
scale. 
Furthermore, as an exercise in retributive justice, Gacaca contributed to the overcoming of 
structural violence through the law in three distinct ways: by providing relief to an 
overburdened judicial system in its astounding ability to handle large numbers of cases, by 
extending access to genocide justice to community level (thUS expanding judicial capacity 
through quasi-judicial means) and thirdly, by implementing a sophisticated system of 
'stratified accountability', that not only provided for an understanding of the nuanced and 
complex grades of accountability for genocide crimes, but in doing so, also offered a way for 
the less serious criminals to be reintegrated into communities. Gacaca provided a way to 
strengthen and expand justice and accountability capacities through alternative means, 
which includes quasi-judicial processes. 
The fact that Gacaca offers, in addition to the benefits listed above, the ability to balance 
retributive and restorative elements provides it with considerable flexibility in order to meet 
diverse needs in relation to building the rule of law (varying from 'reintegrative shaming' to 
incarceration or community service) in thousands of communities across Rwanda where 
victims and perpetrators continue to live together. There are indications that this flexibility 
has enabled Gacaca to develop a form of accountability uniquely adapted to the complex task 
of building community-level accountability after genocide. 
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